1 UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICE MARCH 2002The purpose of these guidelines is to provide guidance on good practice for the design of FPSOs inthe UKCS. These Guidance Notes are not a substitute for current statutory regulations.___________________________________________________________________R M OFFSHORE LTD. PROJECT REVIEWS LTD.R.W.Marshall, S.L.Smith,7 Ewing Walk, 4 West Lennox Drive,Milngavie, Helensburgh,Glasgow G62 6EG G84 9AD0141 956 5643 01436 670243RRMOFFSHORE@aol.com slsmith.redholm@btinternet.com2UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTESFOR UKCS SERVICECONTENTS LISTINTRODUCTIONPART 1: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING FPSOSELECTION AND DESIGN1.1 LOCATION & ENVIRONMENT1.2 FPSO FUNCTION AND FIELD LIFE1.3 LAYOUT1.4 WEIGHT AND SPACE1.5 VESSEL SELECTION1.6 VESSEL MOTIONS1.7 CREW SIZE AND ACCOMMODATION1.8 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK1.9 CODES AND STANDARDS1.10 HEALTH SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENTPART 2: MARINE & STRUCTURAL2.1 INTRODUCTION2.2 HULL CONFIGURATION2.3 LOADS2.4 PRIMARY HULL STRUCTURE2.5 GREEN WATER2.6 BOW WAVE IMPACT32.7 SLOSHING IN CARGO TANKS2.8 COLLISION DAMAGE2.9 STRUCTURAL / PRODUCTION FACILITIES INTERFACE2.10 HULL DEFLECTION PATTERNS2.11 MOTION BEHAVIOUR2.12 MODEL TANK TESTING2.13 TURRET INTERFACES2.14 MOORINGS2.15 CRUDE OIL EXPORT2.16 BALLAST SYSTEMS2.17 THRUSTERS2.18 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONSPART 3: PRODUCTION FACILITIES3.1 INTRODUCTION3.2 FRONT END ENGINEERING3.3 HYDROCARBON AND NON-HYDROCARBON SYSTEMS:CONTINGENT FACTORS3.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIES3.5 GLOBAL LAYOUT: DEVELOPMENT FACTORS3.6 LOCAL LAYOUT: DEVELOPMENT FACTORS3.7 FPSO MAJOR SYSTEMS INCLUDING INTEGRATION/ SEGREGATION3.8 FPSO SMALL UTILITY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMSREFERENCES4UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEINTRODUCTIONPURPOSE AND OBJECTIVESIn the course of the Review of the Rules and Regulations for Floating Installations ofthree Classification Societies, UKOOA Study FPSO JIP 00/01 (ref 1) carried out by RMOffshore Ltd and Project Reviews Ltd, it became apparent that there is currently nosingle design guidance document or set of documents available to owners, operators anddesigners of FPSOs for UKCS service which is FPSO specific.Classification Society Rules cover a variety of floating installations including drillingrigs, semi-submersibles, TLPs and SPARs and there is, inevitably, frequent crossreference to their rules for the classification of ships. Because FPSOs are ship shaped,the tendency is for designers to approach the design of an FPSO as though it is primarilya ship with production facilities as cargo. An FPSO is a floating offshore production andstorage facility which happens to be ship shaped. Therefore there has to be a change inthe approach to its design to ensure that it is considered as a single integrated entity, as isthe case for a fixed jacket installation.The major recommendation of the above study was that UKOOA should develop its ownDesign Guidance Notes for FPSOs to draw the attention of owners, operators anddesigners to the particular requirements of FPSOs, especially those operating in the harshenvironment of the UKCS. The narrative of these Guidance Notes will in the firstinstance assist owners and operators in the early stages of a project, following theselection of an FPSO concept. It will also be of value to designers during front-endengineering and in the early stages of detailed design.The input to UKOOA study FPSO JIP 00/01 was obtained from owners, operators,designers, constructors and consultants involved in FPSO developments. A number ofcommon themes emerged where problems had been encountered in design, build andoperation. These can be considered as Lessons Learned and have therefore beenincorporated in these Guidance Notes in the hope that the problems will be avoided infuture projects.Both UKOOA and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have commissioned studiesand issued a range of reports that are relevant to FPSO design and operation. Some ofthese reports are referred to in the Guidance Notes. It is recommended that FPSOowners, designers and operators familiarise themselves with the listings of UKOOA andthe HSE to identify relevant topics and thereby ensure that findings and recommendationscan be adopted, where appropriate.5The Design Guidance Notes have been divided into three parts. Part 1 covers the generalconsiderations influencing FPSO selection and design. In Part 2 (Marine and Structural)and Part 3 (Production Facilities), specific issues are addressed in more detail, providinga lead-in to the detailed design of the FPSO.LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONSThe Design Guidance Notes should not be considered either as a detailed design guide oras a form of textbook on FPSO design. Neither are they a substitute for current statutoryregulations that prevail in the UKCS. The Guidance Notes are not intended to replace the rules and regulations of theClassification Societies. They recognise that the Societies rules play a valuable role insetting out good engineering practice gained over many years. Although an FPSO in theUKCS does not have to be classed by law, these rules still provide a wide coverage of theissues that have to be addressed to ensure the safety, operability and longevity of theFPSO.The design of FPSOs involves the use of a large range of national and international laws,standards, codes of practice and specifications and so Guidance Notes, by definition, canrefer selectively to only a very small number of these.A field development using an FPSO involves subsea facilities, flowlines, risers, shuttletankers and/ or export pipelines. While the Guidance Notes make references to thesebecause of interfaces between them and the FPSO installation, guidance on these topics isoutwith the scope of these Guidance Notes.In the execution of a project, it is impossible to divorce the engineering of the facilityfrom the management of the project itself. Project management decisions can have bothbeneficial and disruptive influences on technical decisions and on the progress ofengineering. The Guidance Notes do not attempt in any way to set out projectmanagement guidelines. However, where appropriate, the Notes do indicatecircumstances where informed and timely project management involvement can result ina more satisfactory technical and, possibly, commercial outcome.6UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 1GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING FPSO SELECTIONAND DESIGNCONTENTS LIST1.1 LOCATION & ENVIRONMENT1.2 FPSO FUNCTION AND FIELD LIFE1.2.1 Introduction1.2.2 FPSO Hull Sizing1.2.3 Sizing of Production Facilities1.3 LAYOUT1.3.1 Introduction1.3.2 Turret1.3.3 Living quarters1.3.4 Helideck1.3.5 Escape and Evacuation1.3.6 Flares, Exhausts and Vents1.3.7 Wind Tunnel Testing1.4 WEIGHT AND SPACE1.4.1 Weight control1.4.2 Space control1.5 VESSEL SELECTION1.5.1 Selection factors1.6 VESSEL MOTIONS1.6.1 Human Response1.6.2 Effect on Equipment1.6.3 Helicopter operations1.6.4 Model tank testing71.7 CREW SIZE AND ACCOMMODATION1.7.1 Basis for Crew Sizing1.7.2 Accommodation Facilities1.8 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK1.9 CODES AND STANDARDS1.9.1 International Codes and Standards1.9.2 Use of Classification Societies' Rules1.9.3 Client and Classification Society Roles1.10 HEALTH SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT1.10.1 Introduction1.10.2 Design for Safety1.10.3 Design for Health1.10.4 Design for the Environment8UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 1GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING FPS0 SELECTIONAND DESIGN1.1 LOCATION & ENVIRONMENTFPSO-based developments in UKCS now number fourteen and these are located in arange of water depths from 70m in central N Sea to 450m West of Shetlands. Possiblefuture developments in the Faeroes-Shetland trough could take the water depth to1,000m. These extreme water depths introduce the challenges of designing cost-effectivemooring and flexible riser systems which will freely allow vessel motion in waves butconstrain riser top-end displacements within its design limitations.The design of FPSOs in UKCS is also highly governed by the harsh environment. Thisinfluences: Requirement for a turret mooring to allow the FPSO toweathervane and minimise environmental loads on themooring system. Selection of suitable hull size and form with good motioncharacteristics. Freeboard Production facilities design to minimise motion downtime. Hull size to provide adequate buffer storage to minimiseshuttle tanker offloading downtime. Hull structure design (strength and fatigue) Environmental performance Marine installation design and proceduresAn additional important requirement is the desirability for the FPSO to remain on stationfor the duration of field life, without dry-docking for inspection, maintenance or repair.This is because of potential difficulties in riser and mooring disconnection andreconnection in the harsh environment and the economic penalty of lost or deferredproduction. This is especially important for long field life FPSOs with high productionthroughput and complex riser systems.Service in the NW Atlantic region of UKCS places even higher demands on FPSOdesign. The more onerous wave climate imposes higher hull loads and requires extensiveupgrading of existing hulls to achieve strength and fatigue performance. The fatiguerequirement, in particular, coupled with the problem of in-situ repair, strongly encouragesthe use of new-build custom-designed vessels for this area.91.2 FPSO FUNCTION AND FIELD LIFE1.2.1 IntroductionThe function of an FPSO is determined by the type and quantities of the fluids that it hasto process and export, and by the storage requirements for its crude oil product. The sizeof the reservoir, in terms of recoverable reserves and its producibility, will influence boththe size of production facilities and the time the FPSO will be in the field. The exportroute will generally determine the storage capacity of the FPSO. However, when an existing vessel as opposed to a new, purpose-built vessel is consideredfor a specific development application, it may well be that the storage capacity, theavailable deck space and load bearing capabilities along with the remaining fatigue life ofthe hull will determine the function and the field life.The two following sections on the sizing of the hull and on the sizing of the productionfacilities identify the principal issues for consideration by FPSO owners, operators anddesigners in selecting a suitable unit to develop a field.1.2.2 FPSO Hull SizingThe main drivers for hull sizing are:Crude oil storageFor new-build custom designed FPSOs, hull size is driven usually by the crude oilstorage requirement. This is sized on the peak oil production rate and is sufficient tocover the shuttle tanker cycle time between each offloading. The cycle time comprises: Loading time at field Sailing time to/from port (including weather delay en-route) Port discharge duration Connect/disconnect times to FPSO Waiting on weather time to cope with a specified winter storm. This is dependent onthe wave height and wind speed thresholds for connection and disconnection.Other practical factors may influence the crude storage volume. For instance, if theshuttle tanker is part of a pool arrangement with a common size of tanker, the FPSOstorage can be the same volume, to avoid the shuttle tanker sailing with part-filled tanksor leaving part of the parcel behind. For high throughput fields, it may be more economical to provide additional shuttletanker(s) to give more frequent offloading during peak production, instead of enlargingcrude oil storage on the FPSO. Towards the end of field life, when production rates have10declined, the frequency of shuttle tanker offloading can be reduced and it may beeconomic to have a pool arrangement with other fields for sharing shuttle tankerutilisation and operating costs.Hull sizing should also provide sufficient segregated ballast capacity to ensure adequateballast draft to avoid bottom slamming forward and provide required sea-keepingperformance and stability.On converted tankers, it is usually not possible to obtain a tanker that matches theoptimum crude storage requirements outlined above. If the selected tanker has less thanthe required storage volume, the shuttle tanker offloading frequency can be increasedduring peak production, and vice-versa where storage is greater than required. Tankersthat are greatly oversized for their FPSO role will have a cost penalty in heaviermoorings.Where crude oil is exported via pipeline or there is a separate FSU, there is no need forcrude oil storage unless some buffer storage is specified to cover outage of the pipeline orFSU. The hull size can be reduced commensurate with a reduction in crude oil storage,provided there is sufficient deck space for production facilities and adequate sea-keepingperformance.Deck spaceHulls sized for the crude oil storage requirement provide adequate deck space for deckmounted production facilities for small/medium-sized fields. On large throughputFPSOs, where production facilities may be complicated with water injection and gasprocessing, the hull may not be large enough to provide enough deck space for aworkable single-level PAU layout with adequate lay-down area and future tie-in space.For new-builds, it may be economically attractive to increase hull size rather thanconstrain topsides deck area. Availability of tanker hulls for conversionThe size of converted tankers is governed by the availability of suitable tanker hulls forconversion. The technical criteria are: Structural condition and fatigue design Reasonable size to minimise cost of mooring system in harsh environment Adequate crude storage and ballast capacity with appropriate tank layout tominimise sloshing Adequate deck space and payloadTo obtain a suitable hull, it may be necessary to compromise on a non-optimum size ofvessel for a particular field. The most suitable size for UKCS service has historicallybeen in the range 92,000 - 105,000 dwt, irrespective of oil production throughput.11Sea-keeping performanceGood sea-keeping performance is important in the harsh environment to ensure: Crew safety and operability High production uptime Reliable helicopter operation Riser top-end motion is within limits Sea-keeping is a function of size and shape of vessel.Generally, conventional hull shapes can be expected, from experience, to give goodmotion performance with minimal production facility downtime provided attention ispaid to motion sensitive facilities (separator design, gas turbines etc.) Small or novel hull forms require detailed examination of their motion characteristics atan early design stage.1.2.3 Sizing of Production FacilitiesThe key factors which influence the main deck load which the FPSO has to carry in theform of production facilities are: The number of major systems Reservoir characteristics Choice of export route Single or twin production trains Possible redeployment on another, different fieldMajor systemsThe main systems which will have a significant bearing on the size and configuration ofthe FPSOs production facilities are: Crude oil separation Gas processing (dehydration and compression) and possible export Produced water treatment and handling including re-injection Seawater treatment and injection Crude oil export via shuttle tanker or pipeline Main power generation i.e. size and numbers of unitsReservoir characteristicsAs stated above, field reservoir characteristics have a major influence and the facilitiesdesigner therefore needs to have good quality information on:12 Production profiles for oil, gas and produced water Likely duration of the production plateau i.e. flat or peaked Potential for and timing of future satellite reservoir development whichmight extend plateau production Reservoir pressure and extent of reservoir pressure support to determine amountof water and gas re-injection. Gas-oil ratio and possible requirement for gas lift Properties of produced fluids e.g. wax content, sourness, viscosity, specificgravity Fluid arrival temperatures at the FPSOWater injection support may be needed early in advance of significant quantities ofproduced water being available for re-injection. In this case, seawater treatment facilitiessuch as de-aeration units will have to be sized accordingly.High confidence levels in reservoir data and predicted performance are desirable to: minimise the possibility of late design changes and hence their impact on projectschedule and budget reduce the risk of production constraints due to systems or equipment beingsubject to conditions for which they were not originally designed.However, FPSOs may also be used in areas of low reservoir confidence as short-termproduction systems to improve reservoir understanding and prepare for an optimisedlong-term production system.Export SystemThe choice of crude oil export system will also influence facility sizing in that not onlywill flow rates to a pipeline and a shuttle tanker be different but also the levels ofseparation in the oil processing train to achieve the different crude oil specifications foreach route. In the case of heavy, viscous or waxy crudes, low fluid arrival temperaturesmay require extensive heating facilities involving, among other items, waste heatrecovery units on gas turbine drivers.Single or Dual Production TrainsThe FPSO owner has also to decide if the production profiles require single or dual trainsof crude oil separation and of gas compression. The owner has to weigh up the loss ofrevenue arising from a protracted outage of a single 100% production stream against theadditional cost associated with the provision of two 50% streams. Should a single production stream be chosen then a judicious selection of sparedequipment within the train has to be made in order to ensure as high a level of system13availability as possible. Suitably sized test separation facilities can be utilised to give adegree of spareage as well as well as affording more efficient management of the wells.RedeploymentWhere the FPSO is to used on a field with a short field life of, say, five to seven years,the owner has to decide whether to design the production facilities for that field life or tomake provision for the possible redeployment of the FPSO to another reservoir, inanother location. In such cases, perceived potential marketing opportunities may welldetermine facilities configuration, the extent of in-built flexibility to process a range offluid types, and production rates and space and weight provisions for the addition ofmodules or extra piecemeal equipment.141.3 LAYOUT1.3.1 IntroductionThe layout of an FPSO will probably depend on whether the vessel is a new, purpose-built vessel or a new intercept vessel or an existing unit. With a new, purpose built vesselthe designer has two main decisions to make which will influence the overall layout,namely the position of the living quarters and the position of the turret. In the case of anexisting vessel, there is probably only one decision to be made namely the location of theturret as the living quarters will have already been fixed.The following sections consider the principal issues which affect layout. First andforemost, the main considerations are those of the safety of the crew and of reducing theirexposure to the hazards encountered on an offshore installation storing and processinghydrocarbons. Whatever configuration is used, the scale of the hazards reduces towardsthe living quarters, the temporary refuge and the principal points of evacuation.1.3.2 TurretAll turret/swivel positions in UKCS are internal to the hull to minimise accelerations onflexible risers, for structural support of the turret, protection of the swivel andaccessibility for maintenance.There is a choice of turret position:a) ForwardA forward location provides natural weathervaning of FPSO with use of minimal or nothruster power. This is the more common system in UKCS and is used on vessels with ahigh-pressure swivel which permits unrestricted rotation. A forward turret is structurally preferable as it is removed from the central highly stressedpart of the hull and less longitudinal reinforcement is needed. This is especiallyimportant on converted tankers.The acceptability of riser top-end motions and accelerations needs to be checked at anearly stage for forward turrets because of the high combined heave and pitch verticalmotions close to the bow.b) Just forward of amidships This location requires vessels with substantial thruster power to control weathervaning.Where this type of turret is used, the vessel has a wind-on system of high pressuretransfer hoses which permit rotation of approximately 270 degrees before the systemmust be unwound.15The turret opening close to amidships introduces major structural reinforcement problemson a converted vessel but is more easily incorporated at the design stage on a new-buildvessel.1.3.3 Living quartersOn converted vessels, the existing LQ is usually retained in its aft position. On a new-build vessel, the LQ position is largely determined by the position of the turret.For forward turrets, the LQ is placed at the stern to maximise the separation between theLQ and the major hazards of the swivel and the production facilities.For amidships turrets, the LQ is placed at the bow upwind of the major hazards. Theacceptability of motions for crew and helicopter operability should be checked at an earlystage in the design because of the high combined heave and pitch vertical motions at thebow.The advantages and disadvantages of each position are as follows:Position of LQ Advantages DisadvantagesForward LQ/helideck is upwind ofmajor hazards and fire orsmoke in an emergency High vertical motion at bowmay affect crew comfort andhelicopter operations. Natural weathervaning ofFPSO is difficult to achievewithout placing HP swivelclose to LQ. An amidships turret achievesseparation between LQ andHP swivel but requiressubstantial thruster power toweathervane the FPSO.Aft Reduced vertical motion(compared to bow) for crewcomfort and helicopteroperations. Natural weathervaning ofFPSO can be achieved withoutthrusters. Large separation of LQ fromHP swivel. LQ/helideck is downwind ofmajor hazards and fire orsmoke in an emergency.However thrusters could beused to rotate FPSO clear offire/smoke and create a leeside for lifeboats.161.3.4 HelideckHelideck design should meet the requirements of UK CAA CAP 437 Offshore HelicopterLanding Areas: A Guide to Criteria, Recommended Minimum Standards and BestPractice (ref.2). The siting of helidecks on FPSOs will generally be above the livingquarters for logistics and safety reasons, and will therefore be at the forward or aft end ofthe FPSO. The positioning of the helideck should take account of the wind environmentaround the FPSO, particularly turbulence, vertical component of wind velocity and hotgas plumes from flares or turbine exhausts, both at the helideck and on the approaches.The height of the helideck and the air gap between it and the living quarters below shouldensure as clean a flow of air as possible and should be determined using wind tunneltesting.Helideck layout should allow for either parking of a broken-down helicopter or platformcraneage should have helideck coverage and capacity to permit helicopter removal. Design for operations is covered by UKOOA - The Management of Offshore HelideckOperations 1.27, 1997 (ref.3).1.3.5 Escape and EvacuationEscapeDuring layout development studies of the FPSO main and production decks the locationof the main or primary escape routes from these areas to the living quarters and theTemporary Refuge (TR) can have a major influence on the overall layout.In the case of a large FPSO with substantial production facilities covering the main deck,the free open deck area may be considerably smaller than on a large vessel with smallproduction capacity. It is therefore important to assess the escape route requirements at avery early stage to ensure that rapid escape from the more congested areas is notcompromised.One or more escape tunnels can be used to provide direct, protected access from theprocess and utility areas on the main deck into the TR, usually located in the livingquarters. The escape tunnel has to be sized to take account of the range of crediblescenarios of major incidents and the personnel likely to be involved. The tunnel shouldbe capable of withstanding credible explosions and fires to permit personnel to escapewithin a defined time and to allow fire-fighting and rescue crews to gain access if andwhen it is deemed prudent to undertake these activities. The position of the tunnel will be determined by the fire and explosion scenarios but it ismost likely to be on the outside edge of the main deck running the length of theproduction facilities, as a minimum, and possibly the entire length of the main deck. It isunlikely to be located within the production areas unless safety studies indicate17otherwise. The tunnel may be totally enclosed and positively pressurised or it may beopen on the seaward side.There will be intermediate access points from production and utilities areas into thetunnel and layout studies must ensure that the access into these access points is as directas possible and clear of obstructions.The principles of direct, unobstructed escape access apply equally to enclosed areas in thehull, (i.e. the bow section and in the aft machinery spaces or in any superstructure), to theproduction areas and to the main decks where the congestion factors due to cargo tankpipe-work will be greater.Attention should be given to secondary escape routes which may have to be used ifprimary routes are not available. Both primary and secondary routes should be providedwith clear route markings.EvacuationThe main evacuation methods from the FPSO will be via helicopter, subject to proximityand availability of helicopter services and to weather conditions, or via lifeboat. Theaccess requirements to the helideck are set out in CAA guidelines CAP 437 (ref.2).Whether a freefall or a davitlaunched TEMPSC is chosen, lifeboat access will be closeto the TR. Covered access may or may not be provided depending on the outcome of firescenario studies with input from the wind tunnel tests.Consideration has also to be given to secondary means of evacuation such as liferafts orother proprietary methods in situations where it may not be possible for personnel to gainaccess to or be able to use the escape tunnel. The position of and access to thesesecondary evacuation points must be included in the overall layout development studies.1.3.6 Flares, Exhausts and VentsFlaresThe position of the flare structure will be determined largely by the position of the livingquarters. A bow-mounted living quarters will give rise to a stern mounted flare and viceversa. Once a location has been selected, account will have to be taken of the flare stackin relation to the main flare headers and knockout drums to achieve satisfactory pressuredrops in the flare system.The height of the stack will be chosen after careful consideration of flare radiation levelsand the recommended human exposure guidelines. Those given in Section 44.6 (ThermalRadiation) of the now defunct Department of Energys Offshore Installations: Guidanceon Design, Construction and Certification Fourth Edition-1990 (ref 4) are still valid. Theradiation levels on adjacent structures and equipment will also have to be taken into18account. The potential for liquid carry over and ignited droplets should also beconsidered to avoid the occurrence of flaming rain and its fall out on production areas.The flare structure will probably also carry a low pressure hydrocarbon atmospheric vent,discharging at an intermediate point up the structure. The interaction of the plume fromthe vent outlet with surrounding structures and work places has to be considered in anylayout assessment. The risk of ignition of the plume by the flare in still air conditions hasalso to be checked. The outputs from wind tunnel test should be used. ExhaustsThe exhausts which dominate the main deck skyline are those from the main turbo-generators and from any gas turbine drivers used on compressor trains. Although fixingthe location of the turbines themselves may be straightforward, the routing of ducting andselection of the final discharge location may not be as simple. Turbines providing mainelectrical power will be located in the least hazardous area of the main deck. Where theliving quarters are aft, the generators will be relatively near and so the hot exhausts couldhave an adverse interaction with the helideck. Wind tunnel tests will assist in theselection of the optimal location of the exhaust outlet.In the case of a vessel conversion, the existing in-deck generators may be retained toprovide main power. Again the routing and the discharge points of these exhausts haveto be carefully considered to avoid interactions with adjacent structures and work areas.VentsIn addition to the atmospheric vent discussed above, the other large vent discharge pointto be considered is that of the cargo tank venting system. This can be incorporated intothe main flare structure but may discharge at some intermediate elevated location alongthe main deck. The wind tunnel test programme should include a check on the maintanks vent outlet. Still air conditions should also be taken into account.1.3.7 Wind Tunnel TestingWind tunnel testing of a scale model of the FPSO will allow the designer to visualise theflow patterns of air, smoke, gas, hot and cold flare plumes, turbine exhausts and coldvents over and around the principal structures on the main deck. A comprehensiveprogramme of tests covering a wide range of wind speeds and direction will usuallyaddress: air flows around the helideck to establish safe limits of operation air flows around the flare structure, turret and turbine inlet and exhaust support structures to detect possible vortex shedding19 smoke and gas dispersion within and around deck modules, around escaperoutes, lifeboat and life raft embarkation stations, air inlets of turbines andHVAC units areas of low air circulation within modules for possible build up of gasand other fumes hot plume flows from flares and turbine and other engine exhausts andtheir effect on the helideck, other elevated work areas e.g. turret/swiveland adjacent equipment dispersion of discharges from cold vents or the flare following a flame-outWind tunnel tests may be used in conjunction with appropriate computational fluiddynamics programmes to complement the outputs of such programmes. Still airconditions should also be examined to assess the dispersion of lazy plumes.There are several establishments in the UK and in Europe which can undertake testingand their past experience in testing both fixed and floating offshore structures willprovide a guide to the best scale of model to be used and the wind tunnel with the mostappropriate characteristics. Further guidance can be found in section 6 of HSE reportOTO 00:123, Review of Model Testing Requirements for FPSOs (ref 50).201.4 WEIGHT AND SPACE1.4.1 Weight controlFPSO weight is dominated by the weight of the crude storage and hull steel weight.Production equipment represents only a small proportion, typically 5-7% of totaldisplacement, and therefore, in contrast to other types of floating structure, weight ofproduction equipment is usually not a critical feature of FPSO design from an overallship stability viewpoint. Stability constraints on FPSO operation have only occurred ontwo UKCS FPSOs. Production equipment weight control is however important in design of the PAUstructure and deck reinforcement and from a lifting viewpoint during fabrication.The weight monitoring system should allow for tracking during design and fabrication ofweight and vertical, horizontal and longitudinal centres of gravity of all items on-board.It is useful to group items by system and/or by PAU, and within each system byequipment and bulk materials. The monitoring system should record the margins set oneach item and track how these margins are used up during the project. Visibility is alsorequired on the status of each item's weight information i.e. AFC, vendor data, results ofweighing or plate gauging. The first objective is to arrive at the lightship weight and centres of gravity i.e. vesselwith empty tanks and production equipment on board but no fluids in production/utilitysystems. The accuracy of this lightship weight/c of g estimate can be checked once theFPSO is reasonably complete and afloat by the inclining experiment which uses draftmeasurements and stability checks to produce FPSO as-built weight/c of g.The lightship data is used as the basis for producing the various ship conditions withdifferent tank contents and fluids in production equipment, mooring loads, etc. whichcheck draft and stability information against design and regulatory constraints. It is important to set up the weight monitoring program and weight budget at an earlystage in the project since this information feeds into vessel, structural and lifting design.1.4.2 Space controlThe large deck area on FPSOs has facilitated the use of single-level PAUs from cost andsafety points of view, and has led to the view that FPSOs are not space-limited. This isgenerally the case on simple, lower throughput topsides but space control has become aproblem on complex, high capacity topsides. This is manifested in poor lay-down areasand access for maintenance. Utility equipment e.g. switchgear, may be relegated towithin the hull and this can cause problems during construction and hook-up. Alternativelocations e.g. within the forecastle space, may put critical equipment in a location whichmay be more vulnerable to wave damage.21Deck space may be increased on custom-designed vessels by an increase in hull lengthand /or breadth or by 'double-decking' some of the facilities, depending on which is themost cost-effective option, and on whether vessel dimensions have been 'frozen'.Space control should include early review of draft topside layouts by safety andoperations before hull sizing and topside structural strategy is finalised. Design shoulddesignate free space to allow for future de-bottlenecking or tie-in with minimumadditional piping runs or interruption to existing production.Global layout and local layout are discussed in more detail in sections 3.5 and 3.6.221.5 VESSEL SELECTION1.5.1 Selection factorsVessel type selection is field-specific and also depends on future use potential. Thechoice is driven by: Technical factors (size of facilities, environmental loads) Commercial considerations Field Life In-situ inspection, maintenance and repair issues (especially for long field lifevessels) Availability of suitable vessels for conversionVessels can be selected from the following three categories:a) New-build vesselsNew-build vessels offer the opportunity to custom-design the vessel for the particularfield application. This offers the following advantages: Optimised hull size with savings on hull/mooring cost Optimised hydrodynamic performance (motions, green water, bow wave slam) Structure/ systems designed for long-term FPSO duty New structure/ systems - minimum operating costs Optimised for life cycle benefitsNew-build custom-designed vessels may be required where conversions are unsuitablee.g. insufficient capacity/ space for large throughput production facilities, or where theamount of upgrading for long field life and severe environment is found to beuneconomic.b) Converted trading tankerConverted trading tankers offer a minimum capex and project schedule solution whichmay be most appropriate for small/medium size fields where the field life isshort/medium term. This does not exclude converted tankers from longer field life andsevere environment applications, provided suitable durability upgrades are carried out.The primary selection criteria for suitable vessels are: Structure and systems to achieve the necessary durability and field life. Feasibility of executing a life extension program. Reasonable size to minimise cost of mooring system in harsh environment UKCS. Adequate crude storage and ballast capacity and suitable tank layout to minimisesloshing.23 Adequate deck space.Issues arising from tanker conversion to FPSO and technical guidance on these arecovered in DNV Conversion of Tankers to Oil Production and/or Storage Vessels (ref.5).c) Converted intercept tankerConverted intercept tankers minimise project schedule by procuring a tanker hull partway through the design and construction process. The other benefit is a new vessel and,depending on the design and fabrication status, the opportunity to upgrade the structureand systems for FPSO duty. The selection criteria for intercept designs are similar to converted trading tankers. Sincethey are new vessels, intercept tankers have the advantage of not having already utilisedpart of the structural fatigue life.241.6 VESSEL MOTIONS1.6.1 Human ResponseThe FPSO is constantly in motion, even in the most benign weather conditions. It istherefore important that crew selection should take account of the susceptibility ofpersonnel to motion sickness, not just in moderate to severe sea states but also in calmerconditions.A crewmember arriving on the FPSO from the helicopter has no time to acclimatise tothe moving environment and so the individual is expected to function as near normally aspossible in terms of decision making and performing routine tasks. Even though anindividual may not be susceptible to motion sickness, he or she still has to maintainbalance while moving around to avoid bumping in to equipment and fittings. As FPSOmotions become more pronounced the need to preserve balance becomes greater and sothe individuals attention becomes more focussed on self-protection and injuryavoidance.Motion sickness may range from mild nausea to severe nausea and emesis, where theindividual will probably be confined to bed. In the case of mild nausea, a crew membermay be able to continue to work normally with or without appropriate medication, butin these circumstances, it has to be recognised that decision making may be impaired. Studies have been carried out by the HSE in conjunction with a number of medicalresearch bodies in to the physical and psychological effects of motion sickness. HSEreports OTO 99: 036 Human Factors Review of Vessel Motion Standards (ref.6) andOTO 99: 066 Effects of Motion on Cognitive Performance (ref.7) address this. Section 3(Standards) of OTO 99:036 discusses a range of vessel motion frequencies which caninfluence human performance. It is important that FPSO owners and operators takeaccount of the key findings and recommendations of such studies in considering thewelfare and capabilities of the on-board work force during the complete range of seastates likely to be encountered on station. It is recommended that a Human Response Analysis is performed which takes account ofthe motion characteristics of the particular FPSO, the effect on individuals and thesubsequent effects on the safe operation of the installation. Particular attention should bepaid to any novel hull shapes where the possibility of more extreme vessel motions maybe greater than in the case of larger, more conventional ship shaped FPSOs which areconsidered to be more stable. The Human Response Analysis should be carried out at an early stage in the project toavoid surprises later. The analysis should be refined and updated as the project proceedsand in conjunction with the development of the Operations Safety Case to ensure that therisks arising out of motion sickness are clearly identified and the effects managed.25While there is no acclimatisation period for those arriving on the FPSO, there is also noacclimatisation period for those returning onshore after a spell of duty. Appropriateadvice should be given to help individuals to readjust in performing routine land basedtasks such as driving motor vehicles or cycles.1.6.2 Effect on EquipmentOn a fixed offshore platform, the production and utilities equipment is effectively staticin terms of the motions which it might experience from, say, wave slam on the jacketstructure. On an FPSO, the equipment is moving all the time, following the roll, pitch,yaw, heave, surge and sway of the hull. It is therefore essential that before the specifications are drawn up for each item ofequipment, the specifying engineer has a comprehensive understanding of the subtletiesof these motions and their implications. The specifications should then fully identify themotions and the accelerations which the equipment can be subjected to. If possible,specific local conditions should be taken into account. All sea states which the FPSO canexperience must be addressed, and while in severe weather conditions equipment may beshut down, some items such as pressure vessels, tanks and towers may still contain liquidinventory.All rotating equipment, (centrifugal and reciprocating pumps and compressors along withtheir drivers, turbines, diesel engines and cranes) should be considered. Reservoirs forlube oil, seal oil and hydraulic oil should be checked to ensure that excessive sloshing ofliquids, which might lead to damage to internal baffles or loss of pump suction, does nottake place. Bedplates and holding down bolts should be designed accordingly.In the case of pressurised equipment, such as separator vessels and coalescers, sloshing ofliquid inventory has to be taken into account to ensure that internals are robust enough towithstand the liquid loads likely to be experienced. (A number of research institutionshave scale models and simulator facilities to test different internals configurations). Level control systems, especially on long horizontal vessels, have to take account ofliquid levels not being the same at opposite ends of the vessel. Set points of processalarms need to be considered to avoid nuisance and override action. Instrument andelectrical control panels and cubicles should be of robust construction and adequatelysupported to withstand motion forces and any associated vibrations.Packed columns and stripper towers should also be checked for movement of packing,trays and demisters and potential loss or degradation of function. Support rings,foundations and holding down bolting should be designed accordingly. In the case oftowers and columns, the higher over turning moments have to be taken into account. Themotion effects on the flare tower structure should also be considered.26Forces on pipe-work, especially larger bore, liquid lines at higher elevations above maindeck, should be examined. The location of large valves in vertical piping loops shouldalso be checked and loads calculated.On fixed platforms, flare headers can be run sloping towards the flare knock out drums,the falls permitting free draining of any liquids in the headers. On FPSOs, while thedesign can call for a fall towards the flare drum, the hull pitch and roll motions and vesseltrim (especially if trimmed by the stern) may affect the drainage of any liquids. Theprocess engineer has to consider the implications of any liquid hold up on header blowdown capacity and any back pressure effect on the discharge capacity of relievingdevices.Trim and heel of the vessel can also affect the drainage of liquids in the various liquiddrains systems and may also create unacceptable accumulations of water on decks andwalkways unless these effects are addressed at an early stage in the design.The design of pedestal cranes must recognise that the cranes will be subject to hullmotions while operating and allowances have to be made for the effects of thesemovements on the hook load.1.6.3 Helicopter operationsHelicopter operations may be affected by vessel motion, especially those at wavefrequency. The limiting factors for a Puma/Tiger are:Roll Max 3 degrees (half amplitude)Pitch Max 3 degrees (half amplitude)Vertical motion Max 5 metres (combined heave and pitch)Wind speed Max 35 knots cross wind1.6.4 Model tank testingModel tank testing should be performed for all developments to confirm loads andmotion behaviour predicted by analytical modelling. This is especially important forvessels with small or unusual hull forms, where there is a shortage of service experienceand where analytical models lack calibration with model tank test results.Ideally, model tank tests should be timed as soon as possible after conceptual design ofthe vessel and topsides is defined and mass properties and layout are available. Thisenables the tank test results to be incorporated in the detailed design of the vessel,topsides, turret, mooring and risers.27In addition, for small or novel hull forms, preliminary model tests are recommended earlyin concept design to identify any unacceptable motion behaviour and possible remedialmeasures.Technical requirements for models and tank test facilities are covered in section 2.12.281.7 CREW SIZE AND ACCOMMODATION1.7.1 Basis for Crew SizingIt is the general objective of FPSO owners and operators to have a minimum crew sizethat is consistent with maintaining the highest standards of safety, environmentalperformance, field uptime and the preservation of asset integrity.Crew size will be driven by several factors, not the least of which are the size andcomplexity of the production facilities. The maintenance strategy, e.g. batchmaintenance, will also influence crew numbers.Operations input to EngineeringPlanning for the production phase should start at the same time as preliminaryengineering studies. In this way, operations representatives can provide input to mattersof layout, process engineering and choice of equipment, for example. In addition theoperations and maintenance strategies can be developed at the same time as theengineering so that whole life issues can be identified, agreed and addressed in designand manning levels can be firmed up. Steady State and non-Steady State OperationsAs well as planning for day-to-day operations and maintenance activities, the operationsrepresentatives have to consider, among other things: short and long term maintenance integrity inspection programmes duration and frequency of planned shutdowns extent of ongoing support from specialist technicians and engineers need for ongoing support for subsea operations reservoir engineering support possibility of unplanned shutdowns and resources to deal with themAll of these and other factors will influence crew size, which must obviously include allthe marine activities associated with an FPSO and attendant shuttle tanker operations.Provision for FPSO installation, commissioning, major repairsThere has been a tendency to design accommodation for steady state operations in thebelief that keeping the size of the living quarters to a minimum will result in cost savingsto the project. Such an approach may not prove to be cost effective in the long run asthere are, in addition to the items above, other factors such as installation andcommissioning of the FPSO to be considered as well as the possibility of future majorrepairs, upratings and modifications.29While many FPSOs can achieve fully or near fully commissioned status prior to sailaway from the outfitting yard or prior to installation in the field, its has to be rememberedthat the hydrocarbon processing systems for gas, oil and produced water cannot be said tobe fully commissioned until the subsea facilities have been operated and well fluids havebeen introduced on to the FPSO. Should major problems arise in this phase of start-up which require additional manpowerresources, it may not be possible to introduce temporary accommodation in the shortterm. It is not possible to bring flotel facilities alongside the FPSO as with a fixedplatform and so personnel may have to be shuttled in, either from shore or from a nearbysupport facility. The costs of shuttling may exceed the initial capital cost of adding moreaccommodation over and above the levels considered appropriate for steady stateoperations.1.7.2 Accommodation FacilitiesOnce manning levels have been established along with provision for the contingenciesoutlined above, consideration is given to the facilities within the living quarters. Theliving quarters will very likely contain the temporary refuge along with fire fighting equipment provisions emergency control and response room(s) control rooms, radio room, offices and meeting rooms dining, recreation and leisure facilities and locker rooms galley, laundry facilities and stores HVAC plant rooms and battery rooms sick bay and medical rooms helicopter reception facilities The owner will have to decide on whether to provide single or two person cabins and thepossible temporary conversion of two person cabins into three person cabins for short,clearly defined periods such as a planned shutdown. Before any decision on temporaryupmanning provision is taken, reference should be made to the HSEs A Guide to theIntegrity, Workplace Environment and miscellaneous aspects of the OffshoreInstallations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996, notes 114 to120 (ref.8). Consultation with the HSE may also be advisable. Provision has also to bemade for male and female crew members. Normally moveable fittings such as tables and chairs may have to be secured in positionbecause of the movement of the FPSO in heavy weather.301.8 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK There are numerous Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments which apply to FPSOdevelopments in the UKCS, covering a wide range of issues including health, technicalsafety, work place safety, lifting operations, environmental protection and pollutionprevention and control. The main item of legislation is The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, SI1992/2885 (ref.9). The Safety Case Regulations are 'goal-setting' regulations made underThe Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 (ref.10). The key requirement of the SafetyCase Regulations governing design is that all hazards with the potential to cause majoraccidents are identified, their risks evaluated, and measures taken to reduce risks topersons to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).The Safety Case Regulations are backed up by The Offshore Installations (Prevention ofFire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations, PFEER, 1995 (SI1995/ 743)(ref.11), the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (SI1999/3242)(ref.12) and by The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction)Regulations, DCR, 1996 (SI1996/ 913) (ref.13).The main item of legislation dealing with environmental issues is the Offshore PetroleumProduction and Pipelines Act (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1999(SI1999/360) (ref.14). The Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (ref.15) and the MerchantShipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2154) (ref.16) applythe requirements of MARPOL 73/78 (ref.17) on matters of marine pollution withadditional UKCS-specific instructions. General health, safety and environmental requirements are discussed in section 1.10 ofthese Guidance Notes. It is important to note here that the Design and Construction Regulations require designto be based on current good engineering practice, which is appropriately risk-based.Compliance with existing codes, standards and guidance may not be sufficient to meetthe regulatory requirements.311.9 CODES AND STANDARDS1.9.1 International codes and standardsSeveral international design codes for floating production systems are undergoing finalreview or have recently been released:The API Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing and Constructing FloatingProduction Systems RP 2FPS (ref.18) has the widest scope, covering ship-shaped,column stabilised and spar unit design. It also covers the complete floating productionsystem including production facilities, risers and subsea, and export system design. Thecode is a high-level document and relies heavily on reference to appropriate sections ofexisting API codes, classification society rules and United States Coast Guard/ Mines &Minerals Service documents to provide the detailed design guidance. Use of the APIdocument for UKCS guidance would need to recognise the special requirements of(a) the UKCS harsh environment and (b) the UKCS legislative framework.ISO/WD 19904 Offshore Structures - Floating Systems (ref.19) and NORSOK StandardN-004 Design of Steel Structures (ref.20) both focus on structural and marine designaspects. A review and comparison of API and these design codes has been carried out bythe HSE under Review of API RP 2FPS, OTO 2001-006 (ref.21).Other codes for specific areas of design are covered in the relevant sections of thisdocument. 1.9.2 Use of Classification Societies' RulesClassification is not mandatory for an FPSO in the UKCS since design is governed by theSafety Case, PFEER regulations and DCR Guidance. However most FPSO ownerschoose to build their vessel to classification society (CS) standards and some also chooseto maintain class in service for insurance, mortgage and marketing purposes.The following classification societies have recently issued new rules for the classificationof floating production units:Lloyds Register of Shipping (LR): Rules and Regulations for the Classification of aFloating Installation at a Fixed Location, July 1999 (ref.22).American Bureau of Shipping: (ABS) Building and Classing Floating ProductionInstallations, June 2000 (ref.23) and Guide for Building and Classing Facilities onOffshore Installations, June 2000 (ref.24).Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Offshore 2000 Rules for Classification of Floating Productionand Storage Units, OSS -102, January 2001 (ref.25).32Classification can use either:a) Prescriptive approach, where the class rules are based on the results of many yearsoperating experience. These rules are useful in providing a framework for rapidlygenerating an initial design and have the additional advantage of being familiar toshipyards. This design can then be subject to more rigorous analyses and riskassessments.b) Risk-based approach, which can be based on the Safety Case information. All threesocieties LR, ABS and DNV are prepared to provide risk-based classification andhave recently issued guidelines on this viz. LR: Part 1A of the above Rules ABS: Guidance Notes on Risk Assessment Application for the Marine andOffshore Oil and Gas Industries, June 2000 (ref.26). DNV: Classification using Performance Criteria determined by RiskAssessment Methodology, OSS-121, January 2001 (ref.27).It is important for the owner/duty holder to advise the classification society at the outsetwhich of the above approaches is being used and agree the way in which the risk basedassessment will be conducted and the results applied to the design of the FPSO.Class can be applied to the complete floating production system or just to the hull andcritical marine systems. In the latter case, the production systems can be designed tointernationally recognised codes. The classification societies' rules address marine andstructural areas in better detail than production/utilities system areas. This is to beexpected because of the societies' background in ship classification. A review of classification society rules was carried out in UKOOA Study No.FPSO.JIP.00/01, November 2000 (ref.1).LR and DNV also provide guidance notes e.g.LR: Ship-Type FPSO Hull Structural Appraisal, OS/GN/99002, June 1999 (ref.28).DNV: Guidance and Classification Notes, July 1999 (ref.29).1.9.3 Client and Classification Society RolesThe role of the classification society needs to be clearly defined at projectcommencement viz. advisory only, full or part classification, whether classification isduring construction only or also in service, and whether the CS is to assist in preparingthe safety case. This decision will depend on the expected benefits from theclassification society and the following factors:33 Advantages of a classed vessel viz. obtaining a marine mortgage, forinsurance purposes, marketing the vessel for subsequent use outside theUKCS or for general comfort factor. Owner's hands-on/hands-off approach to project management. Strength of the owner's technical design and construction supervision staff. Contracting strategy and its impact on need for supervision. Experience base and capabilities of classification society.It should be noted that using classification society rules does not absolve the owner frompreparing clear design philosophies, basis of design and functional specifications.Classification society rules and guidance are useful in providing a good starting pointwhich is familiar to designers and shipyards, and which reinforces owners' functionalspecifications. This is especially important in dealing with shipyards where functionalspecifications and performance standards are not widely understood.Potential difficulties in using CS rules are that they concentrate on what is safety-criticalbut not what is production-critical and they do not encourage designers to think aboutlong-term life-cycle issues which are especially important in harsh environment UKCS.Some difficulty may also arise over conflicts between prescriptive CS rules and theoutcome of safety cases. The resolution of these may be difficult if the vessel is to beclassed.341.10 HEALTH SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT1.10.1 IntroductionThe prime considerations in the design of any project, large or small, short term or longterm, are: the safety and welfare of all those involved in the construction, installation,commissioning and operation of the facility. minimum impact on the natural environment around the facility during its life andfollowing its decommissioning and removal.The legislation applicable to offshore installations is extensive and it is the responsibilityof the owner, through the project management team and compliance specialists, to ensurethat the legislation is adhered to at a high level. Within the legal framework, through theapplication of best engineering, construction and operating practices, based on recognisedcodes and standards, the integrity of the facility and care of the environment is theresponsibility of those designing, building and operating it. The notes which follow, however, are directed at design activities only.1.10.2 Design for SafetyFamiliarity with key legislationIt is recommended that at the earliest opportunity key members of the projectmanagement and engineering teams on an FPSO project familiarise themselves with theIntroduction sections of the Safety Case Regulations (SCR), the Design andConstructions Regulations (DCR) and the PFEER Regulations, as a minimum (seesection 1.8). In this way, they will gain a better understanding of the principalrequirements of each set of regulations and how these three pieces of legislation relate toone another. While the SCR and the PFEER regulations may be considered by some to be in theprovince of safety and loss control engineers, sections of them are relevant to theactivities and responsibilities of all the design disciplines to a greater or lesser extent. Alldisciplines have a responsibility for integrity of the design and so they should reviewRegulation 4 (General Duty) and Regulation 5 (Design of an Installation) of the DCR toconsolidate their understanding of their responsibilities.A principal feature of DCR is the identification of Safety Critical Items, whose designand performance are essential to the overall safety of the installation. The identificationactivity and the development of associated performance standards are very much part ofthe design phase. UKOOA have issued a joint industry guide in the form of Guidelinesfor the Management of Safety Critical Elements (ref.30).35Concept Safety Evaluation and Preliminary Risk AssessmentOnce an FPSO has been selected as the preferred field development option, a conceptsafety evaluation should be performed along with a preliminary risk assessment. At this stage it is likely that a Statement of Requirements will exist, based on preliminaryengineering study work leading up to concept selection. The overall size of theproduction facilities will be known and a vessel size and type will have been determined.Indeed, a particular vessel may have already been chosen. Layout studies will haveindicated the number, size and position of on deck modules and/or skids and the locationoptions for the turret, living quarters and flare will have probably been reviewed. The high-level safety evaluation should be carried out to identify the significant hazardsand potential major accident scenarios which could have an effect on the integrity of theFPSO and the safety of the crew. By performing the evaluation and risk assessment atthis early stage, it will be possible for the design team to identify any fundamentaldeficiencies in the outline design of the selected concept. It will also be possible toidentify particular areas which have to be targeted during the various phases of design toprevent the occurrence of hazardous events or, if prevention is not possible, to detectevents, and control and mitigate their effects. Changes can be more easily implementedbefore detailed design gets underway. The evaluation and assessment process can berepeated to test the effectiveness of any safety improvements which might be madesubsequently. Providing the evaluation has been comprehensive, the Basis of Design will reflect moreaccurately the requirements and aims of the overall design. Furthermore, a goodfoundation will have been laid for the preparation of the Design Safety Case.Risk Based Assessments and ClassificationIn the UKCS, the Safety Case Regulations require the duty holder to demonstrate thatmajor accident hazards have been identified, their risks evaluated, and action taken toreduce the risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). While it is expected thatthe design of an installation will be based on current good engineering practice ...compliance solely with existing codes, standards and guidance may not be sufficient tomeet the regulatory requirements, (HSE Guidance on DCR Regulations, regulation 5).Demonstration that risks have been reduced to ALARP will therefore require a riskassessment.Outside the UKCS, the legislation of other countries may not require an FPSOinstallation to undergo such an assessment and it may be quite in order for anowner/operator only to provide a demonstration of compliance with the ClassificationRules of a recognised Classification Society. Classification Societies do recognise thatRisk Based Assessment and demonstration of ALARP is an acceptable alternative tocompliance with the requirements of a particular Class notation.36As it is internationally recognised that Classification Societies Rules are based on soundengineering practice, it is accepted that designers will frequently refer to the Rules andwill apply relevant sections regardless of whether the FPSO is to be classed in accordancewith Rules alone or classed on a Risk Based Assessment. In the UKCS, it is likely that arigorous Risk Based approach and demonstration of ALARP will not only secure HSEacceptance of a Safety Case but will also secure Classification Society approval of thedesign. However, as stated above, it should not be assumed that full compliance withClassification Society Rules will secure Safety Case acceptance.1.10.3 Design for HealthThe well being of the offshore workforce is not just the responsibility of Operationsmanagement. Decisions made in the course of the design can and do affect theworkforces health. The attention of designers should be drawn, for example, to many of the provisions ofSchedule 1 for Regulation 12 of the DCR, which not only cover matters of safety but alsomatters which can have an influence on the working environment and hence on the healthand welfare of crew members. Awareness of the principal provisions of the Control of Substances Hazardous to HealthRegulations COSHH 1994 (SI1994/3246) (ref.31) and associated approved codes ofpractice and guidance will assist designers in the correct selection and specification ofmaterials to ensure that the health of those coming into contact with these materials in thecourse of their everyday tasks is not affected1.10.4 Design for the EnvironmentIt is no longer acceptable to regard the seas, the oceans and the atmosphere as convenientdumping grounds for waste products from industrial activities. The increasing awarenessof the environmental impact of offshore developments and the introduction of legislationin the form of the Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines Act (Assessment ofEnvironmental Effects) Regulations 1999 (SI1999/360) (ref.14) now requires operators todemonstrate to the UK Government, stakeholders and the public in general that theircurrent and future activities will have neither short term nor long term effects.For a new FPSO installation, the development of an Environmental Strategy for theFPSO will help to provide a clear direction to the designers of the targets and hencemeasures to be taken to minimize environmental impact. The strategy will also form thebasis of the Environmental Management System to control, monitor and report onenvironmental performance once in operation. 37The emissions and discharges from offshore installations include products of flaring,exhaust gases from prime movers, oily water discharges from slop tanks or producedwater which cannot be reinjected, sewage etc. Routine flaring is no longer considered tobe environmentally acceptable and wherever possible only emergency flaring should becarried out. The environmental threats are compounded by the risk of loss of containment of crude oiland gas leading to a major spillage. In the case of an FPSO, with its large volume ofstored crude oil product and the attendant shuttle tanker operations, the risk of leaks andspills are perceived to be greater than on a fixed platform.The integrity of the FPSO hull over the entire field life along with its cargo handling,product transfer and production systems are dependent on sound design and soundoperating practices and procedures. The storage volume of the hull is significantlygreater than the inventories of the oil and gas processing facilities. Consequently, hullfatigue life and its ability to survive credible collisions, impacts, explosions and fires areof prime importance in the prevention of pollution. National legislation together with international protocols such as MARPOL 73/78(ref.17) dictates the levels of pollutants which can be continuously discharged from anFPSO. Operating companies each have their own corporate environmental policies tolimit or eliminate pollution. The design of the FPSO must therefore satisfy both thestatutory and corporate requirements as a minimum or whichever is the more stringent. Itis expected that the best available technologies will be used to limit or prevent pollutionand that over the life of the field, steady year on year improvement in environmentalperformance can be demonstrated.UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 2 MARINE & STRUCTURALCONTENTS LIST2.1 INTRODUCTION2.1.1 Design objectives2.1.2 Hull design process2.2 HULL CONFIGURATION2.2.1 Hull size and form2.2.2 Stability requirements2.2.3 Structural configuration2.3 LOADS2.3.1 Environmental data2.3.2 Wind2.3.3 Waves2.3.4 Currents2.3.5 Temperature2.3.6 Snow & ice2.3.7 Marine growth2.3.8 Design environmental conditions2.3.9 Operational wind and wave data2.4 PRIMARY HULL STRUCTURE2.4.1 Design methods2.4.2 Finite element analysis2.4.3 Fatigue Design2.4.4 Local strength2.4.5 Reliability based design2.4.6 Material Selection2.4.7 Welding and structural detailing392.5 GREEN WATER2.5.1 Introduction2.5.2 Current prediction methods2.5.3 Avoidance measures2.6 BOW WAVE IMPACT2.6.1 Introduction2.6.2 Calculation of bow wave impact pressure2.6.3 Measures to minimise bow wave impact2.6.4 Full rounded v sharp bow2.7 SLOSHING IN CARGO TANKS2.7.1 Introduction2.7.2 Pressure prediction2.7.3 Avoidance measures2.8 COLLISION DAMAGE2.8.1 Introduction2.8.2 Supply boat operation2.8.3 Shuttle tankers2.8.4 Passing traffic collision2.9 STRUCTURAL / PRODUCTION FACILITIES INTERFACE2.9.1 Packaging of production facilities2.9.2 Structural support of facilities2.9.3 Design loads2.10 HULL DEFLECTION PATTERNS2.10.1 Introduction2.10.2 Calculation of hull deformation2.10.3 Static v dynamic deformations2.11 MOTION BEHAVIOUR2.11.1 Introduction2.11.2 Design values2.12 MODEL TANK TESTING402.13 TURRET INTERFACES2.13.1 Introduction2.13.2 Structural/bearing interface2.13.3 Mooring interface2.13.4 Riser interface2.13.5 Interface with production equipment2.14 MOORINGS2.14.1 Design considerations for FPSOs2.14.2 Mooring analysis2.14.3 Anchor design2.15 CRUDE OIL EXPORT2.15.1 Introduction2.15.2 Export by shuttle tanker2.15.3 Crude oil pumping and transfer hoses2.15.4 Shuttle tanker operations2.16 BALLAST SYSTEMS2.17 THRUSTERS2.17.1 Applications2.17.2 Design considerations2.18 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS41UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 2 MARINE & STRUCTURAL 2.1 INTRODUCTION2.1.1 Design objectivesThe key objectives of hull design are:a) ReliabilityFPSO hull design has to take account of the more onerous FPSO duty compared to atrading tanker: Increased hull loading resulting from weathervaning in harsh environment with noweather avoidance possible and the effects of non-collinear environment. Economic requirement to stay on station for the field life, in some cases 20-25 years,and the problems of performing hull maintenance and repair in-situ. High economic penalty of lost/deferred production during shutdown. Environmental consequences of a major hull structure failure. Variable cargo and draft level.There is therefore a strong case on safety, environmental and economic grounds forrobust and reliable hull design. The FPSO should be treated as an 'Offshore Installation'rather than as a trading tanker in terms of design for reliability.The UKOOA study (ref.1) investigated where problems have been experienced in UKCSFPSOs. The results showed reliability has generally been good but some problems haveoccurred mainly with green water on deck, bow wave impact and shuttle tankeroffloading incidents.This finding has been confirmed by an HSE study to investigate reliability levels fordifferent hull/turret/swivel limit states, entitled OTO 00:097 Rationalisation of FPSODesign Issues (ref.32). The conclusion was that FPSO reliability was generallysatisfactory compared with norms for large projects but reliability for the three areas -green water, bow impact and collision - needed improvement. These areas are thesubjects of on-going studies to improve knowledge and guidance.42b) PerformancePerformance is measured in terms of overall FPSO uptime, comprising productionfacility uptime and export system uptime. The economic penalty of weather downtime ishigh. Hull design (mainly through hull size) needs to minimise downtime by providing astable platform for production facilities and sufficient buffer storage to cover probableshuttle tanker disconnected periods. c) Flexibility for expansionHull design should recognise possible future needs to develop satellite fields which willrequire additional riser slots and possibly extra modules. Additional payload, space,turret and structural supports are cheap to provide at the initial design stage but extremelydifficult and expensive to perform later offshore.d) Design for operationsHull design should also recognise the special in-situ inspection and maintenance needs ofan FPSO on long-term deployment. This topic is discussed in section 2.18.2.1.2 Hull design processThe FPSO hull design process (for a new build vessel) is shown in greatly simplifiedform in figure 2.1.1. This is an iterative process where the results of analysis and modeltest are used to update the basis of design and provide a new starting point for re-analysis.In this respect, FPSOs are less sensitive to weight change than other floating systems andshould therefore require few iterations of the design cycle. Key elements in minimisingthe number of design loops are (a) working from a broadly similar design as a basis (b)avoidance of design changes and (c) timely execution of model tests to feed into design. A detailed description of analysis methods is given in the textbook Floating Structures -A Guide for Design and Analysis, CMPT publication 101-98, OPL (ref.33).FunctionalrequirementsHullconfigurationMetocean dataTopside layout andstructural supportconfigurationMooringanalysisRedesign andre-run mooringand structuralanalysis43Fig.2.1.1 - Simplified hull desigHydrodynamicanalysisStructural design &analysis including fatigue,green water, bow waveimpact, sloshing,accidental loadingTurret designincludinginterfacesPreliminary layout andmass properties definedModel tank testingDesignsatisfactory?Nn processFunctionalloads e.g. crudeoil storage,productionequipment.Riser, mooringand turretconfigurationsFinal designY442.2 HULL CONFIGURATION2.2.1 Hull size and formThe major requirements governing hull size are discussed in section 1.2.2. Crude oil storage Deck space Availability of tanker hulls for conversion Sea-keeping performanceThe overall weight (displacement) of the FPSO is a function of steel weight, topsideweight and crude oil cargo deadweight. Typically hull steel weight (excluding topsides)is 13-16% of displacement and cargo deadweight is approximately 75%. The hull mustalso have sufficient volume to accommodate crude oil storage and segregated ballasttanks to achieve the required ballast drafts and avoid bottom slamming forward. Typicalballast capacity is 35% of displacement.The hull form should be optimised to produce the most economic design possible withinthe design constraints. Major factors are shown below in table 2.2.1.Parameter Function ofHull steel weight Length/depth ratio of hull & hull size Deck space Length x breadthMooring loads Breadth/lengthStability Breadth/depthSea-keeping (primarily pitch) LengthGreen water on deck Freeboard Bottom slamming forward Ballast capacityBow wave impact Bow finenessTable 2.2.1 - Main hull design parameters and their dependenciesIn general, length is the most expensive dimension and should be reduced as much aspossible, but consistent with achieving adequate deck space, acceptable sea-keeping andnot attracting high mooring loads. Breadth should be reduced to avoid high mooringloads and excessive stability causing high roll accelerations, within the constraintsimposed by stability and deck space. Increase in depth has the benefits of increasedfreeboard against green water and improved hull section modulus for longitudinalstrength and fatigue durability. Hull fineness should be a balance between minimisingbow wave impact loads and minimising hull steel weight.For initial design, typical dimensions and ratios for UKCS FPSOs that have performedsuccessfully are given in table 2.2.2.45Parameter Range from successfulUKCS experienceLength 209 - 246 mLength/breadth 5.0 - 6.5Breadth/depth 1.6 - 2.0Draft (max operating)/depth 0.73 - 0.74Draft (ballast)/depth 0.47 Table 2.2.2 - Typical UKCS FPSO hull parameters2.2.2 Stability requirementsHydrostatics and stability are part of the HSE Formal Safety Assessment where it isnecessary to prove with a site and operations specific risk assessment that the stabilitycharacteristics result in a safe vessel, with low risk to health and safety of those on board.The safety case should cover intact and damaged stability, and also integrity of watertightopenings and the possibilities of internal flooding from ballast piping, valves and pumps.The particular hazards from loading and off-loading at sea should be considered.To assist in demonstrating that the above goal has been achieved, guidelines have beenissued by IMO and classification societies. These guidelines differ in requirements andthe user is advised to check that the most recent and relevant information is applied. Thesuitability of the referenced guidance should be considered in the risk assessment. Suchguidance was not specifically designed to consider the hazards from tandem off-loadingto shuttle tankers. Intact stabilityIntact stability requirements are governed by IMO recommendations for intact stabilityand weather criteria referred to in resolution A.749 (ref.17): Initial metacentric height (GM) Righting lever (GZ) Range of stability Dynamic stability limits on roll angle and down-flooding (due to wind gust)Intact stability is also governed by IMO MODU codes which compare wind heelingcurves with righting moment curves to ensure a reserve of dynamic stability. The requirements of operations and crew comfort and safety also need to be taken intoaccount in deciding limits on heel angle and stability. 46Free surface effects on FPSOs can be large because of the requirement to have severalslack cargo tanks (to minimise hull shear and bending). During offloading operations,the ballast tanks will also have free surfaces and these will be large where double bottomtanks are fitted. This will require close examination of stability during the tank fillingand emptying sequences and possible restrictions on the number of slack tanks. It issuggested that stability be investigated at 10% increments in tank filling when verifyingthat loading conditions comply with stability criteria. Smaller increments should be usedwhere there are sudden changes in free surface width.Damage stabilityDamage stability is governed by MARPOL 73/78 (ref. 17) with additional guidelinesfrom the HSE which require the following damage to be examined:a) Peripheral damage of depth 1.5m and minimum 14.5m length extending verticallyupwards from the bottom.b) Flooding of any one compartmentFollowing this damage, IMO requires no progressive flooding at the equilibrium position.2.2.3 Structural configurationDouble sides / bottomDouble sides are required on UKCS FPSOs to minimise risk of oil spillage due tocollision. The spacing from the outer hull should be sufficient to reduce the risk of majoroil spillage from foreseeable collisions to an acceptable level. MARPOL (ref.17) requires2m width of wing tank for trading tankers.Single bottoms are acceptable in UKCS. However, there are practical and economicarguments for single v double bottoms as listed below. It should be noted that the lowrisk of grounding for an FPSO removes one of the most powerful arguments in favour offitting double bottoms on trading tankers.Advantages of double bottoms Flush inner bottom for ease of drainage and cleaning Ease of inspection of structure from double bottom Security against tank leakageDisadvantages of double bottoms Higher first cost Loss of cargo volume Higher centre of gravity of cargo Higher pressure head in cargo tanks relative to outside sea with more loss of cargo ifcargo tank is breached.47An analysis of the trade-off of operational benefits of double bottom v higher first cost isneeded to arrive at the optimum solution for a specific development.Bulkhead spacingBulkhead spacing in cargo tanks is governed by: 1) Minimising free surface effects of part-filled tanks.2) Limits on maximum tank size to keep oil spillage below a certain volume in theevent of tank rupture.3) Avoiding sloshing during filling and discharge of cargo tanks at sea - see section2.7 of these Design Guidance Notes.4) Structural support of production/utility system PAUs.5) More tanks to allow safe inspection and maintenance while not interruptingoperations.Typically, the cargo tank region is subdivided by a centre-line bulkhead and four or moretransverse bulkheads. Deleting the centre-line bulkhead may cause unacceptable freesurface effects and require restrictions on tank filling/emptying sequences to meetstability requirements.482.3 LOADS2.3.1 Environmental dataEnvironmental loading plays a major part in the design of hull, mooring and risers. Thefollowing environmental data should be obtained from recognised sources for designpurposes. Extreme events for wind speed, significant wave height and current. Directional dataand angular separation for extreme wind, wave and current. Wave spectral shape Current speed and direction variation with depth (tidal and background) Wave scatter diagram Wind and wave persistence tables Water depth and tidal/pressure variations Air / sea temperature Ice and snow dataA range of wave height and period combinations should be considered to determine themost severe loading case. It is important to recognise that the various maximumresponses will occur for differing wave periods.Prior to site-specific information being generated, the following data may be used:2.3.2 WindWind speed estimates (m/s) are given in table 2.3.1 below:Wind speed(m/s)Return period(years)Central N Sea Northern N Sea West ofShetlands1 hour mean 100 37 38 4010 min average 100 40 41 43Table 2.3.1 - Omni-directional design wind speedsWind speeds for return period of 10,000years are 16% greater than the correspondingvalue in table 2.3.1.The wind speed variation with height above sea level and mean period is covered inNORSOK Standard N-003 Actions and Action Effects, February 1999, section 6.3.2(ref.34).49The wind force on each part of the FPSO (including suction on back surfaces) iscalculated by:F = 0.0625 A V2 Cs (kgf) where A = projected area (m2)Cs = shape coefficient Shape CsSpherical 0.40Cylindrical 0.50Large flat surface (hull, deckhouse, smooth under deck areas) 1.00Exposed beams or girders under deck 1.30Isolated shapes (cranes, booms, etc) 1.50Clustered deck houses 1.10Table 2.3.2 - Values of shape coefficient2.3.3 WavesWave information should cover a range of wave height / period combinations to ensurethat maximum responses are obtained and that the most severe loading on the FPSO as awhole and also other limit states is identified. These include bow wave impact in shortersteeper seas. In addition, the distribution of wave encounters for all periods that theFPSO will encounter is required for hull fatigue calculations.Extreme wave height dataIndicative values of significant wave heights are given in table 2.3.3 below:Location Central N Sea Northern N Sea West of ShetlandsSignificant waveheight Hs (m)14 16 18Table 2.3.3 - 100 year return significant wave heightsThe 10,000year significant wave height is 25% greater than the corresponding 100yearvalue in table 3 above.The associated mean zero up-crossing period Tz lies in the range:3.2 (Hs)^1/2 < Tz < 3.6 (Hs)^1/250where Hs is in m and Tz is in seconds. In shallower water areas, the wave period iswater depth dependent. The period of the 10,000year wave is 5% greater than the 100year wave period.The expected (most probable) maximum wave height can be derived from H max = 1.86 HsThere is a 1% risk that a wave with H max = 2.5 Hs will be encountered.The range of associated wave periods with maximum wave height is:1.05 Tz < T ass < 1.4 Tz The effect on FPSO structural design should be considered for all values within therange. Wave induced responses consist of:1. First order motions at wave frequency (heave, surge, sway, roll, pitch, yaw)2. Low frequency motions particularly surge and sway near the naturalfrequency of the vessel and mooring system3. Steady or mean drift force The wave-induced responses can be derived from model test results (see section 2.12) orfrom motion analysis computer programs using diffraction theory or, for initial design,2D strip theory as an approximation.Bow wave impact dataIn addition, short steep waves need to be considered for bow wave impact (section 2.6)and green water effects (section 2.5). Guidance on the design wave height and periodrelationship is contained in NORSOK (ref.34).Fatigue dataWave data required for fatigue design consists of a cumulative frequency diagram(exceedance diagram) of the heights of all individual zero up-crossing waves likely to beencountered during a year as an omnidirectional data set (for weathervaning FPSOs)together with representative wave periods for each wave height.This should be derived from a scatter diagram of significant wave height v mean zero up-crossing periods for the specific location.For initial guidance in the absence of site-specific data, the frequency distribution can becalculated from the following relation from the former Department of Energy 4th EditionGuidance Notes (ref.4):51h = D(ln Ny - ln Nh)where h = wave heightNh = number of waves exceeding h in one yearD = distribution parameterNy = total number of waves in one yearValues of Ny and D are given in table 2.3.4.Location Central N Sea Northern N Sea West of ShetlandsNy (/10^6) 5.9 5.6 3.8D 1.13 1.51 1.52Table 2.3.4 - Parameters for determining wave height exceedance The associated average wave period T for each value of h can be determined from therelationship above in this section.2.3.4 CurrentsSurface currents alone are covered here since design of risers is outside the scope of theseDesign Guidance Notes at present.Current measurements should be made at or close to the site for at least one year andpreferably longer to build up an accurate picture of current strength and direction. In theabsence of this data, the following typical values may be used:Location Central N Sea Northern N Sea West of Shetlands100 year surfacecurrent speed (m/s)1.03 0.99 2.001 year surfacecurrent (m/s)0.88 0.89 1.64Direction(approximate)N/S N/S NE/SW Table 2.3.5 - Surface current data52In the absence of model test data, current forces on FPSOs may be calculated usingcoefficients presented in OCIMF report Prediction of Current Loads on VLCCs, 1994(ref.35).2.3.5 TemperatureThe lowest observed daily mean air temperature for UKCS locations is minus 5 degreescentigrade.2.3.6 Snow & iceThe maximum expected wet snow accumulation on horizontal surfaces for UKCSlocations is 200mm with a density of 100kg/m3. In practice, this is unlikely to occur ondeck because of the heat transfer from crude oil storage tanks and production/utilityequipment on deck.2.3.7 Marine growthVery little marine growth has been reported on the hull except some weed at waterlineand some growth in sea chests. There has been a case reported of mussel growth in atopsides seawater cooling system. Treatment of seawater and firewater systems bychemical dosing is addressed in section 3.7.3.2.3.8 Design environmental conditionsGuidance on the design environmental conditions and combinations are provided by ABS(ref.23). The design environmental conditions to be considered to determine the mostsevere loading condition are:a) 100 year wind and waves with associated 10 year current b) 100 year current with associated 10 year wind and waves For weathervaning vessels, both collinear and non-collinear directions for wind, waveand current are to be considered. The angular separation for non-collinear conditions isto be based on site-specific environmental studies. If this is not available, the followingcombinations are to be considered as a minimum:1. Collinear wind, waves and current.2. Wind and current collinear and both at 30 degrees to waves.3. Wind at 30 degrees to waves, and current at 90 degrees to waves.532.3.9 Operational wind and wave dataOperational wind and wave data are required to plan weather-sensitive operations andassess the likely downtime. UKCS data is available in the HSE report Wind and WaveFrequency Distributions for Sites around the British Isles, OTO 2001:030 (ref.36).Recent studies have shown evidence of cyclical changes in wave climate in the NorthernN Sea but not in the Central or Southern N Sea. The trend in mean significant waveheight has been from 3.5m in 1985 up to 4.3m in 1995, based on a 5year average for theJanuary to March period. This trend has now reversed back to a current value of 3.8m.In contrast, the October to December part of the winter has exhibited a reasonablyconstant mean significant wave height.542.4 PRIMARY HULL STRUCTURE2.4.1 Design methodsIt is recommended that the structural design be based on the Limit State approach. Thelimit states to be covered are: Ultimate limit state (ULS) using a 10,000 year return period environmental load (see2.3.2 and 2.3.3 for wind and wave estimates). Serviceability limit state (SLS) to assure service performance and habitability. Fatigue limit state (FLS) using wave data from 2.3.3. Accidental limit states (ALS) following credible accident scenarios.Guidance on application of the limit state approach and partial factors is given in DNVOS-C102 Structural Design of Offshore Ships (ref.37).A starting-point design may be based on the following classification society rules fortrading tankers with the scantlings increased as necessary for FPSO duty e.g. fatigue,sloshing, green water on deck, bow wave impact. LR Rules for Ships (ref.38) - part 4, chapters 9 & 10. ABS Steel Vessel Rules (ref.39) - part 5, chapter 1.The scantlings should also be verified by strength analysis as follows.2.4.2 Finite element analysisModellingThe FEA model should include a representative cargo tank including the boundarytransverse bulkheads and one-half of the tanks forward and aft of this tank. A separatemodel should be made of the turret area. Finer mesh models should be constructed oflocalised areas of high stress and typical design details e.g. support detail for topsides,longitudinal / transverse web intersection and cutout.Details of structural analysis and loading cases to consider are typically given in LR(ref.22) Part 4 chapter 4 section 4.2.Determination of loadFrom experience, the loading cases that should be examined are:1. Transit condition with 10year seasonal environmental condition for the tow route.2. Installation condition 553. Design environmental condition with tank contents and external pressure headsselected to produce maximum differential pressure heads and maximum hog / sagbending effects, coupled with the maximum survival wind / wave / current forces.4. Design operating condition with tank contents and external pressure heads selected toproduce maximum differential pressure heads and maximum hog / sag bendingeffects, coupled with the maximum operating (typically 10 year) wind / wave /current forces.5. Accident conditions, and after remedial action together with 1 year environmentalcondition.6. In-situ tank inspection conditions Permissible stresses and buckling strengthThe permissible stresses are given in the above LR (ref.22) Part 4 chapter 5 section 2.Buckling strength of plates and stiffeners is given in Part 4 chapter 5 section 3 and ofprimary members in section 4.2.4.3 Fatigue DesignFatigue design is an important factor because of the high cyclic loads from the harshenvironment and the cost / difficulty of detecting and repairing fatigue damage in-situ.This means that a rigorous fatigue assessment, taking account of fabrication quality anddetails, should be performed for the site-specific environmental parameters with theFPSO weathervaning into the environment. For converted tankers, allowance should be made for previous usage. The designershould ensure that fabrication details and fatigue analysis are consistent with therequired service upgrade. The areas where fatigue causes problems on an FPSO are:a) Fatigue design of longitudinals in the side shell in the operating draft range wherethere is fluctuating water pressure due to wave action. This may require fitting anextra bracket or collar at each longitudinal to transverse web frame connection toimprove fatigue lives when modifying an existing tanker design. The problem isworst when the vessel is sitting at a constant draft in the case of oil export bypipeline or via FSU.b) Hull girder bending. Increased thickness of deck and bottom plate may be necessarywhen modifying intercept tankers to improve hull girder modulus and reduce cyclicbending stresses.c) In topsides supporting structure, due to transmission of hull bending stress intotopside PAUs.56Guidance on fatigue design and analysis is provided by Classification Societies asfollows. The required target fatigue life is 20 years or field life if longer, multiplied bya factor of safety (see below).LR (ref.22) Part 4 chapter 5 section 5 includes: Factors which influence fatigue Sources of cyclic loading Structural areas to be examined for fatigue Fatigue damage calculations (using Miner's summation) Joint classifications and S-N curves (see Appendix A) Factors of safety on fatigue life (depending on accessibility for inspection/repair, andconsequence of failure) ABS (ref.23) Chapter 4 section 2.13.5 covers fatigue analysis.ABS (ref.39) Section 5 -1 - 5/7 covers the extent of fatigue analysis.DNV are managing the FPSO Fatigue Capacity JIP. The first phase examining fatigueperformance of butt welds is summarised in HSE report OTN 2001:015 (ref.40). Thesecond phase will examine fillet weld performance and will include a comparison withthe earlier MARIN Structural Integrity JIP.2.4.4 Local strengthFormulae for local strength are given by LR (ref.22) part 4, chapter 6: Design heads Watertight shell boundaries Deck structure Helicopter landing areas Wheeled vehicle loading Bulkheads Double bottom structure Superstructures and deckhouses Bulwarks and other means for protection of crew 2.4.5 Reliability based designRecent work by HSE in OTO 98:164 has examined Reliability Based Design andAssessment of FPSO Structures (ref.41). This has adopted the approach to reliabilitydesign of fixed jacket structures where statistical data on loading, materials, fabricationand rigorous analysis methods are applied. The approach has been used on a recentUKCS FPSO to assess the extreme loading states the vessel will encounter and a non-linear finite element analysis, incorporating post-yield and post-buckling behaviour of57elements, has been performed to assess the ultimate capability of the structure under thisloading.2.4.6 Material SelectionSteel grade is of course predetermined for conversion of existing or intercept tankers.For new-build custom-designed FPSOs, it is possible to optimise steel grade for theparticular requirements of FPSO duty. The choice lies between a completely mild steelhull (yield stress = 235 N/mm2) and a hull where the deck and bottom is high tensile steel(yield stress normally 355 N/mm2) and sides and longitudinal bulkhead in mild steel.The issues affecting material selection are as follows: High tensile steel produces a lighter hull (subject to the other constraints below) andallows greater crude oil cargo deadweight to be carried. This is normally of benefitfor dense crude oil where the crude oil capacity is limited by deadweight. For lightercrude oils, especially where a double bottom is fitted, the crude oil capacity is limitedby volume and therefore a saving in hull weight may not be directly beneficial. Fatigue is a major design issue for harsh environment FPSOs and the use of hightensile steel may produce greater cyclic stress ranges than the structural details permitfor fatigue. This constraint may not permit the full advantage of reduced scantlingsand structural weight from HTS to be realised. HTS hull is more flexible (reduced modulus) so that more care needs to be taken intopside/piping design for hull flexibility. Weldability requirements for HTS are more onerous than mild steel.2.4.7 Welding and structural detailingWelding requirements and structural detailing are covered in detail in classificationsociety rules e.g. LR (ref.22) Part 4 Chapter 8.It is important to note that due to the difficulty of in-situ structural repair, high standardsof welding and structural detailing are required to prevent initiation of fatigue cracks.Particular attention should also be paid to quality of field welds between block sub-assemblies where problems have occurred in the past.582.5 GREEN WATER2.5.1 IntroductionGreen water i.e. unbroken wave crests inundating the deck of the FPSO, is a majorconsideration because of the production equipment mounted on deck. This equipment ismounted on a raised production deck (typically 2.5m above main deck) and thisminimises the effect of green water. However damage has been sustained by UKCSFPSOs to cable trays, walkways and stairs, and containers have been lost from theproduction deck. Items which are at most risk are those under the production deck e.g.drains vessels, and these must be designed for green water loading.Green water may be experienced over the bow (especially since the FPSO weathervanes)and this requires the fitting of a forecastle or breakwater to protect turret/swivel andproduction equipment.Green water may be experienced over the sides especially in non-collinearwind/wave/current. This requires adequate freeboard and height of PAU/module abovedeck to avoid green water on the production deck.Green water may also be experienced at the stern, particularly with vessels without apoop deck, due to vessel pitching down at the stern coupled with a wave crest passing.However, this is not considered to be as high a risk as bow or side green water loading.2.5.2 Current prediction methodsGreen water behaviour for a particular design should be studied using model tank tests.For preliminary design guidance, the results of the JIP 'F(P)SO Green Water Loading'conducted by MARIN and the computer design tool 'GreenLab' can be used byparticipants in the JIP. This predicts green water exceedance and correspondingpressures along the FPSO.This program has been used by HSE in Analysis of Green Water Susceptibility ofFPSO/FSUs on the UKCS OTO Report 2001:005 (ref.42) which was subsequentlyreviewed by MARIN in HSE Research Project 3794, MARIN Review of HSEGreenwater Study, completion 2000 (ref.43). This investigated the susceptibility but notthe consequences of green water on deck for UKCS FPSO/FSUs. The analysis indicatedthat: Nearly one-half of these vessels were exposed to high bow green water susceptibility. Most of the vessels were exposed to high green water susceptibility at side in a 30degree heading to waves. Freeboards at maximum draughts are generally insufficient to prevent green wateroccurring on deck.59 More green water is likely to occur at lower wave height/period (typically 12seconds), corresponding roughly to the one-year wave, than with the designmaximum condition. The investigation also examined damage incidents in service. This correlated with theresults of the above analysis and indicated a frequency of 1 incident per installation per3.6 years.Freeboard requirements to avoid/minimise green water are obviously installation and site-specific. Preliminary guidance on green water height is summarised in fig. 2.5.1, fromwhich freeboard requirements can be deduced.Fig. 2.5.1 - Elevation of Green Water above still water level Additional guidance on green water behaviour will be available from HSE ResearchProject 3959 FPSO Response in long and short crested seas, due for completion April2002 (ref.44) and from the 'FLOW' (Floater Loading by Waves) JIP.The pressure due to green water inundation on deck is available for JIP participants fromthe GreenLab computer program at the fore perpendicular, 10m and 20m aft of the F.P.An alternative source for green water pressure is ABS (ref.23), appendix 2, section 3.2.5.3 Avoidance measuresAt the bow, there are two measures used to minimise green water:a) Extending the bow upward to form a forecastle. This structure mdesigned for high bow wave impact pressure (see section 2.6).b) Fitting lower bulwarks at the forward end and allowing green water toaboard but prevented from flowing further aft over production equipmebreakwater. Any structure in this forward end must be reinforced fogreen water pressures.10 - 12m 10 - 12 m18 - 22mFull load stillwater lineProductiondeckust be coment by ar local60At the sides, the main defences are to ensure adequate freeboard and height of productiondeck to raise production equipment above green water level. Bulwarks may be fitted(typically 1.4m high) at the deck edge to hinder green water inundation, but these shouldhave freeing ports to permit rapid drainage of green water and the structural designshould avoid transmitting hull bending to bulwarks. It should be noted that bulwarksmay have the effect of increasing blast overpressure.At the stern, a raised poop deck may be fitted.Equipment should be sited as far as possible above green water inundation areas. If thisis not possible, the equipment e.g. drains vessels, cabling, piping, stairs should bedesigned for green water pressures.Green water susceptibility appears to be highest in January and February and it may bemore economic to restrict operation to lighter than maximum draught during this periodto increase freeboard and decrease green water loads rather than design freeboard for thisonerous period.612.6 BOW WAVE IMPACT2.6.1 IntroductionRecent incidents have highlighted the need to consider bow wave impact at an early stagein FPSO design. In one incident, plating in the forecastle was torn and deck and shellstiffeners buckled and in the second incident, forecastle plating was buckled. Factors increasing the susceptibility of FPSOs to bow wave impact (relative to tradingtankers) are: Exposure to severe UKCS weather conditions with no means of weather avoidance. Weathervaning, which exposes bow area to weather, noting that non-collinearenvironments can also expose bow sides. Full rounded bow shape of many FPSOs (especially new-build).Bow wave impact is attributed to the celerity of water in the wave crest causing highstagnation pressures at the point of impact. Investigation has shown that the maximumpressures occur in short, steep seas e.g. in the first incident above, in 20m wave heightand 10-12 second period i.e. much less than the design wave condition. Since this is awave crest phenomenon, high pressures can be experienced in the upper bow andforecastle, exacerbated by bow pitching downwards.The above incident has shown that particular attention should be paid to the endattachments of shell plating stiffeners, to preventing stiffeners tripping and to field weldattachments of forecastles to the hull. Care should be taken to avoid siting safety /production critical items within forecastles where possible.2.6.2 Calculation of bow wave impact pressureHSE Report Review of Greenwater and Waveslam Design and Specification forFPSO/FSUs, OTO 2000:004 (ref.45) examined the Classification Society requirementson wave slam and the approaches adopted by leading FPSO designers. The conclusionwas that much of the guidance is based on empirical formulae and requires morescientific research to extend trading ship experience to FPSOs.ABS (ref.23) appendix 2, section 4 provides a formula for calculating bow wave impactpressure distribution, taking account of bow shape and position on bow from waterlineand freeboard deck. A first principles design approach is given in the above HSE Report(sections 10.6 & 10.7) to calculate the wave crest velocity and stagnation pressure forgiven wave height and period, and the resulting impact pressures for local plate panelsand larger areas. 62More work is underway to quantify bow impact pressure in the Flow JIP, conducted byMARIN. 2.6.3 Measures to minimise bow wave impactBow wave impact pressures are highest on full rounded bow shapes with raisedforecastles and bulwarks as in fig. 2.6.1 below, where the philosophy is to minimise theamount of green water that overtops the bow. Fig. 2.6.1 - Full-rounded bow shape with raised forecastle and bulwarksAn alternative is to fit a lower forecastle and/or bulwark as in fig.2.6.2, which minimisesthe area of bow structure exposed to wave impact. The greater amount of green waterwhich overtops the bow is deflected by a breakwater further aft in front of productionequipment. The wave pressure at the breakwater (and front of turret if exposed) ishowever considerably reduced from bow front impact pressures.Fig. 2.6.2 - Alternative bow design incorporating breakwaterRaisedforecastle andbulwarksBreakwaterDeckplanWaterline632.6.4 Full rounded v sharp bowFor converted trading tankers, the bow shape is of course pre-determined. For a new-build, bow shape in plan may be either full rounded (or semi-ellipsoidal) or a sharper bowwith or without a rounded extremity. The choice requires a trade-off study of first costversus a number of technical factors below:The full rounded bow provides maximum buoyancy for minimum steelweight due to itslow surface area. It minimises the 'dead space' forward of the turret and maximises thenatural weathervaning action of the vessel. It also maximises the buoyancy in the bowsto aid the bows rising to meet wave crests. However the rounded bow presents a large amount of almost flat surface to wave impactloads and this must be strengthened. Also, waves meeting this surface will be deflectedupwards with more probability of green water overtopping.The sharper bow minimises bow impact forces (although wave impact in oblique seasdue to non-collinear environment needs to be considered). It also reduces mooringforces. The sharp bow is however more costly to construct and provides less space for aforward-mounted turret. 642.7 SLOSHING IN CARGO TANKS2.7.1 IntroductionSloshing in oil storage and ballast tanks of FPSOs is an issue because of the need to filland empty tanks at sea, possibly in severe weather conditions. Resonance between thetanks' natural sloshing period during filling/emptying and the periods of roll and pitch ofthe FPSO could result in high dynamic sloshing loads on the tank boundaries. Theproblem may be exacerbated by the smooth surface of the inner bottom when a doublebottom is fitted.A sloshing analysis should be performed for anticipated tank fillings to determine if thenatural period of the tank contents is close to the vessel natural pitch and roll periods. Ifthe tank natural periods approach the pitch or roll periods, then additional analysis isrequired to determine sloshing pressures and degree of structural strengthening of tankbulkheads.2.7.2 Pressure predictionSloshing pressures can be derived from: LR (ref.38) Part 3 chapter 3.5 ABS (ref.39) Section 5 - 1 - 3/112.7.3 Avoidance measuresIf high dynamic sloshing pressures are predicted, it may be more economic to reduce thesize of the tank by closer bulkhead spacing or by fitting partial slosh bulkheads. This willremove the tank natural period from the hull resonance range, and may be moreeconomical than increasing the tank boundary scantlings. 652.8 COLLISION DAMAGE2.8.1 IntroductionFPSOs by nature of their duty do not have to be designed for grounding damage. Theprincipal cause of damage is collision risk due to the following sources:1. Supply boat 2. Shuttle tanker3. Passing ship trafficType 1 and 2 damages are likely to be low energy damage with no loss of life or risk ofvessel loss unlike type 3 damage which could be a high energy collision from a largepassing ship.The objectives in designing for collision damage are firstly to avoid collision by wellthought out design and procedures for offloading operations which have been subject toHAZID and HAZOP studies. Secondly, the design should minimise the consequences ofcollision viz. spillage of crude oil, loss of buoyancy or stability, damage to productionequipment causing explosion/fire risk, damage to LQ. The immediate aim is reducing risk to life and environment with the secondary aim ofreducing the economic impact of damage on production by facilitating in-situ repair.The topic is the subject of an on-going HSE Research Project 3397-Collision AvoidanceManagement (ref.46). This will examine previous research, legislation and incidents andpresent an overview of the causes and consequences of collisions due to in-field vesselsand passing traffic. It will also review the effectiveness of different collision control andavoidance systems.2.8.2 Supply boat operationGenerally in the UKCS, supply boat operations are conducted on DP with the supply boatpositioned adjacent to the FPSO cranes in the amidships region. The main risk is afailure of the DP system although if the FPSO is free to weathervane, the supply boat willprobably drift clear. An impact, if it occurs, is most likely on the side shell amidships.This is in a double hull area so there is minimum risk of cargo tank damage but it is alsoin the hull area with highest stresses so any damage will probably mean shutdownawaiting repair.Classification Society Rules e.g. LR Rules (ref.22) Part 4, chapter 3, 4.16.1 call for theunit to be capable of absorbing impact energy of 14MJ for sideways collision and 11MJfor bow and stern collision, corresponding to a supply vessel of 5,000te with a speed of2m/s.66HSE Report Collision Resistance of Ship-shaped Structures to Side Impact, OTO2000:053 (ref.47) contains methods of analysing collision damage and calculating theenergy required to deform and/or fail the side structure of the FPSO. 2.8.3 Shuttle tankersCollisions between shuttle tankers in UKCS have occurred because of the inability ofshuttle tankers to react quickly enough to follow sudden weathervaning of FPSOs ontheir spread mooring and because of loss of DP target for maintaining separation betweenthe vessels.The primary risk is collision of the shuttle tanker with the hose reel and aft end structureof the FPSO (commercial risk) and danger to personnel on the aft end of the FPSO.The suggested safeguards and mitigating measures are: Crew competency and well thought out shuttle tanker approach/loading procedures. Providing a 'dead space' at the stern of the FPSO with voids or water tanks in the hull,and ensuring that helidecks, hose reels and fuel tanks are set back from the stern toavoid damage. A 'crumple zone' has been proposed to absorb likely energy impacts withoutcompromising the watertight integrity of the FPSO or causing production to be shutdown. Design of the FPSO stern should ensure that damage from the bow of a shuttletanker (including bulbous bows) occurs above water level to facilitate repair. Thrusters on the FPSO are useful to optimise/stabilise FPSO heading during shuttletanker approach/offloading. Perform a failure modes and effects analysis on power, control and thruster systemsto ensure redundancy against failure.UKOOA FPSO Committee has formulated Tandem Loading Guidelines - Volume 1 -FPSO/Tanker Risk Control during Offtake (ref. 48) which reviewed current UKpractices, the implications of UK legislation, existing industry guidance and internationalinitiatives. The study concluded that tandem off-loading incident rate warrantedreduction by improved practices and the guidelines are intended to reduce the incidentrate and the inherent risks of a major accident.2.8.4 Passing traffic collisionThe probability of collision between passing traffic and an FPSO is increased because thelength of the FPSO (and possibly a shuttle tanker attached) presents a much larger 'target'than a fixed platform. Such a collision could have very large safety and environmentalconsequences.67The main counter measures are to prevent collisions taking place in the first place: Monitoring the course of passing traffic to detect collision courses, with enhanceddetection systems in high traffic areas. Audible warning on attendant vessels Emergency disconnection and sail away of shuttle tanker when a dangerous situationhas been detected early enough. Rotation of FPSO to minimise 'target' as far as possible in prevailing weather ifthrusters are fitted. Crew muster 682.9 STRUCTURAL / PRODUCTION FACILITIES INTERFACE2.9.1 Packaging of production facilitiesProduction facilities are usually located on a production deck (typically 2.5m above maindeck) to minimise the impact of green water, to remove topsides from zone 1 areasassociated with the vessel, and as a safety measure in case of explosion or fire in topsidesto minimise the risk to the vessel's crude oil tanks.The two main choices for structural packaging of production facilities on FPSOs are pre-assembled units (PAUs) or structural pancakes and larger modules, more typically usedon fixed jacket topsides. The trend for cost reasons towards issuing functional specifications to equipmentsuppliers (including the supply of structural PAU) has led to adopting a larger number ofPAUs on recent FPSOs. This has sometimes led to problems due to suppliers'unfamiliarity with the structural design aspects on a moving, flexing vessel. Small PAUsalso have greater potential for interface problems between different suppliers' PAUs andinter-module hook-up problems late in the project. This can be avoided by using largermodules but at the expense of a number of drawbacks (see below). The main factors to consider for module size optimisation are listed below. Support arrangementsVery large 'module' type structures impose high point loads on the vessel structure and itis difficult to reinforce the under-deck structure of converted tankers to take these. Newbuild vessels can be designed at the outset for these loads.Support of 'rigid' PAU/module on the flexing deck of the FPSO must also be considered.For small PAU/modules, which span a short length of deck, the flexing movement issmall enough to allow 'hard' supports to be used.Large rigid modules, spanning a significant length of deck, need to have some flexibilitybuilt into their supports to prevent high hull stress levels being transmitted into themodule.For all support arrangements, it is important to fully consider fatigue due to hull flexureand inertia loads on PAU/modules in the design of supports.Structural weightThe structural weight of large three-dimensional modules is significantly greater than forflat pancake PAU construction. Fig. 2.9.1 illustrates this for a typical large FPSOtopsides (11, 000te).45%36% 27%0 5 10 15 20Fig. 2.9.1 - Variation in structural weight (including supports) with number of PAUsLifting facilities at fabrication siteThe lifting facilities need to have height and reach capable of lifting the PAUs/modulesonto the deck of the FPSO that is at a light outfitting draught. Typical lifting capabilitiesin this role are:Large mobile land crane 600tFloating sheer legs 1,500tHeavy lift crane barge 3,000tpace requirementscake-type construction is on a single level. This maximises safety but often usesle deck space to the detriment of lay-down area. Module-type construction cante two or more levels and leave spare space for future expansion and ample lay-Number of PAU/modulesStructuralweight /topsidesweight %Layout/sPAU panall availabincorpora69down areas. Safety is still equivalent to that of a fixed platform's topsides. Stabilityshould be checked for the higher centre of gravity of the topsides.70Inter-module hook-upThe number of process and utility piping connections, electrical and instrument loopconnections is greatly reduced by using larger modules (see fig. 2.9.2). This is a majoradvantage since these connections are made late in the project at the HUC yard and anyproblems would impact the project schedule.1501005000 5 10 15 20Fig. 2.9.2 - Variation in inter-PAU piping and instrument connectionsContractual arrangementsThe module split will also depend on whether a single topside contractor is appointedwho may prefer to adopt the large module route or a functional specification is issued to anumber of equipment vendors who will produce their own smaller PAU.The above factors need to be weighed up for each particular project to arrive at theoptimum module split.Number ofinter - PAUconnectionsNumber of PAUsPiping(Process &utility)Instrumentloop2.9.2 Structural support of facilitiesTypical structural support arrangements are shown below. Attention is drawn to theneed for careful fatigue detailing of the supports. Individual pillarsIndividual pillars from the PAU down to meet a pad or stool on the vessel's deck asshown in fig. 2.9.3. This is a simple, light and cheap solution. Provision must be madefor misalignment of the pillar relative to the deck support. It is also important to have theattachment weld some distance above the deck to avoid damaging internal tank coatings.Some fatigue damage has been experienced due to either longitudinal hull bending beingtransmitted through the supports to the PAU or bending from transverse loads on topsidesfrom roll motions.Transverse T - bTransverse T-beathese as shown iallows more flexinto local ship's structure and alloPAU structure.PAUPILLARSTOOLDECKPLICEWELDFig. 2.9.3 - Individeamsms mounted across then fig. 2.9.4. The T-beaibility in designing PAUstructure. The topside lw local flexing to reduS71ual pillar support ship's deck with the PAU supports landing onms are fabricated at the shipyard. The system structure and supports without having to tie thisoads are also spread more evenly into the ship'sce the hull bending stresses transmitted into theFig. 2.9.4 - Transverse T-Beam supportBridge bearing proposalThe use of bridge bearings has been proposed to support topsides while allowinghorizontal flexibility to accommodate hull bending. Attention would need to be paid indesign to the number of cycles of distortion in the bridge bearing used in this role,compared to the traditional use where the main effect is thermal expansion. Problems with cross-linking of PAUsAttention is drawn to additional fatigue problems in transverse beams linking two PAUswhere these are sited on different parts of the deck as shown in fig. 2.9.5. The two PAUsexperience different deck deflections due to hull bending and the relative horizontaldeflection can cause high cyclic stresses in interconnecting structure especially if this isshort and stiff.2.9.3 Design loadsThe loads for designing PAUs/modules section 1. The design of local structurealso covered by the above reference in APAUDECKABLETOFLEXAPPROX 10M WEB FRAMESIN TANKSTRANSVERSE T-BEAM72may be derived from ABS (ref.23) Appendix 2 in the hull supporting production equipment isppendix 2, section 7.73PLAN VIEW ELEVATIONFig. 2.9.5 - Potential fatigue problem in PAU connectionsCracking intransverse inter-connection beamPAU1PAU 2742.10 HULL DEFLECTION PATTERNS2.10.1 IntroductionThe FPSO hull acts like a girder and deforms in the vertical plane under the action of 'stillwater loads' (uneven weight and buoyancy distributions) and wave loading. It isnecessary to consider the extreme values of both types of loading to obtain the maximumtensile and compressive stresses/deformations in the deck and bottom. For an FPSO, theextreme 'sagging' condition (fig. 2.10.1A) will be a full load in crude storage tankscoupled with a wave of approximately the ship length with its trough amidships. Theextreme 'hogging' condition (fig. 2.10.1B) will be the ballast condition coupled with awave of approximately the ship length with its crest amidships.Fig 2.10.1A - Extreme sagging condition Fig. 2.10.1B - Extreme hogging conditionThe FPSO hull also deforms in the horizontal plane under the action of wave loading inoblique seas but this effect can be neglected for practical purposes since (a) horizontalbending loads are smaller than vertical, (b) the FPSO hull is stiffer in horizontal bending(since breadth/depth = 2) and (c) the maximum horizontal loads do not occursimultaneously or in the same conditions as peak vertical loads.2.10.2 Calculation of hull deformationHull deformations at deck level should be calculated to give guidance for design ofpiping for production equipment and structural design of PAUs/modules. Both of theseexperience a longitudinal strain due to hull bending. This has a static component due tostill water bending and a dynamic component due to wave action. The hull deformationpattern is shown in fig. 2.10.2. The procedure for calculating hull deformation effects in piping and PAUs/modules is: 1) Establish a baseline case where the FPSO is at the fit-out stage in dock, with the dryweight of topside equipment on deck, at the point when piping flanges are made upand PAU/module to deck structural connections made.2) Calculate baseline hull deformation for this condition.3) Establish critical sagging and hogging conditions (see above).4) Calculate hull deformations for these conditions (static and dynamic components).5) Deformation in piping and PAU/module structure is the difference between (2) and(4) deformations.The hull deformations may be obtained from the coarse finite element model of the hullstructure. Since this is not usually available early in design, the following simplifiedprocedure can be used for preliminary guidance. The deformations are assumed toincrease linearly with distance Y above the neutral axis of the ship (see fig. 2.10.2).Fig. 2.10.2 - Hull bending deformation patternLongitudinal deformation = L1 - L0 = L0 x strain = L x stress / Young's modulus (E)The maximum permissible hull bending stress at deck level due to combined still waterbending and wave bending is 175 . f 1 N/mm2, where f 1 is yield strength of high tensilesteel in deck / yield strength of mild steel based on classification societies' rules. Thestrain corresponding to this maximum stress is shown in table 2.10.1.Strain = deformation (mm)per metre length of shipMild steel hull (235 N/mm2 yield)High tensile deck hull(340 N/mm2 yield)At main deck level +/- 0.84 mm/m +/- 1.22 mm/mAt process deck level(+2.5m above main deck)on long process decks+/- 1.01 mm/m +/- 1.46 mm/mAt pipe rack level(+5.0m above main deck)on long pipe racks+/- 1.1On short process decks orshort pipe racksAs for Table 2.10.1 - MaximuL0L1Y758 mm/mmain deckm hull strain v+/- 1.71 mm/mAs for main deckalues at amidships 76The above deformation values apply in the central 0.4 of the length of the FPSO and canbe tapered outside this area linearly to zero at the bow and stern.2.10.3 Static v dynamic deformationsThe 'static' component of deformation due to still water bending is approximately 40% ofthe values in table 2.10.1 and the 'dynamic' component due to wave action (for themaximum design wave) is approximately 60%.772.11 MOTION BEHAVIOUR2.11.1 Introduction Good motion behaviour is essential for an FPSO operating in the harsh UKCSenvironment for safety and efficient operation, especially in the following areas: Crew comfort and safety Helicopter operation Production & utility equipment operability FPSO motions ('fishtailing') during offloading to shuttle tankerIn addition, knowledge of extreme hull motions and accelerations is required to establishdesign criteria for topside structure and systems.2.11.2 Design valuesDesign values for motions and accelerations should be derived from model test tankresults for the site-specific environment. Preliminary guidance on typical extrememotions is contained in: LR (ref.28) Table 15.1 gives motions and accelerations for various headings. Thesevalues have been derived from LR's database for various FPSO's and environments. Thedata contained in the above document has been analysed to derive the design curves infigs. 2.11.1 - 3 below. Other useful information is contained in:ABS (ref.23) Appendix 2, Section 8, 5.7.1 Ship Motions and Accelerations givesformulae for calculating pitch and roll motions and vertical, longitudinal and transverseaccelerations.HSE (ref.44) will carry out a series of systematic tests on a representative FPSO in shortand long crested seas to identify maximum motion responses. This work should beavailable in April 2002.78Degrees or M2520151050 Head 22.5 45HeadingFig. 2.11.1 - Maximum (100 year) design responses (single amplitude)M/sec23210Head 22.5 45HeadingFig. 2.11.2 - Maximum (100 year) linear accelerations (at vessel CG)Roll(degrees)Heave (m)Pitch(degrees)HeaveSurgeSway79Degrees/sec22.01.51.00.50.0Head 22.5 45HeadingFig. 2.11.3 - Maximum (100 year) angular accelerationsLarge roll motions may also occur due to tide influence turning the FPSO beam on toseas in cases where no active thruster heading control is fitted.RollPitchYaw802.12 MODEL TANK TESTINGModel tank testing is recommended at an early stage in FPSO design to confirm thenumerical analysis results for loads and motions and to pick up any phenomena which theanalytical methods do not cover adequately. This is particularly important for vessels ofunusual configuration. The results from the model tests should be available in time tofeed into detail design of moorings, riser and vessel.The information to be provided by model tank testing includes the following:a) Hull motions and accelerations for all six degrees of freedom to calibrate numericalmodels and for flexible riser and production equipment design and operationaldowntime assessment. Maximum responses depend on both wave height and periodso a range of Hs/Tp values should be investigated that are relevant to the site. Thisshould pay particular attention to wave periods close to the vessel natural periods.b) Video recording of green water behaviour on deck to confirm freeboard and height ofproduction deck above main deck to avoid green water loads on productionequipment.c) Pressure sensors on bow, forecastle and other areas susceptible to high wave impactpressures or bottom slamming.d) Mooring system loads to design turret and mooring components.e) Vessel excursions to feed into riser analysis. f) Effectiveness of thrusters in controlling heading.g) Any undesirable effects e.g. fish-tailingThe scale of the model should be selected as large as possible, usually constrained by thewave generator's capability to model the maximum wave height or by correctlymodelling the water depth in deeper water applications. A typical scale is 1/80.Particular attention needs to be paid to modelling the behaviour of the mooring systemwhich is Reynolds number dependent, compared to the Froude scaling used to determinevessel responses. This will entail modifying the line diameter and surface roughness ofmooring lines (and risers, if modelled).Environmental loads need to be modelled as accurately as possible. Wind loading maybe provided by fans and the wind speed profile relative to the reference height should beadjusted as close as possible to the computed site profile. An appropriate wind spectrumshould be selected to create accurate long period excursions and mooring loads. If this isnot possible, computer-controlled fans on the model can provide the relevant force andmoment corresponding to wind speed and vessel heading. Currents should be modelled to take into account the high loads attracted by risers andmoorings particularly in deeper water and the change in wave shape caused by currents.This may be achieved by underwater jets or by towing the model from a carriage. Modelbasin design should permit testing with non-collinear waves and wind/current.Further details are contained in HSE Report OTO 2000:123 Review of Model TestingRequirements for FPSOs (ref.50).812.13 TURRET INTERFACES2.13.1 IntroductionTurret design requires careful consideration (a) because of its complex nature and beingcritical to safe operation of the FPSO as a whole and (b) because of the interfaces withthe other FPSO systems viz. Structural/bearing interface with vessel hull Interface with production equipment through high-pressure swivel or wind-on hoses Riser interface Mooring interfaceThese interfaces are complicated by the design of each system usually being carried outby different contractors and therefore needing close co-ordination of design basis, designinformation and construction planning.2.13.2 Structural/bearing interfaceThe turret and hull structure in way of turret need to be designed in conjunction to ensureefficient structural paths for turret loads into the hull and compatibility of loads anddeformations in hull and turret structural models.A finite element model is required of the turret and adjacent hull structure. For a foreend turret, the model usually extends from the fore end of the vessel into the cargo tankaft of the tank containing the turret. For an amidships turret, the model usually extendsfrom the tank forward to the tank aft of the tank containing the turret. The loads include:a) Turret weight, mooring and riser tensions, including acceleration inducedloads.b) Overall hull bending and shear forces.c) Internal and external pressure loads corresponding to design tank loadingconditions and range of operating drafts, with wave action.d) Local deck loading due to green seas as applicable.The acceptance criteria for material yielding, buckling and fatigue are covered in section2.4.2 of these Guidance Notes. Fairleads and their supports are to be designed for a load equal to the breaking strength ofthe vessel's mooring lines.Further guidance on structural design is given in LR (ref.22), Part 4, chapter 4, 4.2.13-18and ABS (ref.23), June 2000, chapter 4, section 2.15.1 and chapter 5, section 4.13.82Structural members in turret and adjacent hull should be effectively connected to avoidhot spots, notches and stress concentrations. The loss of hull girder cross sectional areaneeds to be compensated e.g. by increased deck plate thickness, in way of the turretopening. The increased deck thickness should be tapered smoothly fore and aft of theturret opening to avoid stress concentration.Particular attention should be paid to access arrangements for inspection and repair ofstructure and bearings. In this respect, the siting of bearings should be carefullyconsidered. Deck-mounted bearings are easier to inspect but have higher loads thanbearings located near turret mid-depth. Bearing arrangements involving pads shouldhave positive securing to avoid pads falling out in service.ABS requires a corrosion margin of 10% up to a maximum of 1.5mm on turret/hullinterface scantlings.2.13.3 Mooring interfaceMooring arrangements may be either active or passive i.e. locked-off. The active systemrequires considerable space in the turret to accommodate one winch per mooring line andpower/controls for these. Active systems may be employed for several reasons:a) Control of vessel position within flexible riser operating watch circle inshallow water.b) Evening out line tensions in severe weather or after line breakage.c) Facilitating field installation.d) Ease of inspection of upper part of mooring chain in service.e) Emergency disconnection.Passive systems are normally employed to reduce first cost and space requirements in theturret. The mooring line length and tension are pre-set during installation using a singlewinch which acts on each mooring line in turn. This is a time-consuming and weatherdependent operation, and highly dependent on the reliability of the single mooring winch.To speed up installation and provide redundancy, two installation mooring winches arerecommended from operators' experience.2.13.4 Riser interfaceThe layout of the risers and their associated hard piping/manifolding in the turret shouldconsider the following factors:a) Riser installation operations.b) Access for operations e.g. pigging.c) Access (cranes and personnel) for maintenance.83d) Flexibility for field expansion in terms of spare riser slots, riser installationarrangements, and ease of connecting future lines to manifold with minimumdisruption to existing production.e) Safety aspects e.g. ventilation, escape means.2.13.5 Interface with production equipmentThe interface between turret riser systems and production equipment needs to takeaccount of weathervaning of the FPSO around the turret. Fluid transfer is accomplishedby either (a) a high pressure swivel system with multiple toroidal paths for differentduties/ fluid paths or (b) a 'wind-on/off' system of hoses on a drag chain arrangement.System (a) permits unlimited rotation of the FPSO around the turret and is thereforesuitable for all types of FPSO. System (b) only permits rotation of +/- 270 degreesapproximately before the FPSO must be 'unwound'. This limitation restricts system (b) tovessels with substantial thruster power and amidships turrets.842.14 MOORINGS2.14.1 Design considerations for FPSOsIn addition to meeting the normal strength requirements for vessel positional moorings,FPSO moorings are also required to contain the vessel excursions within the limitationsof the flexible riser system. The flexible riser system represents a sizeable investmentitself and operation outside its specified limits would mean delay and loss of productionuntil testing and re-certification takes place. More extreme excursions could result in lossof riser containment and environmental pollution. FPSO mooring systems have long service lives and frequent inspection of mooring linesis not desirable because of the interference with production and the need to mobilise othervessels to retrieve moorings. There are therefore strong grounds for high reliability of FPSO mooring components anda design philosophy that accounts for the high economic penalty of mooring failure.2.14.2 Mooring analysisMooring analysis guidance is given in API RP 2SK Recommended Practice for Designand Analysis of Stationkeeping Systems for Floating Structures, 2nd Edition, 1996(ref.51). This covers preliminary design of moorings using quasi-static methods and alsofinal design using dynamic analysis methods. The factors of safety reflect the accuracyof the analysis method. For deepwater applications, it is important to include thecontribution of riser loads, stiffness and damping in the mooring analysis. The calculation of environmental loads and combination of wind, wave and current loadsand their relative headings are covered in section 2.3 of these Design Guidance Notes.For mooring analysis, loads to be considered are steady-state (mean wind, current, wavedrift), low frequency loads near the natural frequency of the vessel (varying wind andwave drift) and wave frequency motions.The design conditions to be considered are:a) Intact designThe system with all components intact should be checked in the 100year stormenvironment. Acceptable factors of safety are 1.67 against breaking strength if adynamic analysis is used or 2.00 if a quasi-static analysis is used.The fatigue life of the mooring system should be calculated using the site-specificwave scatter diagram. This should equal or exceed the design life which is theservice life multiplied by a factor of 3 for inspectable components and 10 for non-inspectable components. The fatigue life of the mooring line is influenced by allcomponents and defined by the weakest element.85b) Damaged case (one line broken)The system with one mooring line broken should be checked in the 100year stormenvironment. After reaching equilibrium, the system should exhibit a factor of safetyof 1.25 if a dynamic analysis is used and 1.43 if a quasi-static analysis is used.If thruster assisted moorings are used, then the system should be checked for theabove criteria in case of loss of thruster power or mechanical failure on one thruster.This case should be carefully considered where thrusters maintain the heading of thevessel into the environment and thruster loss would result in high environmental loadsif the vessel is exposed to a beam environment.c) Damaged case with transient motionThe dynamic behaviour of the system after one line is broken should be analysed tocheck the maximum excursion is within flexible riser limitations. The system shouldhave a factor of safety of 1.05 if dynamic analysis is used, or 1.18 if a static analysisis used, in the transient condition.The limit on FPSO excursion imposed by the flexible riser system should also beobserved. This limit is determined by many factors that should all be taken account ofduring mooring/riser system design. Typical allowable FPSO excursions are in the rangeof 15%-30% of water depth. This is particularly onerous for shallow water applications.This limit may be constrained by riser clashing (with themselves or with moorings), bendstiffener limitations, pipe overbending, wire stresses, or other factors. The allowableoffset can in many cases be increased by configuration design which includes mid-waterbuoyancy or arches, hold-back tethers near the seabed, large clearance between risers ofunequal hydrodynamic characteristics, and large clearances between risers and moorings.Where steel catenary risers (SCR) are proposed for deepwater applications, a detailedriser analysis is required at an early stage to determine the feasibility and limitations ofSCR for the application. The riser design process must be integrated with mooringdesign in an iterative process. Early analysis of stresses, curvature, fatigue (includingvortex induced vibration damage in strong current areas) is recommended in advance ofFEED. Because of curvature and fatigue restrictions, SCR use on FPSOs would berestricted to deepwater applications i.e. to West of Shetlands areas.2.14.3 Anchor designDifferent types of anchor have been used for UKCS FPSOs. For shorter field liveswhere the unit will be required to move to another location, drag anchors are commonlyused. For longer term applications, piled anchors e.g. suction piles, may be used.Suitable conservative assumptions on soil behaviour and anchor behaviour should bemade to take account of the large economic penalty and environmental consequences ofdamage to risers from loss of positioning. Guidance on anchor design is contained inABS (ref.24) chapter 5 section 2, including suggested safety factors in table 1.862.15 CRUDE OIL EXPORT2.15.1 IntroductionThe decision on oil export route is driven by the availability of a pipeline export systemand the available ullage in the pipeline, and by the relative economics of pipeline versusshuttle tanker operation. Shuttle tanker export is selected in the majority of cases in UKCS since: a) The field in question is in a frontier area with no pipeline infrastructure e.g. West ofShetlands.b) Pipeline ullage would constrain production.c) Shuttle tanker export has very low capex compared to a pipeline system since theshuttle tankers are generally leased on a long-term day rate. With a shuttle tankerexport, there are therefore no high committed export costs in case there is poor fieldperformance and early abandonment.d) Tanker export opex, although higher than pipeline opex, is proportional to the numberof tanker offtakes, and will therefore reduce as production declines.The disadvantage of tanker export is its vulnerability to weather interruption. However,this is largely mitigated by the large volume of crude oil buffer storage available in thehull of FPSOs. This major advantage is one of the key reasons for selecting FPSOs asopposed to TLPs or semi-submersibles for developments where offshore loading isnecessary.2.15.2 Export by shuttle tankerThe objective of the shuttle tanker export operation is to maximise the production uptimeand protect it from downtime from the harsh environment, whilst ensuring a safeoperation and minimising the risk of spillage. Due to the harsh environment, shuttle tanker export in UKCS has standardised on thearrangement where the shuttle tanker is astern of and approximately in line with theFPSO, following it as it weathervanes. Bow manifolds are used on the shuttle tankers tominimize the length of the export hose and enable dry storage on the FPSO. Shuttletanker position relative to the FPSO is normally maintained by dynamic positioning.Experience in UKCS shows an efficiency of typically >98% for the export system. Themain drivers for efficient shuttle tanker export are:Ability of shuttle tankers to connect and stay connected in high sea states.Experience of operators in UKCS has shown that DP shuttle tankers can usually connectto the FPSO in the following conditions:87Criteria for Connection DisconnectionSignificant wave height (m) 4.5 5.5 - 6.0Maximum wave height (m) 8.0 9.5Maximum wave period (s) 15 15Wind speed (knots) 35-40 35-40Visibility (m) 500-800 -Table 2.15.1 - Shuttle tanker connection criteriaThe percentage time connected can be calculated using the Weather Windows Software(ref.49). This program simulates the offloading operations, and can be programmed witha time series of wind speed and wave height for the field over the field life against whichthe program tests at 3-hourly intervals for the ability to connect/stay connected at aspecified wind/wave threshold. Adequate crude buffer storageThe crude oil storage level should be sufficient to minimise production downtime due toweather preventing shuttle tanker connection. Factors influencing the choice of storagelevel are discussed in section 1.2.2. Crude export pumping rateAn important factor in maximising the offshore loading efficiency is to reduce the timerequired for transferring the cargo package from FPSO to shuttle tanker and makemaximum use of the short weather windows. This is an economic trade-off betweenincreased capex of larger pumps, lines and metering skids versus increase in operatingefficiency. In UKCS, transfer times of between 14-28 hours are achieved. 2.15.3 Crude oil pumping and transfer hosesThe equipment requirements on the FPSO for shuttle tanker loading are described insection 3.7.6.2.15.4 Shuttle tanker operationsShuttle tanker dynamic positioning is a key element in ensuring a safe and efficientdischarge operation. Shuttle tanker operations require careful consideration of the criticalinputs viz. hardware, software and human, to ensure a safe operation. Guidelines havebeen published by INTERTANKO (Association of Independent Tanker Owners) entitledRisk Minimisation Guidelines for Shuttle Tanker Operations Worldwide at OffshoreLocations, March 2000 (ref.52). This contains a risk minimisation process flow chartwhich focuses on critical elements in shuttle tanker operations and appropriate measures88to reduce risks to acceptable levels. See also OCIMF (Oil Companies InternationalMarine Forum) Offshore Loading Safety Guidelines (ref.53) and UKOOA TandemLoading Guidelines (ref. 48).Section 2.8 covers shuttle tanker collision and preventative measures. 2.15.5 Export by pipelineOil export by pipeline is employed on only one UKCS FPSO at present. The requirementfor gas export by pipeline is likely to be a priority for FPSOs to avoid flaring and foreconomic/strategic use of gas onshore or on neighbouring installations. Oil and gasexport by pipeline will be dependent on current technology and limitations on highpressure swivel and flexible riser design.892.16 BALLAST SYSTEMSThe capacity and location of ballast tanks should be designed to ensure that with crude oilstorage tanks empty or part-full, the FPSO draught and trim meets requirements onstability, maximum trim for production equipment operation and minimum draughtforward to prevent bottom slamming.The capacity of the ballast system should be consistent with the crude oil discharge rateto shuttle tanker to ensure the above requirements are maintained during dischargeoperations. Ballast system design should take account of the particular demands of FPSOservice:a) More frequent offloading and ballast operations, 5 - 10 times more than a tradingtanker, imposes more wear on pumps.b) Offloading and ballasting at sea where ship pitch motions must be considered as wellas trim. c) Redundancy in pumps to prevent pump breakdown having an adverse impact onproduction/offloading operations.d) Long-term serviceability and accessibility issues for pumps, piping and valvesbearing in mind the difficulty of maintenance and repair in the field. This affects forexample selection of materials for ballast piping and the design of the ballast seachest to ensure it can be blanked off easily for maintenance of ship-side valves.Ballast valves on FPSOs should fail in the closed position to avoid problems withuncontrolled ballasting, de-ballasting or cross transfer of ballast from one tank to anotherin the event of power failure. See LR (ref.22), Part 5 chapter 12, section 10.1.3.Attention is drawn to the possibility of rapid flooding of the machinery space in case offailure of the ballast system (or other major piping system). Consideration should begiven to the following mitigating measures to reduce this risk: Double shut-off isolation valves at the ship's side, with a remote power operatedvalve in addition to the local manual gate valve. CCTV systems to be installed in machinery spaces that are at risk of flooding with adisplay in the ballast control room. Clear and unambiguous bilge and high bilge sensors and alarms. Competent marine personnel, manning 24hours per day, in the ballast/ marine controlroom. A means of draining the space at risk of flooding.Sections 3.6.4 and 3.7.3 also draw the designers attention to the use of remotely operatedmain isolation valves on seawater and firewater duties in the lower levels of machineryspaces.90The design of vents to ballast tanks should ensure that there is no risk of vent blockagedue to sticking of automatic vent closure devices e.g. WINEL valves, which could createa partial vacuum within the tank resulting in structural damage. Section 3.7.4 covers ballast piping issues.912.17 THRUSTERS2.17.1 ApplicationsThrusters may be fitted to FPSOs for several different reasons:a) To maintain heading in vessels fitted with an amidships turret that do not have naturalweathervaning.b) To provide a major part of station-keeping capability in a deeper water application.c) To fine-tune heading to minimise roll motions so that the process is settled, for crewcomfort and to assist shuttle tanker operations.Thrusters may also be useful in fire or platform abandonment scenarios where the vesselcan be rotated to clear fire or smoke from around production areas and living quarters andto provide a lee side for lifeboat launch. The configuration of thrusters and power requirement differs for the above applications.In the case of a) and b), they are safety critical items, and so the configuration and thereliability and the availability of the electrical supplies have to be carefully considered.In type (a), the thrusters are transverse normally tunnel-mounted with sufficient power to'unwind' the vessel before the limits of the drag chain hose transfer system on the turretare reached.In type (b), the thrusters are a combination of transverse thrusters to maintain headingand longitudinal thrusters (which could be main propulsion in a converted vessel) toreduce the environmental load transmitted to the mooring system.In type (c), the thrusters are transverse stern-mounted, either tunnel or azimuthing. Thepower requirements are relatively small, since the thrusters are used only to fine-tuneheading in moderate sea-states, and not to achieve major weathervaning. The normaluses are where the wind and current are not collinear with waves or swell, causing heavyrolling. Thrusters may be used to fine-tune the FPSO heading to reduce rolling. Duringshuttle tanker connection and loading, the thrusters may be used to reduce fish tailing andslow down changes in FPSO heading following a change in tidal strength or direction. 2.17.2 Design considerationsThruster sizing and type selection is a function of the duty requirements above, and theenvironmental loads the thrusters have to overcome. The environmental loading andthrust requirements can be assessed using the methods in section 2.3 of these DesignGuidance Notes or more accurately from wind tunnel and model tank testing. Thrustrequirements need to be increased for the effects of water inflow speed due to highcurrents.92The required power rating can be deduced from manufacturers' data or initially as 100 HPto provide 1.3metric tonne thrust. Power requirements should be increased wherenecessary to cover continuous ratings. Thruster redundancy depends on the duty requirement of the thrusters and requires anassessment of the probability and consequences of failure and the reduced capability ofthe system.For new-build FPSO hulls of dumb barge configuration, it will be easier to fit anazimuthing thruster(s) in a cut-up stern rather than incorporate a tunnel. For convertedvessels, a tunnel-mounted thruster(s) may be more easily fitted in the afterbody skeg.Thruster type selection should take account of maintenance at sea requirements and allowworking parts to be withdrawn into the hull for inspection and repair rather than diver-assisted keel hauling.932.18 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONSDesign of the FPSO should take account of the demands of long-term service with in-situinspection and maintenance and the requirements of performing this safely withminimum interruption to production activity.An integrity management plan should be developed in parallel with the design of hullstructure/systems and the mooring system. This document will cover inspection strategy,the frequency of inspection, criteria for acceptance of results and plans for repair orreplacement of failed items with a permissible time limit for these to be implemented.Design safety factors, fatigue lives, redundancy and corrosion margins should becompatible with the inspection regime in the integrity management plan.Hull design should enable safe means of access to all tanks and void areas for inspectionand maintenance at sea. Consideration should be given to locating stiffeners in doubleskin wing tanks and in double bottom where possible to facilitate inspection withoutentering cargo spaces. Access to pumps and valves for change-out should be provided.Tank arrangements should provide a sufficient number of tanks to enable productionoperations to continue at close to optimum efficiency while selected tank(s) are cleanedfor inspection and maintenance. Tank venting arrangements should facilitate purging ofselected tanks for entry.The International Chamber of Shipping & Oil Companies International Marine Forumpublication International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals (ISGOTT) (ref.54) isa reference for many items relevant to tanks operations. Other useful reference sources are the Tanker Structures Co-operative Forum ConditionEvaluation & Maintenance of Tanker Structures (ref.55), which deals mainly withcorrosion, and their Guidance Manual for the Inspection and Condition Assessment ofTanker Structures (ref.56) which deals with weld defects and possible repair details.The mooring integrity plan should include a reliable means of monitoring the integrity ofeach mooring line and anchor. The permissible delay until a failed line is replaced shouldalso be covered. This will depend on the time of year and the probability ofenvironmental loads exceeding the reduced capacity of the mooring system. Resultsfrom DNV DEEPMOOR and ND/MCS Integrated Mooring and Riser Design Studysuggested a time limit of 3 months.94UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 3PRODUCTION FACILITIESCONTENTS LIST3.1 INTRODUCTION3.2 FRONT END ENGINEERING3.2.1 Performance Standards and Specifications3.2.2 System Sizing3.2.3. Design Safety Case3.3 HYDROCARBON AND NON-HYDROCARBON SYSTEMS:CONTINGENT FACTORS3.3.1 Introduction3.3.2 Gas processing including flaring and venting3.3.3 Water Injection3.3.4 Produced Water Handling and Disposal3.3.5 Sub-sea Infrastructure3.3.6 Export of Oil and Gas via Shuttle Tanker or Pipeline3.3.7 Potential for Recovery of VOCs3.3.8 Decommissioning and Abandonment3.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIES3.4.1 The Purpose of Design Philosophies3.4.2 Safety Management3.4.3 Environmental Strategy and Management3.4.4 Cargo Management3.4.5 Area Classification3.4.6 HVAC3.4.7 Electrical3.4.8 Controls3.4.9 Noise and Vibration3.4.10 Corrosion Management3.4.11 Isolation for Maintenance953.5 GLOBAL LAYOUT: DEVELOPMENT FACTORS3.5.1 Introduction3.5.2 Fires and Explosions including Blast and Firewalls3.5.3 Escape Routes3.5.4 Temporary Refuge (TR) and FPSO Evacuation3.5.5 Containment of Hydrocarbon Spillage3.5.6 Greenwater3.5.7 Environmental Exposure3.5.8 Main Access and Removal Routes3.5.9 Main Cable Routing3.5.10 Mechanical Handling and Lay-down Areas3.5.11 Future Expansion and Upgrading3.6 LOCAL LAYOUT: DEVELOPMENT FACTORS3.6.1 Living Quarters and Offices 3.6.2 Control Rooms3.6.3 Maintenance Access and Removal Routes3.6.4 Operations Access and Operability3.6.5 Workshops and Stores3.7 FPSO MAJOR SYSTEMS INCLUDING SYSTEM INTEGRATION/SEGREGATION3.7.1 Introduction3.7.2 Firewater3.7.3 Seawater3.7.4 Bilge and Ballast3.7.5 Inert Gas3.7.6 Product Offloading3.7.7 Vents3.7.8 Drains3.7.9 Main Electrical Power3.7.10 Emergency Electrical Power3.7.11 HVAC3.7.12 Fire Protection3.7.13 Fire and Gas System3.7.14 Production and Marine Controls (including ESD)3.7.15 Telecommunications3.7.16 Cranes3.7 17 Turret and its Support Systems3.7.18 Safety related sub-systems963.8 FPSO SMALL UTILITY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS3.8.1 Diesel Fuel3.8.2 Fuel Gas3.8.3 Compressed Air 3.8.4 Potable Water3.8.5 Heating Medium3.8.6 Cooling Medium3.8.7 Sewage3.8.8 Helifuel97UKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 3PRODUCTION FACILITIES3.1 INTRODUCTIONAn FPSO is an offshore floating production and storage installation which should beconsidered as a single unit. The approach to its design must take into account that it is asingle unit, even though it is ship-shaped. In the past, the FPSOs production facilitieshave at times been viewed, somewhat simplistically, as the modules located on the maindeck of the hull providing the essential crude oil storage. The production facilities should be regarded as all the physical systems needed to permitthe FPSO to function fully and safely. The marine systems are just as important to thesafe performance of the installation as the oil and gas handling systems and should not beconsidered in isolation. Not all the systems necessarily interact with one another butmany are interdependent. It is essential, therefore, that the interdependencies are fullyconsidered and that all the interfaces, both physical and system related, are identified andaddressed early in the design phase.Part 3 reviews a range of significant design related issues which have a bearing on theability of the FPSO to ultimately function safely and efficiently over the time it is in thefield. It covers matters such as the development of design philosophies, layout, andgeneral system design. Although it does not attempt to fully address the design of the oiland gas production systems, it does touch on a number of issues, or contingent factors,connected with hydrocarbon recovery and processing which can have a significantbearing on the FPSOs ability to function as originally envisaged.It is not intended to provide a commentary on the approach to the management of anFPSO project, but it will at times indicate where certain project management decisionscan have a bearing on the engineering outcomes.983.2 FRONT END ENGINEERINGWhether the project is fast track or is to be run to a more measured timetable, the frontend engineering design phase, (FEED), enables the foundations for the success ofsubsequent phases to be laid down. The project Statement of Requirements, if it hasalready been drawn up, can be refined and the more detailed Basis of Design can bedeveloped, along with other activities discussed below. During this phase, it is likely that long lead major equipment items such asturbogenerators, compressors, high pressure pumps, large pressure vessels etc will beordered. A high level of definition will therefore be needed for these items, at least, tominimise the risk of significant change during their design and manufacture.3.2.1 Performance Standards and SpecificationsThese standards, as their name suggests, will set out the performance of the FPSO, itssystems and equipment. The standards will indicate the levels of reliability, robustnessand durability which will be needed to achieve the safety, environmental and productionuptime targets which the field development aspires to. They should not be confused withdetailed specifications.Performance StandardsA performance standard for a particular item of equipment or system may take the formatof a simple data sheet or sheets. The creation of performance standards encourages theowner/ operator and the designer to give careful consideration as to how the item shouldperform in terms of output, throughput, behaviour etc under the complete range ofoperating conditions, both normal and abnormal, likely to be encountered in the course ofthe FPSOs life. Furthermore it enables emphasis to be placed on the need for highstandards of reliability and the consequences of low reliability.Functional SpecificationsFunctional Specifications may be employed to set out the requirements which a range ofequipment items have to meet to try to ensure a degree of uniformity in layout andperipheral items such as provision of small bore piping, compression fittings, valve types,pressure switches, paint systems, junction and terminal boxes etc. These specificationsshould go some way to avoid a large number of different item types from a wide range ofmanufacturers. They should also help to limit the number of vendors likely to beinvolved for support and maintenance during the operations phase and help to keep therange and levels of the spare parts holding within manageable proportions.99Industry Standards and SpecificationsOver recent years, there have been several UK oil industry initiatives to reduce costs ofequipment and services. One of these was the CRINE initiative, as part of which modelspecifications were developed in an attempt to reduce and dispense with the highlyprescriptive and costly levels of specifications employed during the 1970s and 1980s. Itis also recognised that a wide range of accepted and acceptable national and internationalstandards and specifications exist, e.g. API, BS, ISO, EN, covering the design,manufacture, assembly, installation and operation of the generic types of equipment. Itshould therefore not be necessary for owners and designers to overly customise thesestandards and specifications to reflect their preferences.During the Front End Engineering phase, the preparation of performance standardstogether with functional specifications and the judicious selection of industry standardsand specifications (and any model specifications, if considered to be suitable), should gosome way to ensuring that the owner and the operator of the FPSO will not only get themost suitable equipment and systems but the desired efficiency and longevity.Criticality RatingsAs part of fast track projects, it has not been uncommon for FPSO owners and their majordesign contractors to let out the designs for small modules or large skids to the supplier ofthe principal item or items of equipment to be housed in the modules or skids. Twotypical examples are gas compression and oil separation packages. As these suppliersand their sub vendors are two or even three steps removed from the design of the FPSO,their appreciation of the particular requirements of the FPSO may be limited. This can affect the ability of the equipment to perform satisfactorily and so it maybecome necessary for the owner and the major design contractor to have a closerinvolvement in the design and build of the particular package. The degree ofinvolvement can be determined by assigning a criticality rating to the equipment. As thename implies, the rating reflects the importance of the equipment to the safety and theuptime of the FPSO: the higher the rating the greater the involvement of engineering andquality assurance staff at vendor and sub-vendor level to secure a satisfactory product.The Front End Engineering phase is the ideal time to assess criticalities and to draw upthe ensuing action plans.3.2.2 System SizingThe FEED phase will allow the basic design parameters of the FPSO to be firmed up,with the designers liaising with the reservoir engineers to ensure that there is a highdegree of confidence in the reservoir profiles and fluid properties. For example, a lateincrease in the hydrogen sulphide content of the produced fluids can have a seriousimpact on equipment and system build and on schedule if the relevant materialspecifications have not been applied.100Production Profiles and Flowsheet DevelopmentSystem sizing will most likely be carried out using proprietary process engineeringsimulation packages. The refining of flowsheets or process flow diagrams (PFDs) for thehydrocarbon and principal utilities will be ongoing, and at this stage consideration has tobe given to the possibility of future expansions, either within the field or from satellitedevelopments of other accumulations in the vicinity. The production profiles willindicate the duration of the ramp-up to peak oil output, the nature and duration of thepeak production phase and the tail off. A sharply spiked profile with a short plateau maynot justify sizing the facilities for the peak. On the other hand, the likelihood of in-filldrilling, satellite development or the FPSO acting as host producer may have a majorinfluence on how the facilities are finally sized.Fluids PropertiesAt this stage, the properties of the reservoir fluids have to be well defined. Duringexploration and appraisal drilling, it has often been the case that insufficient attention hasbeen paid to the taking, handling, analysis, storage and retention of fluid samples.Inadequate fluid data can result in a degree of guess-work on the part of the processdesigners which may create future operational problems. Parameters such as gas-oilratios, wax content, pour point, specific gravity, viscosity, arrival temperature etc need tobe fully defined so that the designer can take in to account fouling, corrosion, chemicalinjection, heating, cooling etc when sizing the various systems.Production Trains and Equipment SparingDecisions have to be taken on the number and size of oil separation and gas processingtrains, the configuration of the water injection system and the sparing of key items ofequipment e.g. 2x50% pumps or 2x100% pumps or 3x33%pumps.System sizing and the development of the layout of the main deck are concurrent,iterative activities. These lead in turn to the sizing and location of production modulesand/ or pallets and the development of the construction and installation strategy. Inaddition, power profiles will be produced, leading to the sizing and selection of the mainpower system in terms of size and numbers of power generation units, especially sparecapacity.3.2.3 Design Safety CaseThe UKCS Safety Case Regulations (ref 9), regulation 4 and guidance note 87, call forthe submission of a Design Safety Case to the Offshore Safety Division of the Health andSafety Executive. As the name implies, the document sets out the essential features andprovisions to be incorporated in the detailed design of the FPSO to afford the highest101levels of safety on the installation. The project schedule must allow for the developmentof the Design Safety Case, and its submission to and review by the HSE. System sizing and layout studies will have a bearing on the assessments of the risks andconsequences of explosions, fires, collisions, impacts and other major incidents. Thenature, likelihood and possible consequences of such incidents will influence the degreeof equipment segregation, the provision and location of firewalls, blastwalls, escapetunnels etc, as well as the provision and extent of passive and active fire protection. Acarefully prepared high quality document, submitted in a timely manner, is essential iflate and major design changes are to be avoided.1023.3 HYDROCARBON AND NON-HYDROCARBON SYSTEMS: CONTINGENT FACTORS3.3.1 IntroductionWhile the oil separation system is probably the largest system within the productionfacilities, there are other sizeable hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon systems which havean influence on FPSO design. This section does not discuss the design of the oil and gassystems or of these other systems in detail but highlights a number of factors whichshould be considered and possibly allowed for in the design. Aspects ofdecommissioning and abandonment are also touched on.3.3.2 Gas Processing Including Flaring and VentingThe size of the gas processing system will be dictated largely by the gas-oil ratio, thevolume of produced fluids and whether there is a high pressure export or disposal systemor a requirement for gas lift.Given the environmental and economic desirability of minimising the flaring of gas, theowner will have to decide how best to ensure high reliability and uptime of the gashandling system. A single train of gas compression may be adequate where the gasproduction rate and the fuel demands of FPSO are in balance. Where the gas productionrate is high, then environmental considerations may dictate the selection of a twin train ofcompression. In the past, very low pressure gas in, for example, the third stage separatorand coalescer would have been flared or vented. Now, the provision of a very lowpressure gas collection and compressor system will serve to further reduce flared andvented emissions.Gas end-users, such as turbines, injection wells or pipeline, will dictate the specificationof the gas, and may necessitate the provision of a gas dehydration system. A decisionthen has to be made on whether all the gas handling facilities will be mounted in one ormore modules, with attendant considerations of global and local layout, operability andmaintenance access.Safe disposal of gas in emergency is normally via the flare system although in somecircumstances venting may be used, providing adequate dispersion can be demonstrated.The flare system usually consists of an HP system, and LP system and an atmosphericvent for very low pressure disposals. The location of the flare stack is determined by the position of the Living Quarters,forward or aft. Elevated flares or ground flares may be considered. In the case of anelevated flare, height will be dictated by flare tip type, radiation and noise levels,proximity of the base to other items of equipment such as the turret structure, anddispersal patterns of the hot gas plume. Where an elevated flare or a ground flare is103located at the stern, the possible effects of the plume on the shuttle tanker have to beconsidered.Where cold venting is used, consideration has to be given to the location of the ventoutlet, plume dispersal, ignition of the vent plume from external sources includingelectrostatic discharge and the flare itself, exposure of personnel to radiation from anignited plume and snuffing of an ignited plume. The sizing of relief devices and the flare system will usually be in accordance with theAPI Codes of Practice, API RP 520 Sizing, Selection and Installation of PressureRelieving Devices in Refineries (ref 57) and API RP 521 Guide for Pressure Relievingand Depressuring Systems (ref 58).3.3.3 Water InjectionReservoir pressure support will usually be provided by the injection of high pressurewater. The water may be filtered, deaerated seawater, or produced water or a mixture ofboth. Additional treatment of the injected water may be needed such as the injection ofcorrosion inhibitors, scale inhibitors and biocides.Removal of oxygen from seawater may be carried out by vacuum deaeration or bynitrogen stripping. Both methods require a tower and so the position and the height ofthe tower have to be considered carefully from the point of view of FPSO motions.Filtration of seawater will be by coarse filters possibly backed up by fine filters. Inselecting a filter unit, consideration has to be given to on line cleaning of filter elementsusing backwash to avoid the need for regular intervention. The filtration system shouldalso take into account bloom periods of plankton when the ingestion of large quantitiesof plankton will lead to rapid increase in pressure drops across the filters and the need formore frequent cleaning cycles.Injection of the water is via high pressure centrifugal pumps. The pump casing is usuallyof the barrel design. Depending on the volume of water required and the criticality ofwater injection for reservoir support, it may in some cases be possible to use only a singlehigh pressure pump. In the design of the high pressure injection pipework considerationhas to be given to the possibility of high surge pressures arising from the rapid closure ofvalves on the subsea injection flow lines and christmas trees.3.3.4 Produced Water Handling and DisposalIn recent years it has become usual practice to reinject produced water into the reservoir,not only to provide pressure support but to avoid potential environmental problemsarising out of the continuous overboard disposal of the fluid. Produced water may be104injected on its own or with treated seawater, provided that the two fluids are compatibleand the risk of scale precipitation in the injection string and reservoir is low.On older fixed installations treatment of produced water to reduce its oil content prior tooverboard discharge used to be done using settling tanks, flotation tanks and skimmers.Treatment is now more commonly achieved through the use of batteries ofhydrocyclones. Not only are they modular and compact but, more importantly, they areinsensitive to FPSO hull motions.Provision has to be made for the handling, storage and disposal of produced water whenthe injection pumps are not available. Hull tankage may have to be provided to cover foroutages of short duration. In the case of a lengthy outage, the produced water will haveto be discharged over board to the oil content specification, currently set at 40 ppm oil inwater, laid down by the Department of Trade and Industry, pursuant to the Prevention ofPollution Act 1971, as amended (ref 59).3.3.5 Subsea InfrastructureWhether the field is being developed through a single reservoir or a number of reservoirs,a subsea infrastructure will be needed, which will consist of production wells, andinjection wells for water and gas. Although the design and provision of subsea facilitiesare outwith the scope of these Guidance Notes, it is important to make allowances in theFPSO facilities design for elements for the control and monitoring of the subseaequipment and for its chemical injection requirements.The main interface between the FPSO systems and the subsea equipment is the turret andits support structure. Risers and umbilicals terminate within the turret. Umbilicals willcontain both electrical and hydraulic power and control cables which interface with therespective power and control packs. These can be located, to facilitate operations andmaintenance, in a dedicated room within the turret structure. The control packs will inturn interface with the main control room usually via dedicated slip rings within the turretswivel or occasionally via a telemetry link.Chemicals such as methanol and corrosion inhibitors, depending on usage, will pass fromthe FPSO into the turret via a suitable swivel port.Where a wind-on turret is used, no swivel is required and utility connections etc aredirect via flexible hoses.Once the number of wells required for the field development has been established, closeliaison is needed between the subsea infrastructure designer, the turret designer and theFPSO production facilities designer to ensure that the requirements of each party aredefined and the interfaces are fully identified. Input is also needed from the operationsteam on control and monitoring requirements within the main control room.105There may also be a requirement for pigging of the subsea pipelines and risers. Anypigging facilities will be located in the turret and the design will be carried out by thesupplier of the turret since the turret, swivel and their facilities are incorporated within asingle proprietary design. The design and build of pig launchers/ receivers with theirisolation valves, interlocks and vents must ensure that pigging operations can beconducted safely. Where oil is exported via subsea pipeline, the design of the piggingfacilities will have to comply with the relevant sections of the Pipelines SafetyRegulations 1996 (SI 1996/ 825) (ref 60). Again, good interface management in this areais just as important as sound engineering design.3.3.6 Export of Oil and Gas via Shuttle Tanker or PipelineExport of OilOil can be exported directly via a shuttle tanker or via a high pressure pipeline into alarger pipeline gathering system. In the UKCS, shuttle tanker is the more common exportroute. Oil can also be exported indirectly via a lower-pressure pipeline to an FSU in thevicinity of the field.Direct export into a pipeline system will depend on the availability of riser technologyappropriate to the water depth, the flow rates and the system pressure. In theory, onboard storage of oil on the FPSO should not be necessary as the situation is similar toexport from a fixed platform. However, owners may make provision for on board bufferstorage to cover for short outages which could occur in the pipeline system or in the turretand swivel systems.Direct export into a shuttle tanker from the storage tanks requires high capacity cargotransfer pumps to ensure short turn around times for the tanker. The oil flows from thepumps via a transfer hose which is deployed from the FPSO stern. Flow rates will dictatethe diameter of the hose, and FPSO/ shuttle tanker separation during transfer willdetermine the length. The hose may be stored flat on a runway or on a reel.Where a reel is used, it will be located at the FPSO stern. In that location, it will benecessary to consider its proximity to the living quarters, the temporary refuge, escapeways and the lifeboat embarkation station(s) from the point of view of leakage andspillage, especially in emergency situations. Consideration has to be given to theremoval and repair of damaged hose sections and so suitable space and handlingprovision has to be made.The cargo pumps will usually be deep well hydraulically powered units. However, in thecase of tanker conversions, the owner/operator may chose to use the existing pump unitslocated in the cargo pump room in the machinery space. The removal of deep wellpumps for maintenance must be considered in layout and mechanical handling studies, toavoid potential clashes with production equipment located in modules above the cargodeck. 106The design of the hydraulic power system must be such as to minimise the effects ofnoise and vibration both inside the hull machinery spaces and on deck, especially near theliving quarters. Care must be taken to minimise the transmission noise into sensitiveareas via the structure, pipework and piping supports. The design of the rigid highpressure hydraulic pipework must take into account deck flexure and removal andreplacement for maintenance.Indirect export into a nearby FSU is similar to direct export to a pipeline system, exceptthat the pressures will be lower and the pumping units will be smaller, possibly singlestage centrifugal units instead of multistage high pressure barrel units. Again, the FPSOowner has to decide whether FPSO buffer storage is to be provided to cover for shortoutages of the turret swivel, the export pumps or the FSUExport of GasGas surplus to fuel requirements can either be reinjected into the reservoir or adjacentsuitable geological formations for storage (which may or may not involve subsequentrecovery) or it can be exported via a suitable pipeline. It is no longer environmentallyacceptable to flare or vent surplus gas on a continuous basis. Either way, high pressurecompressors will be needed along with gas dehydration facilities and the provision for theinjection of chemicals to prevent, among other things, hydrate formation in the subseasystem.3.3.7 Potential for Recovery of VOCsVolatile organic compounds (VOCs) exist in the vapour space above the surface of the oilin the cargo tanks of the FPSO and the shuttle tanker. Filling of the tanks with crudeproduct will displace the VOCs, vapours and inert gas from the inert gas blanket toatmosphere via the tanks vent system. The drive to improve the environmentalperformance of FPSO and shuttle tanker operations has prompted consideration in recentyears of systems to recover VOCs for reinjection into the FPSOs gas processing system.During the transfer of crude from the FPSO to the shuttle tanker, it may be possible tolead the displaced gases, via a low pressure hose parallel to the product transfer hoseback, into the tanks of the FPSO. In this way the tanker avoids venting the gas toatmosphere. Some tankers may already be provided with vent gas stripping units so thatthe actual volatile compounds are removed before the inert blanket gas is discharged toatmosphere. If this is so, then no parallel transfer hose may be necessary.Where a transfer hose is required, it will most likely be stored on and hence deployedfrom the stern of the FPSO, in which case provision has to be made for a reel (or otherpayout system) and associated hydraulic (or electric) power as well as facilities for hosehandling and repair. 107When the cargo tanks on the FPSO are being filled, displaced blanket gas can betransferred into empty tanks. Any surplus gas can be recovered via a very low pressuresystem using a blower/ compressor into the LP gas system of the FPSO for furthercompression and after which it may be used as fuel or eventually exported.3.3.8 Decommissioning and AbandonmentThe obvious advantage of the FPSO compared to the fixed jacket installation is that at theend of the field life it can be disconnected from its moorings and its risers and towedaway either for subsequent reuse on another field or for breaking up. Although an FPSO and its facilities will be designed to ensure that it will remain onlocation throughout its field life and will not have to be taken prematurely to dry dock forrepairs, inspection or modification, it is prudent for the designer of the turret to allow foran earlier than planned disconnection. Ideally, mooring and riser disconnection should bethe reverse of their installation but provision should be made to ensure that if this not thecase, then allowance has been made for an efficient disconnection procedure.Decommissioning of the FPSO will involve the total purging and cleaning of allhydrocarbon systems, and systems which closely interface with them, before the removalof modules or pallets and the subsequent removal of equipment. The original processengineering design will have allowed for purging and cleaning as part of routineoperations leading to planned and unplanned shutdowns etc. It is recommended that atthe design stage consideration is also given as to how the systems might bedecommissioned. Provision at the design stage for a likely decommissioning scenariocan contribute to making decommissioning safer and more environmentally friendly aswell as limiting the cost.The guidance in the DCR guide (ref 8) pertaining to Regulation 10 of the DCR,Decommissioning and Dismantlement, should be noted.1083.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIES3.4.1 The Purpose of Design PhilosophiesBefore the detailed engineering of an FPSO gets underway, the project Statement ofRequirements and the Basis of Design documents should be in place as a minimum.They provide a high level route map for the project management and engineering teamson the overall objectives for the project.The next level of the route map will be provided by a series of strategies/ designphilosophies. The development of these philosophies will provide a more detailedframework for the design, permitting upfront identification and resolution of a wide rangeof issues ahead of the detailed design phase when the pressures of the project schedulemay not always be conducive to carefully considered decision making. The strategies/ philosophies discussed below are deemed to be the principal ones whichcan provide an overall design plan, not just for production systems or marine systems butfor the FPSO as a single entity. They serve as a focal point to which all design groupscan refer. Provided they are clearly-written, unambiguous documents endorsed by theproject and engineering management, they will go a long way to ensure a commonunderstanding of how the major issues of the FPSO design will be handled. They are,therefore, an essential tool for both global design consistency and for effective interfacemanagement.As the design phase progresses, it may be advisable to update the philosophies to assistthose developing the operating instructions.3.4.2 Safety ManagementThe safe operation of the FPSO and the safety of its crew over its life is the primeobjective of all concerned in its design, build, installation and operation. The safetymanagement philosophy, although prepared by the project safety team, has to be sharedwith and endorsed by all key project participants. It will provide the foundation for theDesign Safety Case and the Operations Safety Case and will outline the steps in thesafety decision-making process which will in turn influence the design. The Safety Caseregulations (ref 9), the DCR regulations (ref 13) and the PFEER regulations (ref 11) willprovide the essential minimum pointers for this philosophy to follow.It will address the identification of major hazards and the subsequent analysis of thesehazards and their frequency. It will give an outline of the approach to the prevention offires and explosions and other major accidents, and subsequent control and mitigation.(During the detailed design phase further guidance may be obtained from UKOOAGuidelines for Fire and Explosion Hazard Management (ref 61)). Explosion modellingwill be discussed. It will cover in outline both active and passive fire protection measures109and the provision of fire and blast walls. Escape, evacuation and rescues will also becovered to enable layouts to be developed and safety equipment provisions to be made.It will address dropped and swinging object protection and the possibility andconsequences of ship collision.A schedule of safety related studies will be presented to ensure that these are carried outin an optimum sequence to minimise the effects of findings and recommendations on thedesign programme. Such studies might cover wind tunnel testing, smoke and gas ingress,and smoke clearance. Motion effects and human response will also be included.The Safety Management philosophy for the design phase will enable the Operations teamto form the basis of its safety management system (SMS) which will be a majorcomponent of the Operations Safety Case.3.4.3 Environmental Strategy and ManagementAll new offshore developments in the UKCS are now required to perform anEnvironmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for submission to the Department of Trade andIndustry Oil and Gas Directorate, in accordance with the Offshore Petroleum Productionand Pipelines Act (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1999 (SI1999/360)(ref 14). The preparation of the EIA will prompt the field developer to consider hisenvironmental objectives in the light of the potential interactions between the FPSO(along with its export route and its subsea infrastructure) and the ecology of the field, forexample fish breeding grounds, cetacean migration routes, seabird activity, and seabedflora and fauna such as corals.The starting point is a base line survey of the proposed field location and it is against thissurvey that the impact of the FPSO and the other field systems and hardware can beassessed. Provision has to be made therefore for regular monitoring against the baseline,reporting of changes and implementing improvement measures where these are indicated.The interactions, which can be short and long term, can arise from a range of activitiesand operations including: drilling in the field and the disposal of drill cuttings trenching of buried subsea pipelines noise from onboard machinery and associated marine traffic overboard discharges from the FPSO such as treated produced water from thereservoir which has not been reinjected slops tank water ballast water where a more desirable segregated ballast system has not been used warm return seawater from the main cooling circuit sewage. 110Operators should also consider the requirements of the draft Offshore ChemicalsRegulations 2001 (ref 62).However, it is not just the interaction with the local environment which has to be takeninto account but also the interaction with the global environment in the form of emissionsof flared gas, vent gas, VOCs and exhausts from internal combustion engines. Emissionsof carbon dioxide, oxides of nitrogen and of sulphur and methane have all to beconsidered. Further guidance on these and other emissions are contained in the OffshoreCombustion Installations (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Regulations 2001 (SI2001/1091) (ref 63).The field developer, along with the FPSO owner and operator, has to set downenvironmental discharge targets for the short term e.g. during offshore commissioning,field start-up and early operations, as well as for the long term on the basis of using themost appropriate technology and procedures that are available or are likely to becomeavailable and proven within a realistic time frame.Environmental aspirations and targets have to be discussed well in advance with thedesigners of the FPSO to ensure that these are realistic and achievable. An aspirationtowards, say, zero flaring may only be achievable through increased levels of complexityin process system design and control. With the introduction of emissions tradingschemes, it may be possible to adopt a strategy of minimum flaring through the use of aconventional flaring system coupled with a strict flare management policy.A clear, comprehensive environmental strategy at project outset, along with an indicationof the operations environmental management system, will guide and assist the designer inproviding the systems, hardware, controls and monitoring facilities to meet the desiredperformance targets.3.4.4 Cargo ManagementFor a purpose built FPSO, it is possible to design the cargo handling system from scratch.The creation of a cargo management philosophy will permit the operations team to workwith the design team in addressing not only the interaction with the crude oil productionfacilities but also the issues associated with: Offloading to shuttle tankers Reception tanks Transfer between tanks and associated valving Inerting of tanks Venting of tanks Tank inspection and isolation for entry Tank washing Cargo pump types and pump maintenance Protection against over- and under-pressuring of tanks111 Prevention of in-tank explosions Manifold configuration and isolation Product heating and cooling Redundancy as cover against equipment breakdownThe cargo management philosophy should be written to ensure that the hull systemsdesigner and the designer of the production facilities work as one to create a systemwhich will provide the highest standards of safe operation and a high degree of operatingflexibility. For example consideration may be given to the use of two parallel ventsystems, one for tank filling and one for tank discharging, to handle the different rates oftank out-breathing and in-breathing for these two operations.While Classification Societies Rules for the classification of ships and tankers canprovide useful pointers, adherence to the Rules will not always provide full guidance onthe issues above or guarantee the desired outcomes.In the case of a tanker conversion, the cargo system may have already been designed andbuilt and is therefore likely to require some form of adaptation to meet the needs of theFPSO. Given the imperatives of a fast track project, major modifications to the cargosystem may not always be welcome. Nevertheless, a cargo management philosophy canserve to highlight where the existing system may have limitations. If only smallmodifications are authorised, then provisions can be made to fully describe the limits ofsafe operation and thus avoid or minimise the risks of incidents such as tank over orunder pressuring.3.4.5 Area ClassificationIt has not been uncommon on past FPSO projects to have two electrical hazardous areaclassification systems on the same vessel. On some FPSOs based on converted tankers,equipment on the main deck and in the cargo pump rooms had been designed initially inaccordance with tanker area classification codes of practice. In some instances this hadresulted in main deck areas classified as non-hazardous. Production equipment above the main deck was designed in accordance with Institute ofPetroleum (IP) code part 15 Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations (ref 64)or another similar internationally recognised code. The mix of the two codes inevitablyresulted in the removal and replacement of many electrical items on the main deck areadue to production area zones extending into those areas of the main deck which had beenrated as non-hazardous.Unless they are told otherwise, shipyards will provide tanker hulls in accordance withtanker practice. However, the principal Classification Societies now recognise that asingle code of practice should be applied to the FPSO in its entirety reflecting theproduction duty of the FPSO. The production of a Hazardous Area Classificationphilosophy document at project outset which gives a single approach based on IP15112and/or the most recent editions of classification society rules, e.g. Part 7, chapter 2 ofLloyds Rules (ref 22), and Section 4 of DNVs Offshore Standard OS-A101, SafetyPrinciples and Arrangements, January 2001 (ref 65), will remove any ambiguity andensure consistency across the entire FPSO.3.4.6 HVACA tanker, whether second hand or new intercept, will have an HVAC system which hasmost likely been designed in accordance with marine practices. Although it might beexpected that new build FPSOs will have their HVAC systems designed at the outset toreflect their function as a production facility, by following the design approach used onfixed installations, this may not always be the case. On a number of new FPSOs themarine based HVAC systems specified by the shipyard have had to undergo significantupgrading to comply with production installation service.A comprehensive HVAC design philosophy should ensure that the HVAC systemdesigner will take into account the special requirements of a floating production facility.The philosophy should include not only the living quarters and machinery spaces but alsoany other hull compartments or superstructures used for control panels, switchgear andstorage. In addition any enclosure in the turret has to be included along with the specialrequirements of the ventilation of the enclosed escape tunnel.As well as setting temperature, humidity and noise levels and the number of air changesper hour for each room or space, the philosophy will include other major topics such as Provision of smoke and gas detection Prevention of smoke ingress into accommodation and control areas Smoke clearance, especially in accommodation and control areas and inescape routes Interaction with the FPSOs main fire and gas system Ventilation of the TR and main control areas in emergencies andshutdown of non-essential users Provision of minimum life support in upset conditions Implications of hazardous area classification Dispersion of gas in areas where gas escapes may occur and use ofsupplementary mechanical devices Fire protection and rating of dampers and ductwork Controls, control stations and control system configuration (avoidingundue complexity) Position of inlets and exhausts relative to hazardous areas (especiallywhere the LQ is downwind of the production facilities) Testing of fire and gas and shutdown dampers Spareage of fans Pressurisation of spaces and airlocks113Classification Societies Rules now generally reflect the need to provide HVAC designsappropriate to an FPSO, not just a tanker. Although now defunct, the Department ofEnergy Guidance Notes (Fourth Edition) Section 47 (ref 4) still provide a useful guide todesigners, with more detailed coverage than that given in the Classification SocietiesRules.3.4.7 ElectricalA preliminary FPSO equipment list and a outline load schedule will enable the electricaldesigner to develop the key one-line diagram, set generation voltage levels and determinethe required generation capacity. Unlike a new build FPSO, where these activities shouldbe straightforward, a tanker conversion will bring the added complexity of existinggeneration facilities and consumers and the associated distribution and control systems. A decision will therefore be required on whether or not to integrate the existing tankersystem with the new system needed to support production facilities, and the extent of anyintegration. Furthermore, the existing generators will be liquid fuelled and so theirconversion to dual fuel service (for both environmental and operating cost reasons) andthe safety implications of introducing fuel gas into the existing machinery space havealso to be consideredThe electrical design team may have to address a number of options such as Retaining the existing systems including the generators, and, providing theequipment and cabling specifications are acceptable, integrating the existing andthe new via a central control unit Retaining the existing systems but decoupling the tankers generators and using asingle source of power, i.e. gas turbine generation, across the FPSO. Mothballing, if space permits, or removing the existing systems and having asingle system approach.The electrical design philosophy will call up the standards and specifications to be usedfor transformers, switchgear, distribution boards, cabling, lighting etc making it clear thatthe equipment must be suitable for the arduous conditions under which the FPSO will beexpected to operate. Consideration has to be given to the saline atmosphere, possibleexposure to hydrocarbons and deluge water. Equipment located in a hazardous areashould be suitable for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere and so there should beguidelines on the certification and type testing of electrical equipment for these duties. Switchgear for general on-shore industrial use is unlikely to perform as well over the lifeof the FPSO as more robust equipment specified for offshore or marine duty. If large HVtransformers are located on the main deck they will probably be exposed to sea spray andpossibly green water and will have to be specified accordingly.114General guidelines on earthing should be provided as the existing earthing system on atanker may not be compatible with production facilities earthing requirements. Where amix of unearthed and earthed systems may occur, as may be the case with a convertedtanker, an assessment should be performed to fully identify equipment on each system,especially essential equipment, and where isolation, monitoring and alarm provision isneeded to avoid stray currents between the two systems. The existence and avoidance ofinduced currents should also be discussed including the physical separation betweenpanels and transformers. The philosophy should include guidelines on cable routing and segregation. Thesurvivability of cabling and associated equipment on ESD, Fire and Gas and otheremergency systems has to be addressed as well as the need for redundancy. Cabling onthese systems should be fire resistant. Where existing tanker cabling does not comply,consideration should be given to either new cabling or additional fire protection for highrisk areas.The provision of transits and their sizing should also be addressed. Underestimation oftransit capacity can often result in unwelcome and disruptive modifications to structuralbulkheads and decks during construction.The philosophy will also provide guidance to the mechanical package engineers on theminimum electrical standards to be adopted on skid-mounted units to ensure a highdegree of electrical uniformity across the FPSO.The philosophy will contain the high level rationale for the configuration of main powerand emergency power generation and the extent of spareage of generation equipment.Emergency supplies for essential systems will include lighting, the Fire and Gas system,the ESD system, HVAC for smoke and gas clearance, ballasting, communications etc. Itwill also set out the rationale for the sizing of the battery systems and the uninterruptiblepower supplies (UPS).It will address black start although this topic will probably become the subject of aseparate more detailed document developed later in the design. Heat tracing provision and design approach should also be addressed, with appropriateconsideration having been given to process fluid properties and wind chill factors.A schedule of the main power system studies to be undertaken (e.g. short circuit,stability, load shedding and load acceptance) should be included to ensure that the timingof study outputs will minimise any impact on the designFurther guidance may be obtained from Lloyds Register Rules, Part 6 (ref 22), and fromDNVs Offshore Standard OS-D201 Electrical Installations, March 2001, (ref 66).1153.4.8 ControlsGiven the nature of an FPSO with equipment in an exposed hostile environment on amoving deck, the use of simple localised control systems, involving greater operatorinteraction, can be ruled out. Distributed control coordinated via a central control facilitywill require less intervention involving operators working outside.The development of a control philosophy allows the design guidelines to be set for thedistributed control system (DCS), the emergency shut down system and the fire and gassystem. It will also set guidelines for the essential control functions which would berequired in the event of a major incident or emergency.The philosophy will allow the designer and the end user to decide whether to specify asingle integrated system encompassing all three elements or a separate system for each ofthe three elements. A new build FPSO will have no existing control system(s) unlike a converted tanker.However, it will have production controls and marine controls. The designer and theoperator have to decide whether to fully integrate the marine controls with the productioncontrols or have separate systems where there may be a marine monitoring facility withinthe production system but no executive action.Where a converted tanker is being used, a judgement has to be made on the suitabilityand use of the existing marine and utilities control systems in the new FPSO role.Existing local control panels (LCPs) could be retained with alarm functions incorporatedinto the new central control system. On the other hand, the LCPs could be removed andthe control and alarm functions integrated into the new DCS.The suitability of the tankers fire and gas detection and control systems and its ESDsystem have also to be assessed for compatibility with and possible integration into thenew systems to be provided for the production facilities. Otherwise, it may be simpler todo away with the existing systems and provide a new system or systems for the new duty.Again, the philosophy will address the control of mechanical equipment packages andalthough the package vendors may have controls which are very specific to theirpackages, the issues of monitoring, shutdown and interfacing with other packages can behighlighted.The responsibility for the development of the control philosophy does not rest just withthe control engineers. A major contribution will come from the process engineers thusensuring that the FPSO will function and respond as a single entity and not as a disparateassembly of packaged units and other assorted equipment items.In the development of the philosophy, and later in the design of the control systemsarchitecture, reference should be made to the International ElectrotechnicalCommissions (IEC) standard 61508, Functional Safety of Electrical, Electronic,116Programmable Electronic Safety Related Systems, January 2000, (ref 67) and UKOOAGuidelines for Instrument Based Protective Systems, issue No.2, November 1999 (ref68). Lloyds Rules (ref 22), Part 6, chapter 1 Control Engineering Systems, also provideadditional information to assist the author of a controls philosophy.3.4.9 Noise and VibrationThere are clear occupational health guidelines for the exposure of workers to noise andvibration, for example the Noise at Work Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/ 1790) (ref 69).These guidelines should form an integral part of the project noise and vibrationphilosophy. In addition the HSE report OTO 99:012 Collection and Analysis of OffshoreNoise Data (ref 70) states that It is noted that the Department of Energy Guidance Notes,Fourth Edition,(ref 4) now have no statutory status but (section 52) may be regarded asrecommended guidance on noise levels for design purposes.It is recommended that specialist input is used when drawing up the philosophy and inthe follow-up of the design and build of the FPSO and its equipment. In this way, it willbe possible to demonstrate the extent to which the guideline targets have been met.Where noise and vibration levels for individual items or groups of equipment or areashave not met the targets, realistic and practicable reduction measures can beimplemented.The preliminary layouts for the FPSO will provide an early indication of where the majorsources of noise are likely to be located and whether there is likely to be a concentrationof high noise generating sources in certain areas of the decks or machinery spaces. Noisecan emanate from: rotating equipment high velocity, turbulent and pulsating flows in piping blowdown and relief valves control and throttle valves orifice plates vents, flares etc.The objective should be to strive for designs which are inherently quiet as opposed to theacceptance of noisy equipment and encasing or shielding it in extensive acousticcladding. The use of personal hearing protection is not an alternative to effective noisecontrols. Such protection should only be used where the means of elimination orsignificant reduction of noise have been clearly shown to be unrealistic or impractical.Restricted areas where hearing protection must be worn can then be designated.Background noise levels can be estimated which can be taken into account in the designof the public address and general alarm systems. Early indicators can be obtained on thepossibility of adverse noise effects on the living quarters and control areas of the FPSO.Steps can then be taken to relocate offending equipment or, if this is not possible, further117action can be made to redesign the equipment or for the provision of acoustic insulationand a range of measures to eliminate or substantially reduce structural borne noise.Hydraulic power units are often a source of high frequency noise and so closer attentionhas to be paid to the design of their pumps, valves and pipework to reduce not just thelocal noise but also the transmission of noise to other sensitive parts of the FPSO.Vibration and noise frequently go hand in hand and, as stated above, the Fourth EditionGuidance Notes, section 52, (ref 4), also provide useful information on vibration issues.Anti vibration mounts under diesel engines and other types of reciprocating equipmentshould be specified. Consideration should also be given to the possible effects of shockloading and vibration arising from explosions especially on critical equipment, forexample control panels for the ESD and Fire and Gas Systems, emergency electricalpower, communications etc and other potentially sensitive items. Cable connections intocritical panels and adjacent cable runs should be included.Early input on target noise levels can be fed into purchase specifications and enquirydocuments. Vendors will be expected to state in their bid proposals the anticipated noiselevels from their equipment and to demonstrate by shop tests that these have beenachieved. Where the anticipated noise levels are exceeded, the vendor should beexpected to provide suitable noise attenuation measures which are practicable, robust anddurable.3.4.10 Corrosion ManagementThe effects of corrosion on any field development can be dramatic, insidious and costlyunless there is a clearly defined corrosion management strategy in place from the start ofthe project phase. The strategy or philosophy has to cover all phases of the developmentfrom design, through construction, commissioning and operations and has to encompassall aspects from downhole, through the subsea systems, across the FPSO and the exportand disposal routes. There must be active participation of experienced materials andcorrosion specialists at all stages The strategy should address not only the materials selection for the entire range of fluidsto be handled or encountered and the monitoring and assessment of their performance butalso address preventive and mitigation measures, some of which are indicated below. The design of equipment and pipework coming into contact with the fluids on the FPSOhas to consider not just materials of construction and corrosion allowances but featuressuch as: Dead legs Areas of low flow and stagnation pockets Areas of high fluid velocity, turbulence and erosion Complex, high stress piping arrangements118 Low points Chemical injection points Corrosion under insulation Suitability of various types of insulation Inspection under insulation Areas of inaccessibilityConsideration has also to be given to avoidance of contact between incompatiblematerials including the use of insulating gaskets and isolation spools. Temperature canalso influence corrosion rates and higher than anticipated temperatures in service mayhave a damaging effect.Corrosion of structural members, pressure vessel saddles and skirts, pipe supports,clamps etc has also to be considered, especially those items under insulation and passivefire protection.The prevention of corrosion under insulation has to be fully addressed. Pointers shouldbe provided on proper selection of insulation materials and designs, application ofinsulation systems which, while allowing removal for inspection, preserve theirwatertight integrity.Paint and other coating systems have an important part to play in corrosion protection.The selection and application of coatings requires careful consideration, taking intoaccount surface preparation, operating temperatures, fluids to be encountered,susceptibility to damage and methods of repair. Attention should be given to the internalcoatings of tanks including crude oil, (especially if the oil has to be kept hot to maintainfluidity), produced water, (if holding tanks are required), and slops.In the manufacturing and construction phases, there has to be an awareness of the qualityof the build to prevent the unwitting introduction of features which can lead to problemslater. For example, the attention of engineering and quality control staff should be drawnto the careful selection and handling of welding consumables, the vetting of welding andpre- and post-weld heat treatment procedures, and the monitoring of welding and heattreatments. The fitting (and inadequate sealing) of temporary branches such as high pointvents, drains and test points to facilitate the hydrostatic testing of pipework duringconstruction can also introduce corrosion pockets.During the commissioning phase, the use of inappropriate fluids for flushing or initialcirculation of piping circuits can lead to subsequent problems e.g. the use of chlorinatedtowns water in stainless steel systems without subsequent thorough flushing withdemineralised water can lead to chloride cracking while the use of stagnant dock water incupronickel piping can introduce bacteria which lead to premature holing.The early involvement of the operations team in the development of the corrosionmanagement strategy is vital to a successful monitoring and inspection programme forthe early detection of potentially serious problems and the prevention of their recurrence. 119An outline schedule of surveys can be developed for the operations phase to permit acomprehensive assessment of the performance in service of the materials. HSE report OTO 01:044 Review of Corrosion Management for Oil and Gas Processing(ref 71) provides general guidelines for the creation of a comprehensive life of fieldcorrosion management system.3.4.11 Isolation for MaintenanceIsolation for maintenance of mechanical equipment, pipework, pressure vessels, tanks,(including cargo tanks) and other confined spaces requires close attention during thedevelopment of the process P&I diagrams to ensure a safe and consistent approach acrossthe entire FPSO.The Isolation for Maintenance philosophy will determine where it is acceptable to use Single valve isolations Single valve isolations with spades only Single valve isolations with vents Single valve isolations with vents and spades Double blocks Double blocks and bleeds Double blocks and bleeds and spades Physical disconnection i.e. removable spoolsIt should be a single, unambiguous document for use by both topsides and hull designers. Input from the operations team and full endorsement by them is essential as it is they whowill subsequently have to implement the isolations. The isolation for maintenance policyhas also to be understood and correctly implemented by the vendors of skid mounted andmodular equipment, as well as their designers and subcontractors.Early preparation and issue of the isolation for maintenance philosophy will minimise thepotential for late design changes involving additional valves, spools, vents and tappings.1203.5 GLOBAL LAYOUT: DEVELOPMENT FACTORS3.5.1 IntroductionIn the development of the layout of an FPSO the prime objective is the creation of aworking environment which will be as safe as possible under a wide range of operatingconditions, normal and abnormal, and weather related as well as production related. It isa multidiscipline project task, involving many inputs. It is an iterative process which hasto take account of the evolving design and has to address potential conflicts and clashes.Above all, it requires good communication between the inputting and interested parties toensure that the highest standards of safety are achieved.The following sections address layout issues under a number of headings. All areimportant and for some FPSOs some of the topics will be more important than others.No attempt has been made, therefore, to list them in any order of importance.3.5.2 Explosions and Fires including Blast and FirewallsLoss of containment of hydrocarbon fluids can be minimised by sound design practicesand by comprehensive and thorough operations and maintenance practices. Although itis possible to minimise the incidence and size of leaks and spillages, experience hasshown that it is impossible to totally prevent them. It is therefore necessary to consider arange of credible circumstances which can give rise to explosions and fires in variouslocations around the FPSO.Further guidance is contained in UKOOAs guidelines on Fire and Explosion HazardManagement (ref 61).Explosion Risk in Production AreasThe risk of leaks and the possibility of these finding a source of ignition is greatest in theproduction areas where the operating pressures are higher and the fluid inventories arelarger. Consideration has to be given to the likely size and type of leaks, e.g. gas,flashing gas liquids emanating from a flange (e.g. defective gasket) or a hole (e.g.fractured pressure tapping). Preliminary layout studies will have located the mainequipment items and so it will be possible to develop explosion scenarios taking intoaccount Size of hole Initial pressure and pressure decay Fluid inventory Equipment density Weather conditions e.g. still air, or gale force winds121A number of computational models are available to enable the effects of explosions to beestimated in terms of explosion front velocities and overpressures. Among the inputs tothese models will be the layout and shape of equipment, the extent of solid decking, theobstructions caused by piping and pipe and cable racks and other structural members.The development and running of the model for a range of explosion and fire scenariosand layout configurations will enable the designer to adjust the layouts to reduce thevelocities and overpressure effects. The modelling of blast overpressures is a highly specialised activity, sometimes open to arange of interpretations. It is recommended that liaison with the consultants creating andrunning the model is carried out by individuals who have an appropriate level ofexperience in this field.Several joint industry projects have been conducted in recent years in attempts to validatethe outputs from the runs of certain models. Further information on the outputs from theJIPs can be obtained by referring to the Research Outputs featured on the HSEs web sitewww.hse.gov.uk/research/frameset/offshore.htm (ref 72). However, there is still debatewithin the industry as to whether any firm conclusions can be drawn.Regardless of the location of the living quarters, forward or aft, the main blast wall willbe along the side of the quarters facing the production facilities to afford the maximum ofoverpressure protection to the LQ. The blast wall will also serve as the main firewall andis likely to be H120 fire rated. Where other superstructures are provided e.g. at the bow,consideration has to be given to blast wall rating and the fire rating of the bulkhead facingthe production area.Careful consideration has to be given to the use of intermediate blast or firewalls. Theirinclusion, while providing, for example, an intermediate line of defence for the main blastwall, could restrict natural ventilation and dispersion of gas accumulations and result inhigher overpressures by introducing additional blockage. Higher local over pressuresmay cause more damage to equipment and piping etc and so produce an incident ofgreater magnitude than might have been the case if no secondary blast wall had beenincluded in the first instance.The escape tunnel if provided will present lateral blockage to the explosion front. Beingso close to the production modules and therefore exposed to higher blast pressures, it willhave to be designed to withstand the full effects of the explosion.The use of solid decking on the underside of the production modules located above themain or cargo deck may at first glance provide benefits in terms of controlling liquidspillages on to the area below. However, the decking may also reduce natural ventilationeffects and lead to higher overpressures.Single tier modules will allow blast pressures to dissipate more quickly. However, theamount of production equipment required and available deck area limitations may result122in a second level in a module. Where this is the case, open grating between levels shouldbe used if at all possible. Orientation of pressure vessels should also be chosen to reduceoverpressure effects. Transverse alignment of their principal axes is likely to provide agreater degree of protection for the LQ by forcing the blast front outwards towards theseaward sides along a shorter path.The gap between the main (cargo) deck and the underside of the production pallets ormodules is usually around 2 to 2.5m, its depth being dictated by a number of factors i.e.the structural framework to support the modules etc above, the need for adequate accessto cargo pipework and pump, reduced exposure of production equipment to greenwaterand hazardous area classification considerations. Explosions in this area can lead todamage to the crude oil tank roofs and therefore have the potential for event escalation.In the interests of good ventilation and blast overpressure reduction, every effort shouldbe made to keep blockage to a minimum.Explosion Risk in Utilities AreasOn FPSOs with a forward turret, the utilities equipment will be located towards the aftend of the FPSO and away from the hydrocarbon containing systems. The risk ofexplosions in this area should therefore be lower. Having the utilities between productionareas and the LQ provides a barrier and separation against blast overpressures.Obviously there is still a risk from a dense cloud of gas drifting downwind and finding asource of ignition in the utilities area. Similar attention should therefore be paid toreducing congestion and blockages to promote ventilation and minimise overpressuresshould an explosion occur. Furthermore, the main gas turbines for power generation will also be in this area and so itis essential to minimise the possibility of leaks from the high pressure fuel gas supply.Where existing diesel generators have been retained within the machinery spaces andhave been converted to dual fuel units, then considerable care has to be taken with thedesign and routing of the fuel gas supply and the ventilation system within the confinedspaces.Fire Risk in Production AreasThe two main types of fires which can occur are jet fires from ignited jets of highpressure gas and pool fires, as the name implies, on the surface of a pool of hydrocarbonliquid which may have leaked or been spilled. Safety and loss prevention specialistsshould advise on credible scenarios for both types of fire to assess what can be done toalter layouts to minimise jet impingement on critical pressure vessels, cargo tank roofs andsupport structures separate vessels with large inventories of flammable liquids to reduce thechances of several vessels being engulfed simultaneously in a large pool fire.123The main firewall to protect the temporary refuge and the living quarters from a fire onthe main or production decks is the face of the LQ facing the production areas. A singleappropriately rated wall will serve as both fire and blast wall. While the main firewallwill most likely be H120 rated, a lesser rated wall will be provided to protect anyadditional superstructure on the main deck, such as a forecastle, housing switchgear orlocal control panels. Intermediate firewalls on the main decks, like intermediate blastwalls, only serve to increase congestion and reduce air flow and should only be usedwhere studies indicate a specific need for them.Fire Risk in Utilities AreasThe farther utilities equipment is from hydrocarbon areas of the FPSO, the lower the firerisk. Fire scenarios should be developed to ensure that the position of gas turbines, forexample, will not lead to incidents and escalation from them, such as gas leaks andturbine blade and disc failures. Inside the hull in the machinery spaces, the equipmentand the nature of the fluids handled is unlikely to present any significant risk. Thesegregation of emergency generators and fire pumps in separate rooms, protected bysuitably rated firewalls should contain any major fires arising from fuel leaks. The Classification Societies provide guidelines on machinery space layout and bulkheadand deck fireratings: Lloyds Register (ref 22) Part 7, chapter 3 DNV Offshore Standard OS D301 Fire Protection, January 2001, (ref 73), chapter 1 ABS (ref 24), chapter 3, section 8, subsection 93.5.3 Escape RoutesIn the development of the layout of the FPSO the principal consideration is the safety ofpersonnel and their ability to escape safely and swiftly from dangerous incidents andpotentially dangerous situations wherever these might occur on the FPSO.Escape Route PlanningWith the most hazardous areas being in the hydrocarbon processing area, the planning ofprimary escape routes must consider a range of incident scenarios at an early stage toensure that the most appropriate provisions are then in place and become a corner stoneof the design.Primary RoutesThe primary routes must ensure that personnel can escape from the remotest parts of theFPSO to the security of the Temporary Refuge in the most direct manner possible withthe minimum of detours and obstructions. The overall size of the FPSO and the extent of124the facilities which its carries will dictate whether an enclosed or partially enclosedtunnel or an open escape route is provided for the main and production deck areas. A50000 bpd facility on a very large tanker may be relatively compact compared with theremaining open deck area and so no enclosed primary escape route may be needed. Onthe other hand, with a large facility, a tunnel becomes the obvious choice.Primary escape routes from the machinery spaces must also be considered. Unlike theproduction areas, there are likely to be several levels within the machinery spaces whereescape will have to be via stairways or vertical ladders. Adequate layout provision mustbe made for stairways and companionways which are wide enough and not excessivelysteep to allow for rapid escape and for quick access for rescue or fire fighting teams. Classification Society guidelines on escape can be found in Lloyds Register, (ref 22), Part 7, chapter 3 DNV (ref 65), OS A101, section 6 ABS reference (ref 24), chapter3, section 8, subsection 13.Tunnels and AlternativesTunnel size and length will have an effect on layout as will the provision of access intothe tunnel. Size will be determined by the number of persons using it under emergencyconditions and the size of incident response teams. Even though the tunnel may bedesigned for the worst credible fire or explosion scenario, unforeseen circumstances mayrender it unusable. In such a situation, an alternative primary escape route to the TR willhave to be provided, which may or may not be a second tunnel. Where escape to the TRhas become impossible, then direct escape routes to life rafts or other individual forms ofescape must be provided.3.5.4 Temporary Refuge (TR) and FPSO EvacuationTR LocationLayout studies together with the outcomes of incident studies will determine the bestlocation for the Temporary Refuge. The most common location for the TR has tended tobe in the living quarters on the main deck, having taken into account the proximity ofsleeping areas, the main FPSO control room and the exits from the tunnel or otherprimary escape routes from the main deck and the machinery spaces.Evacuation to Embarkation PointsProvision has to be made for the entire FPSOs complement to quickly access the mainmeans of evacuation. In the case of helicopter evacuation, then a secure stair tower to thehelideck has to be provided. This will probably be the main stairway in the LQ. Wherefree fall lifeboats are to be used then the layout has to make provision not only for the125lifeboat support structures but access to them from the TR. Where davit launchedlifeboats are being deployed, the route from the TR has to be planned, making allowancefor the embarkation stations and whether these will be open, partially open or enclosed.Lifeboat TypeThe choice of lifeboat type, davit launched or freefall, is usually a matter of operatorpreference, in line with the prevailing corporate policy. The pros and cons of each typeare generally well known as are the issues associated with launching from the bow areaand the stern in arduous conditions with large motions of the FPSO. Whatever type isselected, layout implications can be considerable and should therefore be addressed early.The maximum anticipated number of persons on board (with allowances having beenmade for additional personnel, for shutdowns for example) plus the contingency factorwill dictate the size and number of the lifeboats, with four intermediate sized TEMPSCshaving a greater impact on layout than two 100% craft.3.5.5 Containment of Hydrocarbon SpillageSpillages of any liquid on the decks of an FPSO are more difficult to manage than on afixed installation due to the motions of the FPSO vessel. The risk of run off to the sea isgreater with larger amplitudes of pitch and roll coupled with seawater washing over thedeck areas. Vessel trim will also affect spillage movement.The avoidance of spills of any kind, by design and operations procedures, is anothercornerstone of any environmental strategy but, nevertheless, provision has to be made forspills occurring. The major dichotomy confronting the operator and the designer whenaddressing the possibility of a major hydrocarbon spillage is whether to: contain as much of the spillage as possible and thus increase the risk, especiallyunder major upset conditions, of a large pool fire or allow the spillage to go overboard and face a significant environmental incident.Adequate provision can be made for small spills under equipment through the provisionof strategically placed drip trays, bedplate bunds etc. Where there is the risk of spillsfrom chemicals such as those used for seawater or produced water treatment, the tankinventories are relatively small and containment within the chemical injection skidsthemselves can be readily achieved. For larger spills, especially of hydrocarbon liquids, where there is also a large inventorywhich may not be immediately or readily isolatable, it will be necessary to divide upplated deck areas, but principally the main deck, into zones with longitudinal andtransverse upstands or bunds. There will obviously be a limit to the height of anyupstands or bunds otherwise access may be compromised and water run off, undernormal operation, may be restricted. It is not considered realistic or practical to size the126containment zones for the inventory of a single large pressure vessel such as a third stageseparator. These upstands will help to reduce the migration of spills over the entire deck area due tosloshing. Removable sections will allow the movement of equipment over the deck formaintenance. Depending on operations policy, they may be left in position most of thetime or they can be inserted quickly when a large spill occurs. The latter approach doesallow better drainage of sea and rainwater off the deck and reduces the potential forcorrosion due to free standing water. The safety and environmental implications should be discussed by the respectivespecialists at an early stage so that the appropriate provisions can be made during layoutdevelopment. The management of spills, especially hydrocarbon spills, will feature inboth the Operations Safety Case and the Environmental Impact Assessment.3.5.6 GreenwaterThe topic of greenwater has been discussed in Part 2, section 2.5, under the headings ofprediction methods and structural avoidance measures, such as bulwarks andbreakwaters.Although the provision of bulwarks and breakwaters may go some way to reducinggreenwater effects, it is advisable for naval architects to discuss with layout developersand the other engineering disciplines the susceptibility of a range of equipment andfittings to damage from greenwater, both from the bow and the side. Where there is ahigh probability of greenwater inundation, attention has to be paid to the orientation ofmajor equipment items to reduce the loadings on shells, foundations, branches andfittings. On FPSOs where the Living Quarters are stern mounted, the major plant items which arelikely to be susceptible to loading from greenwater coming over the bow and the side are: Flare knockout drums and flare headers Turret Slug catcher and separation vessels Closed drains drumFor greenwater coming over the bow, the flare stack and flare support structure are alsosusceptible, while in the case of greenwater from the side, gas compression equipmentmay also be vulnerable.Where an escape tunnel is provided, attention has to be paid to possible greenwaterloadings.127On FPSOs where the Living Quarters are bow mounted, the quarters themselves willprovide a high degree of protection to the equipment in the lee. Much of the equipmentwill be utilities equipment with a lower profile than that of the hydrocarbon processingequipment located towards the stern. The effects of greenwater loading will be less andadequate side bulwarks may provide sufficient protection without other extensivemeasures. Where large gas turbine generators are used, care has to be taken with thedesign of the turbine enclosures to ensure that the large slab sides are not overloaded.While the gap between the main deck and the production deck above may go some wayto protecting equipment on the higher level, the susceptibility of pipework (cargomanifolds, firewater and seawater main headers etc) and equipment in the air gap has alsoto be considered. Layout designers may be limited in the options for reorientating majorpiping headers and so the piping designers have to make provision for adequate supportsto take any greenwater loading. Provisions may have to be made to protect pipework foroverboard dumps for seawater and firewater where these are side mounted.Major cable racks, if these are positioned at low levels or on the sides of the FPSO, canalso be susceptible to greenwater loading and their design must take loadings intoaccount.Smaller items of equipment such as fire and gas detectors, TV monitoring cameras, lightfittings, firewater deluge subheaders, small cable trays, flashing beacons, handrails,signage etc are more difficult to protect but suitable bracketing and support may go someway to minimising impact damage.3.5.7 Environmental ExposureThe open structure of the FPSO to promote effective natural ventilation inevitablyincreases the exposure of the crew and equipment to wind, sea spray, rain, snow and to amuch lesser extent, ice. The provision of windbreaks to give some protection to thoseperforming plant operations and maintenance may not always be feasible but shouldnevertheless be considered. The positioning of equipment with the main axis parallel to the hull centre line can gosome way towards reducing bluff body interruptions to air flow and promoting better airmovement. It may also reduce heat loss from insulated vessels, especially where heatconservation is essential to good separation and fluidity of product. However, this mayprovide a more open path for blast pressure fronts travelling towards the TR. It may benecessary, therefore, to chose transverse orientation to provide better protection for theTR. Wind tunnel tests and computer blast modelling will indicate which orientation willafford better overall safety.The orientation of air intakes for HVAC systems and for turbomachinery should be suchas to avoid the ingestion of spray, rain and snow. Where the layout of gas turbines and128their main intakes cannot eliminate or minimise their ingestion, snow hood protectionshould be provided to avoid air filter blockage.3.5.8 Main Access and Removal RoutesThe more equipment and systems there are on and in an FPSO, the more congested it islikely to become. In the interests of safety and to facilitate operations and maintenanceactivities, close attention has to be given to how personnel and equipment componentscan move and be moved around the FPSO with relative ease and speed.Personnel Access on the Production DecksThe majority of personnel movements will be between the living quarters and controlroom areas on the one hand and the main and production decks. Direct access into theseareas is desirable when speed of response is needed to deal with plant upsets whichrequire manual intervention. Direct access is also of paramount importance whenattending to accidents, evacuating injured personnel and responding to emergencysituations such as leaks, spills and fires.This can be achieved through the provision of a central access way running the length ofthe production deck with side access ways coming off it at regular intervals. The spacingof these side access ways will most likely correspond to the gaps between modules,pallets or large equipment skids. Some of them will also correspond to intermediateentry points into the escape tunnel.Where a central access way is not feasible, then consideration has to be given to accessways running down the port or starboard sides of the FPSO. Where an escape tunnel isprovided, then this too can serve as a personnel access way. However, it must not beused as an access way for moving equipment as this would compromise the main escaperoute.Wherever possible the main access way should be straight, with no ramps, steps or smallstairways. The side access ways should also be free of obstructions. The central and sideaccess ways can also serve as primary escape routes, even though the escape tunnel willbe the principal primary escape route. The minimum width will be dictated by escapescenarios. On the main or cargo deck, it may not be as easy to provide straight, flat main accessways due to the complexity of the piping and the header systems. The most direct accesswill be down the port and / or starboard sides between the side coaming and the mainpiping areas.129Maintenance Access on the Production DecksThe movement of equipment items and sub assemblies to the laydown areas and to themain workshops in the machinery space or to smaller work areas in a secondarysuperstructure will have a major influence on the configuration of access ways.A flat, straight and wide central access way will facilitate the use of trolleys and use of afork lift truck, suitable for duty in hazardous areas, may also be contemplated. Up-frontlayout study work may identify the central access way as a pump alley providing easieraccess to pumps and their drivers. Where horizontally mounted shell and tubeexchangers are used, the central access way can double up as a tube bundle withdrawalarea.The width of access ways will be dictated by the manoeuvrability of the largest item thatcould realistically be expected to be moved. During layout development it is often easyto concentrate on aspects of routine maintenance and to overlook the possibility of havingto deal with a large single item of equipment or a sub assembly. It may be prudent toconduct a what could possibly go wrong review to identify circumstances whichwould require better maintenance access, which in turn might lead to quicker turn roundand reduced downtime.Personnel Access in Machinery SpacesWhere the FPSO has large production facilities, it is likely that the machinery spaces willbe extensively utilised for utility equipment and systems such as electrical switch rooms,diesel treatment, air compressors, emergency electrical generation, firewater pumps,seawater pumps etc etc. The machinery space will also provide the main workshop.As these items will be on different levels, access will be via stairs and ladders. Safetyconsiderations will dictate how the stairs and ladders will be configured to ensure thatroutes are as direct as possible and that steeply angled stairways are avoided. Not allcrew members will have come from a marine background and will possibly not be usedto ship style companion ways which may permit forward facing or backward facingdescent. When rapid personnel response is required, the risk of slips and falls isincreased and so normal stairways are recommended wherever possible. They alsofacilitate the retrieval and removal of casualties, either on foot or on a stretcher.Maintenance Access in Machinery SpacesIt is likely that the main stores and workshops will be located in the machinery space. Amain access route will be required between these locations and the main deck, with themovement of large items taking place through an appropriately sized hatch or hatches.Ideally the hatch will afford direct access into the workshop from the main deck to reducethe requirement for further handling activities once the item is inside.130Wherever possible the main hatch should be located behind the firewall/blast wall. Ahatch located on the non-hazardous area of the main deck on the other side of the wallcreates problems of potential ingress of gas into the machinery space in the event of amajor leak while the hatch is open for access. The hatch design will have to incorporate areliable gas seal.The HSE Research Report 3770, Machinery Space Risk Assessment (ref 74) providesuseful guidance to the designer on various issues to be addressed in Machinery Spacelayout development.3.5.9 Main Cable RoutingSeveral factors will affect the placement of the main cable routes including Cable types and the need for segregation e.g. HV, LV, control, F&G, ESD,telecomms, emergency supplies Location of main consumers of power Location of control room, termination panel room Location of local control rooms Module configurations Location of main piperack(s) Position of power generators and use of new and/ or existing units Position of switch roomsOn a large FPSO with substantial production facilities, the main switchgear will probablybe located in the machinery space due to limited space on the main deck. Where a bowsuperstructure is provided, some switchgear may also be located inside it along withcontrol panels for package units such as gas compressors. On FPSOs with much smallerfacilities, it may be possible to have switch rooms on the main deck situated in a non-hazardous area.The use of a central structure running the length of the FPSO can serve both as the mainpiperack and the main cable rack, giving several tiers and permitting lateral separation.There are obvious advantages in cable pulling operations and greater protection againstdropped objects.Cable rack running down the port and starboard sides are more prone to impact fromswinging loads during supply boat offloading. If run at low levels, for example at theedge of the cargo deck and below the production deck within the module supportframework, the racks are more susceptible to greenwater damage1313.5.10 Mechanical Handling and Laydown AreasDuring layout development, main pedestal crane operations should be addressed todetermine the extent of crane coverage, e.g. two cranes or three, port and/or starboardlocations, maximum operating radius etc, and the preferred locations of the laydownareas. Mechanical HandlingMechanical handling studies have tended to be carried out during detailed design, bywhich time compromises will have already been made due to conflicts with equipmentmodifications, larger modules, additional equipment. It is recommended that at least ahigh level mechanical handling study is carried out during layout development to ensurethat other major issues, and not just those involving main cranes, are addressed. It may not always be sufficient to reserve space for a central access corridor alone.Consideration has to be given as to how major plant items and sub assemblies such ascompressor cartridges, large valves, pump barrels, HV motors, can be moved safely andquickly from their location (which may not necessarily be accessible by pedestal crane)to the central access area and on to a laydown area or a suitable uplift point. Devicessuch as gantry cranes and main runway beams can be considered.During FEED, where long lead equipment items are under discussion, involvement of thechosen or potential vendors on maintenance needs will ensure that at least some provisionis made at an early stage for the handling of large items whose removal and replacementis critical to the safety or the production uptime of the FPSO e.g. gas generators of gasturbine generation sets.Inside the machinery spaces, where access between floors will be through hatchesinvolving hoists and possibly an overhead crane, consideration has to be given as to howto get items to the hatches. Again the use of gantry cranes and runway beams has to beconsidered. Once an item has been moved to main deck level, its route to a suitable pick-up point has to be identified and planned for.Special provisions have also to be made for items such as the shuttle tanker export hoseand any other hoses, mooring hawsers and winches associated with tanker operations. The turret involves a large amount of high pressure mechanical equipment, such asvalves, pig receivers and launchers, and the swivel itself. Early involvement of the turretsupplier is essential to ensure that by making adequate allowances at an early stage of theproject, turn around times for critical items are minimised in the operations phase. Thisis particularly important in the event of problems with multi-path swivels. Depending on the type of turret and the turret vendor, a small jib crane may be suppliedwith the turret. It is advisable to cross check that the jib crane is suitable for turret dutyand that it can reach suitable landing and pick-up points on the main deck area of the132FPSO. It is also to be expected that the turret supplier will have made adequate provisionfor access to and removal of damaged bearings within the turret housing in the FPSOhull.Laydown AreasThe provision of sufficient lay down areas is frequently an area of dispute between theFPSO designer and the operator. It is often too easy for laydown zones to be reduced ortaken over for additional equipment and late modifications, leaving the operator withinadequate on-deck storage and handling space. It then becomes necessary to providesmaller elevated laydown areas on the roof of a module, for example. The risk of impactfrom swinging loads and dropped objects becomes greater and so more protective steelwork has to be provided.Laydown areas should always be accessible for the main cranes. Where there aresecondary storage areas which are not accessible for the main cranes, then these areasshould be in close proximity to minimise the amount of secondary mechanical or manualhandling. Consideration has to be given to the laydown, handling and storage of a wide range ofoffshore supplies from food to drums of hazardous and toxic injection chemicals. Whilethe great majority of items arrive containerised, it is on the laydown areas that they areunloaded and then moved on. If secondary storage/ laydown areas are created, thenpotential impact on access for operation and maintenance, means of escape, obstructionof flame and gas detectors has to be considered.3.5.11 Future Expansion and UpgradingAt the start of a project it is not always possible to predict how the field will perform bothin the long and short terms. Making provision for future developments in and around thefield can be influenced by a number of factors: Well productivity lower or higher than expected Opportunities for infill drilling to boost through put or maintain plateau Exploitation of other satellites in the vicinity Acting as a host FPSO to another unconnected development Gas and produced water volumes lower or higher than anticipatedCatering for uncertainty can be achieved by building in a margin into the processengineering design, providing the choice of margin does not result in significantequipment size changes. The initial use of undersized impellers on pumps andcompressors (providing there is adequate margin in the drivers) may be acceptable alongwith the provision of larger nozzles on some pressure vessels as a means of providingflexibility at a low first cost. This approach may also avoid having to make sizeablespace provisions.133Small production facilities on a large hull have a smaller footprint and offer scope for theaddition of modules, pallets or skids at a later date. Where the production facilitiesoccupy almost the entire main deck, the opportunities for expansion may be quiterestricted within the existing facilities. It may be possible to install a module on top ofthe existing facilities, providing: The vessels centre of gravity and vessel motions are not adversely affected The existing modules structure does not require significant modification Structural modifications inside cargo tanks can be avoidedIt may be that it is not only the oil processing facilities that have to be expanded and thatprovisions have to be made in the utilities systems. Placing new large items into themachinery spaces may be impossible or undesirable and so space provisions have to bemade on the main deck. One single area may be set aside for hydrocarbon equipmenttogether with utilities equipment, offering the possibility of a single skid or module.Consideration should be given to providing an area on the outside edge of the vessel asthis simplifies any lifting operations and reduces the risks from the potential problems ofcollisions from swinging loads and dropped objects.1343.6 LOCAL LAYOUT DEVELOPMENT FACTORSDuring layout development it is often too easy for the designers to concentrate on thelarger issues and to devote less time to issues which can in fact have a major influence onthe day to day operation of the FPSO, in that the effect on personnel is more tangible.Working in cramped conditions, not having direct access to equipment, having to toleratesub-ergonomic control room or office layouts are just several of the factors which canaffect personnel efficiency and attitudes and can in turn affect safety.An FPSO has different requirements to a tanker and while these differences may be fullyappreciated by those familiar with traditional offshore platforms, they may not be fullyunderstood by ship designers. The following sections are included so that both ship andfacilities designers can incorporate appropriate measures to create satisfactory workingand living conditions in what is already a harsh external environment.3.6.1 Living Quarters and OfficesIt is expected that the owner/ operator of the FPSO will have a major influence on thesize of the living quarters, its layout and the standards of fabric and fittings. Differentcompanies have different approaches in each of these areas, e.g. single vs two personcabins, but if these requirements are not communicated to the designer, then the endproduct may not prove satisfactory to those who have to live and work there.As well as providing facilities for eating and sleeping, the quarters or accommodationblock will probably also contain the Temporary Refuge, the main control room(s) andoffices. Other facilities may include but may not be limited to: Radio room Emergency response room Helicopter reception area Locker rooms and wash rooms Recreation areas such as quiet rooms, TV/ video rooms, activities rooms and gym Medical room and sick bay HVAC plant room(s) Switch room Stores Small workshop e.g. instrumentation Fire stations, with safety equipment such as BA sets etcThe input of operations team representatives should be solicited on all aspects along withinput from the accommodation or hotel services contractor who will advise on matters ofgalley, dining room, stores size and layout etc. Care should be taken to avoid routing ofpipework for certain services and utilities such as grey sewage through galley and storesareas.135The function of the TR has to be clearly understood by the designer. Input from Safetyadvisers as to the siting, size and layout is also recommended to ensure that underemergency situations it is possible for the crew to assemble, receive information andinstructions and move out to the embarkation points in an orderly manner.Office layouts should allow for computer terminals, filing and document storage and forsmall round-the-table meetings. Meeting rooms should allow for larger gatherings andvideo conferencing and be capable of being temporarily turned into an office orcoordination area for, say, commissioning or a major maintenance campaign.The views of medical and occupational health advisers should be sought for the layoutand equipment provisions of the medical room and sickbay.3.6.2 Control RoomsThe main control room is the permanently manned nerve centre of the FPSO. It isessential that great care is given to its sizing and layout to facilitate verbalcommunication and movement of personnel and to make sure that decision making is notcompromised.To ensure that the FPSO is operated as a single entity, it is recommended that the controlsfor the marine systems and the production facilities are co-located in a single controlroom. Co-location does not imply that there shall be a single combined control systemfor production and marine systems.The layout designer must consider among other things Size and number of production, marine and emergency control panels Back of panel access Provision of control desks, including public address facilities CCTV monitoring facility Administration of the permit to work system and issuing desks Production reporting system Additional work stations for supervisor and control room operatorsSome FPSO owners may have a preference for windows in the control room to allowviewing of the production deck and / or the stern area, especially shuttle tankeroperations, even though CCTV facilities have been installed. Where installed thewindows shall be rated for fire and explosion conditions.The control room will have adjacent to it a terminations rooms for the marshallingcabinets for the control systems cabling coming in from the FPSO. The design of thesuspended floors in the terminations room and the control room should be deep enough tofacilitate the orderly pulling, laying and grouping of cabling as well as access fortermination and inspection. There should be sufficient lateral space allowance to avoid136tight radii on cables. Some allowance should be made for the installation of additionalcables for possible future expansions.3.6.3 Maintenance Access and Removal RoutesOn a continually moving FPSO with a high level of exposure to the elements, it isessential to personnel safety that there should be, wherever possible, acceptable accessfor the maintenance and removal of equipment. Those responsible for the overall layoutof the FPSO should address the provision of main access routes and the principal featuresof mechanical handling such as jib and gantry cranes and large runway beams. However, in the case of mini-modules, palleted and skid-mounted packages, the packagedesigner will be at least one step removed from the main layout designer and may not beas appreciative of the particular difficulties of working on an FPSO. Overall layoutconsiderations will dictate the boundaries of the skid or module and so the designer has tofit everything in as best as he can. Access for maintenance may not be the mostimportant consideration. The early involvement of representatives from the operationsteam and a mechanical handling specialist and collaboration with the skid vendor shouldlead to a layout which is more user friendly. Gas compressor skids in particular can become very congested not just with the mainitems and valves but also with peripheral valves and piping e.g. lube oil, dry gas seals,casing vents and drains. Flanges are numerous and the integrity of these joints is key tothe avoidance of leaks. In such cases, good access is essential. Where there is a singletrain of compression, any outages have to be dealt with promptly to minimise flaring andassociated production cut backs. Having to dismantle half the skid to remove a cartridgeis undesirable. Chemical injection skids with multiple pumps and compact, congestedpipework can present similar access problems. With up-front attention to maintenanceaccess needs, such a situations can be avoided.Heat exchanger maintenance can be facilitated by the provision of removable pipe spoolsaround nozzles. These spools can afford better access to plate packs or tube bundles andavoid the need to cut and rejoin welded pipe.Runway beams above a skid along with optimally positioned padeyes can assist theremoval process off the skid. Removal to the workshop or to a laydown area or to acrane pick-up point has also to be allowed for. Trolleys are suitable for working on theflat but where stairs have to be negotiated, manual handling may be unavoidable. Inthese circumstances the input from the mechanical handling specialist is essential.The HSE has prepared guidelines for mechanical handling on FPSOs (Research project3806: Development of Manual Handling Toolkit for FPSO Design and Specification) (ref75). These should be consulted as part of an approach to ensure greater levels of thesafety in mechanical handling and rigging activities.137It is easy to overlook more mundane but nevertheless routine and potentially manpowerintensive activities such as checking and calibration of level gauges routine inspection and cleaning of fire, gas and smoke detectors removal of relief valves, bursting discs and flame arresters cleaning of inline filters change out of light fittings checking operation of fire and gas dampers etc etcIn many cases it will be possible to gain access by portable devices, or from nearbywalkways, while others may warrant permanent or semi-permanent access from smallplatforms. Each activity has to be considered on its merits taking in to account thefrequency, complexity and duration of the task. The cost of permanent access has to beweighed up against the cost of scaffolding and the potential loss of efficiency.3.6.4 Operations Access and OperabilityEven with production facilities which are largely controlled and monitored from a remotecentral control room, it will still be necessary for production technicians to make regularoutside tours and inspections and to prepare, isolate and make safe equipment formaintenance.Although individual items or groups of equipment can be remotely shut down quicklyand isolated in normal and emergency conditions, prompt local on-skid intervention maybe required. Valves to be operated frequently, if not motorised in the first instance,should be positioned such that levers and hand wheels are readily accessible. Similarly, sight glasses and local pressure and temperature gauges should also be readilyvisible. In short, the design of the equipment has to be user friendly in the interests ofsafety and efficiency.In the lowest levels of the machinery spaces containing seawater and firewater pumpsand headers, there is a risk of flooding in the event of a piping or connection failure.Access may be required to certain motorised as well as non-motorised isolation valves aspart of the emergency response. Layouts should take the need for such access intoaccount. Section 2.16 lists several mitigating measures which can be adopted to reducethe risk of flooding in machinery spaces.The early involvement of experienced operations representatives in the development ofthe layout of skids and packages should ensure that most of the basic needs, as opposedto individual preferences, are met.1383.6.5 Workshops and StoresOnce an FPSO is on station, it will be expected to remain on station for the field life. Itwill only be in exceptional circumstances that it will be disconnected to return to port anddry-dock. While certain items of equipment will can be shipped back to shore either as aunit or piece-small for repair, in an emergency it may be necessary to carry out repairs onboard. If it is not possible to perform these repairs in-situ, then the work may have to bedone in the FPSOs own workshop.There will probably be two or even three types of workshop Mechanical Electrical Clean instrumentation, including telecommsThe largest will be the mechanical workshop equipped with machining, drilling, grindingand cutting facilities. An oil bath may be provided for removal of lightly shrunk-oncomponents. There will also be a welding bay (with provision made in the HVAC designfor fume extract) which can also be used for hand grinding. Lathes, milling machines and drills should have adequate space around them to allow formanoeuvring items on to the machine. Overhead lifting facilities will include runwaybeams and possibly a small gantry crane. The location of the main workshop should beselected to avoid excessive handling of equipment and, if possible, located on the maindeck or first level of the machinery space. Access for equipment coming from above orbelow will be via hatches. These should be positioned vertically above one another tofacilitate single direct lifts from the lowest level to the main deck. Hatch openings willbe provided with removable barriers.Main walkways in the workshop should be straight to facilitate movement of bulky itemsas well as for escape purposes. It is likely that the mechanical superintendent will have an office in or adjacent to theworkshop and this should be equipped appropriately to enable any computerisedmaintenance planning and recording system to be run. Provision should be made fordocument storage such as vendor maintenance manuals where these are notcomputerised.Where other smaller workshops are provided they too must cater for the routine needs ofthe particular discipline which they serve.StoresThe storage space requirements of an FPSO differ from those of a tanker. The largerinventory of equipment alone will call for more storage volume, and the larger crew willalso have a bearing on stores and storage.139It is unlikely that any major capital spares or bulky items will be stored offshore butgiven the range of equipment on a typical FPSO, the range of consumable items can besubstantial. At the start of a project no one can say with certainty what the final offshorestores inventory will be. However the combined experience of marine and productionrepresentatives should provide early reliable indicators as to the general requirements.On larger FPSOs with larger production facilities, the amount of equipment, especially inmachinery spaces, bow compartments and forecastles (where these are used) will reducethe free space available. Instead of having a large single store to serve the maintenanceneeds, the maintenance crew may have to operate between two or more storage areas.Providing the needs have been addressed in advance this situation may be quiteacceptable. However, when dedicated space is inadequate, use will inevitably be made ofother free areas as ad hoc storage, leading to double handling, risk of obstruction ofaccess ways and possibly a slightly increased fire risk as well.If possible, main stores, like the main workshop, should be close to the main entrance ofthe space or superstructure in which they are located. This will reduce the amount ofhandling needed to get from the main drop off point, which in turn should be accessibleto the main crane(s). From the standpoint of personal safety, manhandling of stores andother supplies is not desirable and may not even be possible in adverse weather. Stores will have computer facilities to help control the issue and usage of components.Racking should be designed for ease of access but should take account of possiblemovement of items with movements of the hull.In addition to the main stores, there will be galley stores (dry and cold), paint stores,chemical stores (these may be on open deck areas properly dedicated to their storage),and rigging and lifting gear stores. All have special requirements, including ventilationetc for humidity control and fume removal, which the designer will have to address.1403.7 FPSO MAJOR SYSTEMS INCLUDING SYSTEM INTEGRATION/ SEGREGATION.3.7 1 IntroductionIn this section, design aspects of the major non-hydrocarbon systems on an FPSO arediscussed. Where appropriate, issues of integration and segregation are touched on asthis is an area which requires careful consideration when a conversion of an existingtanker or modifications to an intercept tanker in an advanced state of build are beingcontemplated. The design of systems which handle production fluids are not discussed, with theexception of product offloading, vents and drains. The design of topsides processingfacilities is almost always undertaken by contractors who generally have an establishedtrack record in the design of similar facilities on fixed platforms. These contractors arefamiliar with the main design issues and use international and national codes andstandards for hydrocarbon system design and equipment specification and build. However, this section and section 3.8 cover several systems, which although nothydrocarbon systems themselves, are an integral part of the production facilities, e.g.seawater, heating medium, inert gas etc. In the past, because some of these systems havehad their origins in the hull of the FPSO, their design has been handled by the hullcontractor. In such cases, it might have been more appropriate for the productionfacilities designer, with his greater appreciation of the requirements of productionfacilities, to have had overall design responsibility. In this way many of the interfaceproblems and conflicts between design codes could have been avoided, or at leastminimised.Feedback from FPSO owners, operators and designers suggests that there are still areaswhere the facilities designers, on the one hand, do not appreciate that the FPSO is not afixed facility, while on the other hand, the vessel designers do not understand thecharacteristics of production facilities. This has led to problems in the design of pipingsystems in the production facilities which, while designed to recognised API and ANSIstandards, have not got sufficient flexibility to accommodate hull bending and flexing.Similarly, some ship systems have been designed to traditional marine standards whenpiping codes more suited to continuous production operations might have been moresuitable.For each of the following systems, therefore, it is recommended that the designers teamsare made aware of the special characteristics of an FPSO to ensure that a single facility isprovided. This will go some way towards avoiding a repetition of the problems whichhave affected projects in the past and to creating consistency and continuity for projectsin the future.1413.7.2 FirewaterThe firewater system, if not the largest system on an FPSO, is certainly the mostextensive. As it is one of the key safety and loss prevention systems it naturally receiveswide coverage in the Classification Societies Rules, in SOLAS and in other recognisednational and international codes and standards. In spite of designers adhering to thegeneral guidelines given in these various documents, design shortcomings have arisenwhich have lead to major and minor disruptions in the operation of many FPSOs. Segregation/ IntegrationOn a new build FPSO there will be a single firewater system throughout the installation.In the case of a conversion, the size of the production facilities will dictate the extent offirewater coverage and so the existing ships system will have to be checked both forcapacity and design pressure. Design pressure will usually be determined by the heightof the monitors serving the helideck.In the case of a small production facility, only minor uprating of the existing system maybe necessary in terms of pump head and capacity, providing the general condition of thepumps and piping is satisfactory for the field life. Where there is a substantially greaterwater requirement than the ships system can deliver, checks have to be carried out toestablish whether the existing system can operate in conjunction with the new, in terms ofpump curve compatibility. It may then become necessary to dispense with the existingpumps and use the existing firewater network (again subject to its condition) as anextension of the new system for the production facilities.Pumps, Drivers and HydraulicsOn a new build FPSO the designer has several choices for pump configuration: Diesel direct drive centre-line mounted pumps located in the machinery space Diesel direct drive caisson pumps located on the main deck Diesel/ hydraulic drive caisson pumps, with deck mounted pumps and remotedriversElectric drives may be considered for firepumps provided it can be demonstrated that thesecurity, reliability, protection and integrity of the electrical supply is as high as thatoffered by conventional diesel driven units. Deck mounted firepumps will each be located in a suitably rated enclosure to protectthem against fire and explosion. Firepumps in hull machinery spaces will also beprotected against fire and each will be housed in a suitably fire rated enclosure. 142The designer can refer, for example, to Lloyds Register, (ref 22), part 7, chapter 3 ABS, (ref 24), chapter 3, section 8, subsection 5 DNV, (ref 73), chapter 2where guidance can be found on driver requirements, batteries, hydraulic starting,aspiration air, exhausts including insulation and silencers, enclosure ventilation, lube-oilheaters, cold starting, fuel supply and storage, remote isolation of fuel supply, sizing offuel tanks, remote starting etc.Caisson pumps are used on fixed installations but have recently been used on someFPSOs because they are easier to install and remove for maintenance than pumps in thebottom level of the machinery space. They also avoid the need for a firewater seachestand the attendant problems of seachest blanking to permit inspection of the seachestisolation valves. Where pumps are located in the lowest level, the issues of seachestinspection have to fully considered at an early stage in the hull design. It should not beassumed by the hull designer that divers will be used for this activity on a fullyoperational FPSO. Good designer/ operations team dialogue is needed to ensure that aworkable inspection system and a practicable closure scheme are adopted.For a conversion, issues surrounding segregation and integration, as referred to above inthe preceding section, must be addressed. Where additional capacity is needed, the pumptypes listed above have to be considered.Whatever the outcome, it will be necessary fully examine the pressure distribution withinthe system to ensure that the correct quantities of water are delivered when and whererequired. Various software packages are available to assist the designer in achievingoptimum distribution.A surge analysis of the firewater system should be carried out to avoid overpressuring thepiping on the start up of large capacity high-head pumps, especially where cupronickel isused (current design pressure limit is 20 bar). Hydraulic analysis consultants can usuallyundertake this work, which will include making recommendations about minimum flowand dump line sizing, the use of surge accumulators, and valve sequencing and openingand closure times.A small jockey pump or auxiliary seawater pump should be provided to maintain mainheader pressure and prevent premature activation of the deluge system in case of valveleakage and the inadvertent opening of drain or flushing valves at header ends.Metallurgy and PipingIn the majority of FPSOs the firewater system will be built out of cupronickel alloy.Practical alternatives are superduplex alloys, which are stronger and more robust thancupronickel but are generally more expensive, and glass reinforced plastic (GRP) which143may be used with some limitations in those areas where the size and intensity of the firesis deemed to be less.The HSE has carried out a Review of the Degradation of Firewater Piping and NozzlePerformance due to Blockage OTO 00:035 (ref 76). The review allows the designer toconsider the advantages and disadvantages of the various material options which may beappropriate for the specific installation. UKOOA has produced a Recommended Practicefor the Use of GRP Piping Offshore (ref 77) and ABS in reference 24, Appendix 1, givesguidance on the use of Plastic Pipe Installations.This section deals with cupronickel systems and the following points should be noted Velocities should not exceed 3m/sec to avoid erosion Avoid stagnation pockets which can result in anaerobic bacterial attack of theoxide layer and lead to pitting and holing At the extremities of headers and subheaders consider bleed points to avoid deadlegs Where dock water is used for initial flushing and commissioning, thoroughlyflush the entire system with clean water immediately thereafter to avoid the riskof rapid corrosion. Guard against mixing incompatible materials and fittings including delugenozzles, compression fittings, and carbon steel temporary construction aids, asthis can lead to premature galvanic corrosion. Carbon steel pipe supports and hangers should employ neoprene or similar sleevematerial to prevent galvanic corrosion Small-bore pipework should be adequately supported to avoid vibration failures.Avoid large valve assemblies on small branches. While larger bore branches will use swept tees, small branches should haveweldolets to provide reinforcing. Set-in branches must not be used, even forpressure gauge tappings. All fittings must be strong enough to withstand the higher pressures on firepumpstart-up. In the living quarters, domestic quality copper piping, joints and fittingsmust not be used for firewater duty.The main firewater headers will be run in a ring main designed so that sections can beisolated for maintenance and inspection without affecting the availability of the ringmain. The headers should also be protected from the effects of blast and from missilesfrom explosions by locating them behind deep structural members, for example. Careshould be taken when locating the first supports for branch lines off the ring main to takeaccount of the linear movement of the ring main and prevent overstressing of the branchconnections.1443.7.3 SeawaterDirect or Indirect CoolingThe seawater system is probably the largest system on the FPSO, providing water forcooling and for injection into the reservoir to maintain pressure support. Seawatercooling may be direct or indirect. In direct cooling the seawater acts as the heat transfermedium in an open loop system and is returned overboard. Where indirect cooling isused, the heat transfer medium is a fresh water/ glycol mixture in a closed loop,exchanging heat with seawater which is then discharged overboard.Indirect cooling is usually the preferred method in that the materials of construction ofthe piping and heat exchanger shells and tubes in the cooling circuit will for the most partbe carbon steel. The main seawater/ cooling medium exchanger will probably be oftitanium or superduplex alloy. Where direct cooling is used, there will more cupronickelor superduplex piping and the heat exchangers will require more exotic materials eitherfor the tubes where there is tubeside cooling or for the tubes and the shells where there isshellside cooling.Return seawater may be discharged over board from an overside pipe or its may bereturned via a through deck caisson. Where caisson discharge is used, then the positionof the exit should be remote from seachest or seawater lift caissons to avoid warm waterbeing recirculated.Where direct cooling is used, pressure drop considerations may rule out the use ofcupronickel whose maximum design pressure is 20 bar. If this is the case, thensuperduplex or similar alloys will have to be used.The seawater system will be cross connected to the firewater system to provide a degreeof flexibility during commissioning and pre-start up activities. While relatively smallvolumes of firewater may be used for short periods to provide seawater, seawater cannotbe used as the main source of firewater unless it can be demonstrated that the reliabilityand integrity of the seawater system, including the electrical supply, is as good as that ofthe firewater system.Segregation/ IntegrationIt is unlikely, in the case of a tanker conversion, that the existing seawater system willhave the capacity to serve the substantially larger demands of the production facilities.The three options open to the designer are: to provide new pumps to serve the new and the existing system with a cross overbetween the two sets of piping to provide new pumps for the production facilities demands and run the twosystems in parallel (pump characteristics being compatible) again with a crossover145 replace or mothball the existing system and provide a single new piping andpumping system for the entire FPSO.Factors affecting the decision will include the relative costs for each option and thegeneral condition of the tankers seawater pumps and piping for longer service.In the case of a new build the obvious choice is a single system for the entire FPSOunless there are special considerations specific to the FPSO which dictate otherwise.PumpsFor a new build FPSO the designer may locate the seawater pumps in the machineryspace, using conventional centre line mounted casings, or on the main deck, subject tospace availability, using caisson pumps of the type used on fixed jacket installations.Compared with pumps in the lowest level of the machinery space, caisson pumps take upless volume. The length of the header runs is shorter as they are closer to the main endusers. They are also more accessible for operations and maintenance, and as they do notrequire a seachest, they avoid the problems associated with seachests and seachestinspections. They reduce piping congestion in the machinery space and reduce the risksof seawater flooding in the lower levels because of the significantly reduced numbers ofvalves and flanges.Although more accessible for maintenance, they do involve more mechanical fitting andhandling which may be affected by rough weather conditions on a more exposed deck.It is worth repeating here that where in-hull pumps are selected, the inspection ofseachests and valves must be addressed early in the design phase. The use of divers and/or ROVs to fit blanking plates should not be assumed and so the design of seachests, thepositioning of main isolation valves, the specification and selection of valves should beregarded as significant activity in its own right. Involvement of corrosion and inspectionengineers is recommended to determine what non-invasive methods can be used inservice to monitor seachest, main valve and piping integrity while in service.Metallurgy and PipingWhere cupronickel is used, then the guidance given above in section 3.7.2 on Firewateralso applies.Superduplex or duplex alloys used on seawater duty ensure more robust piping systemsthan cupronickel, which is more vulnerable to impact from dropped objects or swingingloads. However, cupronickel is already widely used offshore and crews are generallyaware of its limitations in this respect.146Attention should be paid to the metallurgy of bulkhead transition pieces to avoid the useof incompatible materials, either through the use of insulating gaskets or special spoolswith good corrosion properties.GRP piping may be considered for use on seawater duty as an alternative to metallicpiping. Earlier concerns over its vulnerability to fire or thermal radiation are now lessand as mentioned in section 3.7.2, there are codes of practice for the design andconstruction of GRP systems which can be applied with greater confidence. Chemical dosing will be needed to prevent the build up of marine growth in the pumpingand piping systems and in seawater cooled heat exchangers. Dosing of the firewatersystem is also required to avoid marine growth. Sodium hypochlorite is usually injectedinto pump suctions and into caissons (where these are used). This chemical can begenerated on board from raw seawater in a hypochlorite generator. Due to its corrosivenature it has to be piped in GRP or PVC or titanium. Titanium tubing is used downcaissons to deliver the hypochlorite into the pump suctions as it is less prone tomechanical damage during pump stack removal and replacement.Care has to be taken with the injection of hypochlorite to ensure that it is well mixeddownstream of the injection point and thus avoid high local concentrations which can beaggressively corrosive in cupronickel systems. Regular in-service monitoring of theeffectiveness of the dosing is recommended to detect the early build up of marine growth.The use of injection quills will reduce the likelihood of corrosion, but the quills must alsobe designed to avoid fatigue failures.Consideration should be given to the provision in the lower levels of the machineryspaces of remotely operated main isolation valves for both seawater and firewater as ameans of reducing the risk of flooding of these spaces in the event of a flange or branchfailure (refer also to section 2.16).3.7.4 Bilge and BallastCoverage of these two systems in the Classification Societies Rules is extensive andcomprehensive, e.g. LR (ref 22), part 5, chapter 12. System design issues are alsodiscussed in section 2.16 of these Design Guidance Notes. Consideration may be givento alternate means of bilge disposal/ storage to give operating flexibility for slops tankinspection, taking due cognisance of the need to avoid communication betweenhazardous and non-hazardous drains systems, as discussed in section 3.7.8.Attention should also be given to the material of construction of both systems. In thecase of the bilge system, the bilge water will be predominantly stagnant seawater withdiesel and lube oil from small leaks and spillages. The ballast system also is prone toexposure from stagnant seawater, although the displacement of this and systemreplenishment will be dictated by crude oil production rates and the frequency of cargotransfers to shuttle tankers.147As dosing of these systems with chemicals is not practicable due to the intermittentnature of their operation, the choice of materials of construction becomes important.Where GRP has been specified for the larger ballast system, then care must be given tothe configuration of the main headers. Sufficient flexibility has to be built in to allow forthe flexing experienced by the hull during regular filling and discharge of the cargo tanks.Where the FPSO exports continuously to a pipeline or an FSU and sits at constant draft,then the problem is less.The design of GRP ballast piping systems should be done in conjunction with themanufacturer of the pipe and the fittings to ensure that these components will operatewithin their design stress limits. Pipe supports should support but not restrainexcessively. The interface between ballast pumps and main ballast pipework should beexamined to ensure that nozzle loads in service are within the acceptable limits.3.7.5 Inert GasThere are two inert gas systems on an FPSO, one for the blanketing and purging ofproduction equipment where the inert gas is nitrogen and one for the blanketing of themain cargo tanks, where the inert gas is carbon dioxide.By comparison with CO2, nitrogen usage is small and is usually generated fromcompressed air in a membrane exchange unit. The compressed air comes from the FPSOinstrument and plant air system. Pressure swing absorption units may be used as analternative source of nitrogen. Back-up is provided from large bottles of high pressurenitrogen called quads. Cryogenic nitrogen can be used but has to be transported fromshore in special flasks. Careful handling is required to prevent leakage and spills as thevery low temperature of the escaping nitrogen impinging on a surface may result in brittlefracture of carbon steel components, deck plate etc The carbon dioxide is produced from the combustion of diesel oil in an inert gasgenerator. The two systems are not cross-connected. Inert gas generators for tanker useare familiar equipment items. (LR (ref 22), part 5, chapter 14, section 6).On a seagoing tanker the inert gas header system is relatively uncomplicated. Tankinspections or maintenance can be more readily done in port or in dock and tank entrycan be done while all the tanks are empty. By contrast, the header system on an FPSO ismore complex due to the need to fully isolate individual tanks for inspection or repairswhile other tanks are still in service.The creation of a cargo management philosophy or strategy document, along with anisolation for maintenance philosophy, at an early stage in the project should greatly assistthe designer of the inert gas header(s). Whether the FPSO is a conversion or a new build,the designer should be able to develop a header system which provides full flexibility foroperations and inspections and at the same time confers the highest level of safety for148personnel entry into tanks and protection against mal-operation and possibleoverpressure.While safety of operation is of paramount importance to avoid tank overpressure or underpressure, care should be taken to ensure that the system of isolation does not becomeoverly complex and difficult to implement in practice. A risk assessment should becarried out during design to ensure that the system of isolation is both safe and workable.Cargo tank overpressure and vacuum sensors with alarms should be considered.3.7.6 Product OffloadingThis section deals mainly with the engineering issues associated with product offloadingto a shuttle tanker. Operational matters, including the use of global and line of sightpositioning systems, controls - both automated and manual, emergency procedures etc,associated with shuttle tanker offloading are covered in publications by shipping interestgroups such as INTERTANKO (ref 52) and OCIMF (ref 53).Offloading via a pipeline to an FSU or into a high pressure gathering system is likely tobe a continuous operation, similar to that for a fixed jacket installation. Crude oil fromthe separators/ coalescer will be pumped through booster and barrel pumps into the highpressure system while conventional cargo pumps will be used to export to an FSU.Flexible or steel catenary risers (depending on water depth) connect the FPSO to a subseariser base. Where high pressure pumping is involved, checks should be performed toestablish surge pressure levels on the rapid closure of subsea isolation valves.The two principal components of the product offloading system to a shuttle tanker are thecargo pumps and the hose reel. Cargo pumps can be conventional centrifugal unitslocated in a cargo pump room (more likely to be found on a tanker conversion where theexisting pumping facility is retained) or deep well pumps in each cargo tank. In the case of pumps in a pump room, the main design issues centre around possible loss of containment the early detection of leaks and prompt shutdown fire detection and protection hazardous area classification ventilation acceptable access for operations and maintenance.For deep well pumps the design issues relate to isolation for maintenance and removal. Itshould be possible to isolate a pump set without having to take more than one tank out ofservice. When designing the production facilities located in modules above the maindeck, sufficient overhead clearance should be provided for pump withdrawal. In thedesign of pipework, allowance should be made for removable spools and for the insertion149and removal of line blinds/ spectacle plates to avoid unacceptable loads on pump nozzlesand to reduce the possibility of flange leakage from poorly made joints.At this point, it is appropriate to draw the designers attention to a significant differencein the way the crude oil piping system on an FPSO is operated compared with that on atanker.When a tanker takes on a cargo in port, the deck piping runs warm. While at sea thepiping cools down and, some days or weeks later in port, warms up again during cargodischarge. Provision for thermal expansion is through the use of proprietary flexiblepiping components. Should there be any leakage from these components while the tankeris in port, it is likely to be noticed quickly and easily contained.On an FPSO, the cargo manifolds may be running warm almost continuously, expandingand contracting depending on which tanks are filling at any one time. Under theseconditions, the flexible piping components are subjected to continuous movement. Thechances of leakages of oil on to the main deck are greatly increased, as are the risks of anuncontained or poorly contained oil spillage flowing overboard and into the sea. There isalso a greater risk of fire should there be a large loss of containment. In the interests ofsafety and environmental protection, the main cargo pipework should be designed withno flexible couplings or bellows units. Provision for expansion should be made usingexpansion loops. Consideration should also be given to expansion loop provision on theinert gas and vent headers although the risks to safety and the environment are less Where a hose reel is used, the reel size will be determined by the export rate and theseparation distance between FPSO and shuttle tanker. The hose reel can be a sizeablestructure, located at the stern of the FPSO, possibly close to lifeboat stations and livingquarters. For these reasons and the prevention of leaks, the hose reel and hose designshould ensure smooth payout and rewinding of the hose to avoid snagging, kinks andoverstressing of the hose sections and joints. The swivel joint / goose neck should be of aproven design. The hose will also be provided with a weak link connector also of provendesign, to minimise any spillage to the sea of crude oil in the event of a suddendisconnect, controlled or otherwise, between FPSO and shuttle tanker.Adequate provision has to be made for maintenance of the reel and change out of hosesections, with sufficient handling and storage capacity for several hose sections in theevent of a failure close to the centre of the reel.It is likely that cargo pumps and hose reel will be hydraulically powered. Power packsand motors can be noisy unless sufficient attention is paid to the design of thesecomponents and the valves. Whether the power packs are positioned on deck or in thehull, every attempt should be made to minimise structure borne noise. Systemcleanliness is essential for smooth operation and so the configuration of the high pressurehydraulic piping should allow for cleaning and ease of dismantling and reassembly.150Winch systems will also be required for handling of pick-up buoys, messenger lines andany hoses associated with the recovery of VOCs from the shuttle tanker. Located at thestern, they will also require provision for power and maintenance.3.7.7 VentsThere are essentially two venting duties on an FPSO. The larger venting requirement isfor the cargo handling system while the smaller is for the hydrocarbon productionfacilities. On a new build FPSO it is possible to integrate both duties into a singlesystem. On tanker conversion, while integration into a single system is also possible, theowner may choose to keep the two systems segregated.Cargo Vent SystemOn a tanker, the rates of cargo loading can be several times higher than on a producingFPSO. A tanker vent system, based on the use of vent posts or a single vent header, maynot be appropriate for the new FPSO duty. A vent header originally designed for tankeroperations will have a low pressure drop and low velocities such that at vent exit, thedispersion velocities will be also be low and there may not be adequate plume momentumto give satisfactory dispersion in low wind or still air conditions.Vent posts located on the main deck may clash with the rest of the production facilitieson a congested topsides and will have to be led away to suitable locations for safedispersal or else manifolded into a header collection system.The vent system and the inert gas blanketing system interface with each other at the cargotanks. During unloading, high discharge rates demand high inerting rates and so thedesigns of both systems have to take account of the differences between the filling anddischarge modes of operation. A dual header system may therefore be considered as ameans of providing flexibility of operation.The configuration of the tank isolation valves on these headers, if correctly chosen, canprovide a high degree of operational flexibility as well as reducing the risks of tankoverpressure. The tank pressure/vacuum valve discharges have to take account of theproduction modules located above and must be led away to a suitable point to ensureadequate and safe dispersion or else manifolded and incorporated into the vent header oratmospheric vent system.If the owners environmental strategy demands it, recovery of VOCs from the cargo tankvents may be achieved through the use of a blower/ low pressure compressor andrecycling the vent gas into the process. Alternatively some form of VOC strippingsystem may be incorporated.151Production VentingDepending on the pressure level of equipment to be vented, vent gas may discharge in tothe HP flare header, the LP flare header or the atmospheric vent header. In the case ofthe very low pressure discharges, consideration may be given to the use of a low pressurecompressor, linked to the cargo vent system to recover gas which might have been flaredor vented direct to atmosphere.HP/ LP InterfacesVenting from production systems may be intermittent or regular, controlled or manual,routine or emergency. The venting or blowdown may be via blowdown valves, pressurerelief valves, bursting discs or orifice plates and through the use of manual valves. Inmany venting, relief or blowdown situations, there is the possibility for a high pressure/low pressure interface to exist where the low pressure side may not be capable ofwithstanding the design or operating pressure of the more highly rated system. It shouldbe the responsibility of the process engineering designers to identify all potential HP/ LPinterfaces to ensure that overpressurisation of the lower rated system is not possible. AnHP/ LP interface register should be created and maintained throughout the whole life ofthe unit. Acoustically Induced Vibration in Flare/ Vent headersIn the case of high pressure venting into the closed HP flare header system, the designershould be aware of the phenomenon of acoustically induced fatigue in thin walledstainless steel pipework. Fatigue failures can occur rapidly where there is a regular blowdown or venting cycle, forexample in a gas dehydration regeneration sequence. Where there is a discontinuity inthe flare header wall, such as a small vent line or a pressure tapping, fatigue failures canoccur in the parent pipe at the junction between the branch and the header. Thediscontinuity may also be a construction aid such as test or vent point for hydrostatic orlow pressure pneumatic testing, where such form of testing has previously been fullyauthorised. The use of these construction aids must be monitored and where used, designchecks must be carried out ensure there is no susceptibility to acoustically inducedfatigue failure, either in the short or long terms.3.7.8 DrainsThere are three types of drains system on an FPSO which are associated with production,namely the closed drains, the hazardous open drains and the non hazardous open drains.Drains serving the enclosed machinery and other spaces within the FPSO are, as in atanker, channelled into the slops tank collection system. 152Closed DrainsThe closed drains systems is slightly overpressurised and gathers the drains from allpiped hydrocarbon drain points into a collection vessel where the drained liquids areallowed to gas off before being pumped back into the oil production train. There shouldbe no cross connection with any of the other drains systems. The collection vessel willbe located at main deck level below the production deck to permit drainage under gravity.In the main production area where the deck area is open grated, drip trays positionedunder pressure vessels collect minor leaks etc from flanges, sight glasses etc. Pumpbedplate bunds with valved drains intercept small leaks from seals and flanges. Theseand the oily contents of drip trays are in turn drained off locally into the hazardous opendrains and then to the slops tank, possibly via an intermediate holding tank.Hazardous Open DrainsOn an operational tanker, the main drains are only likely to have to deal with leaks andspills while loading and discharging in port. Scuppers have bungs inserted to preventspills going overboard and larger spills may be contained within main deck bunds. Whileat sea, the main deck drains have mostly to handle rain water, wash down water andseawater washing over the decks, with discharges all going to sea.On an FPSO, the cargo piping system on the main deck will be running full for a highpercentage of the time. The main deck is open to the production deck above through theopen grated flooring. Consequently, the deck drainage system has to deal with all typesof spillages and leaks plus rainwater, washdown water, firewater deluge and seawater.The hazardous open drains will utilise a trap system to intercept small spillages. Thesecan flow into a hazardous drains collection tank, where oil/ water separation takes place.Recovered oil is returned to the process and oily water can be transferred to the slops tankfor further separation and final discharge over board, to comply with the permissible oilin water levels determined by law or by company policy, whichever is the more stringent.The problems of containment of large spills and leaks while minimising the risk of amain deck pool fire have been discussed earlier in Part 3, section 3.5.5. Bunding aroundthe main deck with removable sections can provide a workable compromise It is impossible to design a hazardous open drains system to deal with such a wide rangeof flow rates and so it has to be accepted that under certain circumstances, e.g. underdeluge conditions or during storms, the drains system will be overloaded, the back-upbunding will overflow and some coincident hydrocarbon spillage may be washedoverboard.The hazardous and non-hazardous drains should not be interconnected directly orindirectly, even via a common reception tank. By maintaining segregation, any gasesfrom the hazardous drains cannot migrate back into the non-hazardous system. On a153tanker, the slops tank and the cargo tanks share a common inert gas system and aretherefore cross-connected. On an FPSO, the inerting of the slops and cargo tanks shouldbe fully segregated. Traps should be inspected and cleaned on a regular basis to ensurethat there is still a seal and that the trap is not blocked with debris. Throughout thesystem, there should be adequate provision for rodding points for cleaning out drainheaders.In the past there have been a number of serious incidents on fixed platforms where gashas migrated, via cross-connected drains and dry seal traps, into a non-hazardous areacausing explosions and serious injury.Non-Hazardous Open DrainsAs the name implies, this system serves the non-hazardous area of the main deck. Trapsare provided and will take away seawater, rainwater, washdown water and deluge into theslops tank collection system. Large volumes of water overflowing the traps gooverboard.The comments on hazardous drains in the preceding section and on the avoidance ofpossible interconnections also apply here.3.7.9 Main Electrical PowerOptions for a new-build FPSOOn a new build FPSO, the power requirements will be largely determined by thedemands of the production systems. The demands of marine systems e.g. bilge andballast, thrusters (where fitted to assist shuttle tanker operations) and any propulsionsystem (should the owner require this either for future use of the FPSO in anotherlocation or for the voyage from yard to field), will be much smaller by comparison.Unless the owner has very good reasons for choosing two power systems, then the entireFPSO can be powered from a single main power supply.Generator Type and LocationThe main generators are likely to be dual-fuel gas turbines, which may be aero-derivatives or industrial units. Whichever type is selected, they should be of provendesign with a clearly demonstrable track record of reliability on offshore duty. Where theturbine is not packaged by the original equipment manufacturer, the packager should alsobe able to demonstrate a sound tack record of packaging this type of unit for offshore use.The layout of the area around the generation sets and the layout of the enclosure shouldafford ease of change out of main components such as gas generators. The risks to thegeneration unit itself and to surrounding equipment from the failure of turbine blades,discs and rotor should also be considered when locating the package.154In view of their size and the complexity of the turbine package e.g. inlets and exhausts,enclosure ventilation etc, they will be positioned on the main deck to avoid any clashwith the build of the hull.The number of generation sets to be selected will have to take account of: Fit with the maximum continuous load Operating flexibility Operating strategy i.e. machines on full load, part load, hot stand-by etc Start up of the largest drive/ drives The machines proven performance and perceived reliability Running costs Weight and space impact First cost, cost of spares holdings and maintenance costsTransformers and SwitchgearWhere deck space permits, it may be possible to locate the main transformers on the maindeck while the main switchgear is housed in a purpose built switch room or in a suitablesuperstructure. As most of the large power consumers will be on the main deck, thisarrangement reduces cable runs. If deck space is at a premium, then the specifying,selection and procurement of transformers and switchgear to be positioned inside the hullmust be done in good time to minimise the potential for interface problems during hullconstruction.Transformers located on the open deck must be suitable for the exposed marineenvironment. Switchgear specification should take account of the offshore duty.Options for converted tankers: Integration or SegregationIn the case of a conversion, the tanker will already have power systems for propulsion(most likely direct drive diesel units) and for electrical power (also diesel driven). It islikely that the owner will retain the propulsion units for the voyage to the field and forpossible use later if the FPSO is to be deployed on another field. Depending on the power demands of the production facilities, (much of which will beplaced on the deck), compared with those for any of the ships systems which may havebeen retained, the options open to the owner could be:1. Retain the existing generators in the hull and if hull space permits add new diesel units to make up the shortfall for the production facilities2. Retain the existing generators in the hull and add new units on the main deck3. Mothball the existing generator units and add on deck generation capacity for the entire FPSO155Option 1 can result in an integrated, more flexible main power system or the two sectorscan remain segregated. Consideration must be given to converting the existing generatorunits to dual-fuel firing to maximise the utilisation of produced gas. Where theconversion takes place, the safety issues of fuel gas supplies in a confined space must befully addressed.Option 2 offers both integrated and segregated systems with the choice of the additionalgas turbine units or dual fuel reciprocating engines on the main deck.Option 3 is the fully integrated optionWhichever option is chosen, and depending on the amount of deck space available, newswitchgear and transformers can be placed on the main deck. For integrated options,checks should be carried out on retained electrical switchgear, cabling etc to forcompatibility with the new system. Where systems are segregated, the existing systemshould be checked for condition and to confirm its electrical suitability for the new FPSOapplication. The use of a single electrical control system will improve operability,especially in emergency situations.3.7.10 Emergency Electrical PowerThe emergency load schedule (including critical loads such as thrusters), will determinethe size of the emergency generation capacity. The load schedule for an FPSO will beconsiderably larger and different from a tanker. The designer, who may be more familiarwith ships than with offshore production platforms, may require additional guidance fromthe owner and the production facilities designer to ensure full emergency powercoverage.On loss of main power, it is essential that the production facilities can be shut downsafely and that the rest of the FPSO, with all its essential and emergency control andmanagement systems and life support systems (including TR) can continue to functionnormally and safely. In the event of a major emergency, the battery back up systems must ensure thatminimum control room functions are maintained along with emergency lighting, radioand communications facilities, navigation aids etc. Battery systems design must takeaccount of access for inspection and maintenance, heat removal and ventilation of thebattery room. Consideration has to be given to starting up the entire FPSO from what is commonlyknown as black start conditions. The preparation of a black start philosophy at an earlystage in the electrical design will highlight the basic power supply needs to establish andmaintain life support and emergency systems.156Larger systems requiring power from emergency generators will include auxiliaryseawater, instrument air, potable water, HVAC, diesel fuel etc in sufficient quantities toget at least one main generator on line. It should also be possible to operate at least onepedestal crane, especially if it is an electro-hydraulic unit, to permit essential fuel andsupplies to be transferred from supply boats. As design progresses, it is prudent to checkthat the actual loads on the emergency and critical load schedule do not exceed thecapacity of the emergency generator. Eventually it may be necessary to carry out a fullconnected load test of the generators to ensure that they are capable of supplying the totalconnected power for the required period of time.The size of the emergency generator will in general be dictated by the size of the FPSO,ranging from 500 to 800 KW for smaller production units to over 1MW for an FPSO witha throughput of over 100,00bpd. There are well-established guidelines for the design ofthe emergency generator and its support systems including fuel supply, starting facilities,inlet air and exhausts, the enclosure and its protection and ventilation. (For example,reference can be made to Lloyds Register, (ref 22), Part 6, chapter 2, section 3). Thereare also guidelines for the design and protection of the emergency switch room and thedistribution system.It is usual to have two 100% rated emergency generators. It is possible to justify the needfor a single emergency generator on the basis of the risk of losing main power andemergency power at the same time and for an extended period being low. Making thecase for a single or a second emergency generator will also have to take into account thepotential loss of production should the FPSO be unable to return to normal operationwithin a realistic time interval.The location of the emergency generator(s) and the emergency switch rooms should takeaccount of their accessibility relative to the main control room or switch rooms shouldmanual intervention be needed quickly in an emergency situation.3.7.11 HVACAs stated earlier in Part 1, the development of an HVAC Design Philosophy or Basis ofDesign document will highlight the fundamental requirements for an offshore oil and gasinstallation operating as an FPSO. Furthermore, the document should clarify thedifferences between an FPSO and a tanker to ensure that designers, due to a lack offamiliarity or understanding, do not initially design and specify marine type systems.Although the Classification Societies now generally recognise that floating productioninstallations have particular requirements, their guidance on HVAC is still contained intheir rules for the classification of ships or mobile offshore drilling units. An alternativesource of guidance can be found in the Department of Energy Fourth Edition GuidanceNotes (ref 4), section 47.157Although a large proportion of the HVAC design is for the Living Quarters, the overalldesign should reflect the requirements of the FPSO as a unit. Should a specialist HVACdesign contractor be engaged, the contractor should demonstrate a proven track record inthe design of offshore systems. Experience of hotel systems alone is not sufficient. The main outputs from the HVAC systems design will be the flow diagrams, theschematics and the D&IDs (ducting and instrumentation diagrams). Good qualitydocuments will greatly assist those commissioning and operating the systems and canprove beneficial if and when modifications are needed at a later date.In the specification and selection of HVAC equipment and in the development of layouts,three main requirements have to be addressed:Suitability of equipment for offshore use (robustness, materials of construction)The range of equipment and components is considerable e.g., fans (supply, extract andrecirculation), air handling units, dampers (fire and gas, pressure control, shut-off,volume control), silencers, heater units, louvres, mixing boxes, humidifiers, ductwork,bellows units etc etc. The specifications have to ensure that all items (not just the highvalue items) are suitable for duty offshore with its high saline atmosphere, high relativehumidity levels and the risk of condensation. Incorrect materials can lead to prematurecorrosion and the inconvenience and cost of replacement. Special attention should begiven to battery rooms and laboratoriesAccessibility for operation and testingOnce the system(s) have been commissioned and satisfactorily balanced, there will stillbe a need to perform regular tests and checks on certain components, principally thoseconnected with the Fire and Gas system. These include the fire and gas dampers and thesmoke and gas detectors in the inlet and exhaust ducts. These must be readily accessibleas they are essential parts of the safety system.MaintainabilityDuring layout development of the FPSO, HVAC maintenance needs can often beoverlooked with equipment and ducting being shoehorned in after the main piping runsand cable rack routings have been determined. Where there are large spaces to be ventilated, the size of fans, filters, and air handlingunits will be commensurate. Adequate provision should be made for access to theseitems and for removal of components. In-duct fans units are a good example of itemswhere handling difficulties can arise due to inadequate provision.1583.7.12 Fire ProtectionFire protection on an FPSO will be a mixture of active and passive protection. Activeprotection is provided by fire water (deluge, sprinklers, monitors, hose reels), foam, C02blanketting and portable extinguishers. Passive protection is provided by the use of fire rated partitions and by fire resistantcoatings applied to primary structural members, bulkheads, decks, framing, equipmentfoundations, and pressure vessel shells, saddles and skirts. Protection may also berequired on structures, e.g., the flare tower and turbine exhaust supports, whosepremature collapse on to other structures and equipment may result in escalation of anevent The type and extent of each method of protection will be determined by the outcome offire and other safety related studies. While estimates of fire-water coverage developed atthe start of FEED can give a reasonable guide to the sizing of the firewater pumps for theearly placement of purchase orders, the extent of passive protection takes much longer toassess. The timing of these studies is therefore important to enable realistic workscopesfor the supply and application of passive protection to be developed.Close liaison between safety and loss prevention engineers and process engineers isdesirable for the development of fire scenarios, the outcome of which may indicate that insome areas of the FPSO, blanket deluge or extensive passive protection is not alwaysnecessary in the control of fires and the preservation of structural integrity. In certainareas, which in the past might have been provided with sprinkler coverage, it may bepossible to provide adequate protection against the size and types of fires anticipatedusing strategically placed hose reels and hand held extinguishers appropriate to the typeof fire.Once the number and extent of fire zones have been established, then it becomes possibleto determine the full extent of water coverage and passive protection for each zone.Active ProtectionVarious aspects of the design of the main firewater system such as pumps and metallurgyhave been discussed above in section 3.7.2. The following section deals briefly withperipheral equipment.In areas which are deluge protected and /or hoses and monitors are used, it is essentialthat insulation, (thermal, acoustic, passive fire protection) on equipment, piping andstructural members or panels, is designed and installed to withstand the deluge waterforces. Insulation should also be impermeable to firewater and seawater to preventcorrosion under it.The numbers and size of deluge valve sets will be determined by the water demands ofindividual fire zones. (Large sets frequently require more space than had been initially159allocated for them in preliminary layout studies). They also have to be positioned awayfrom the area which they serve and suitably shielded to ensure that they are not renderedunserviceable by the event they were intended to be used against. Although deluge valve sets have been features of active systems offshore for many years,it is still possible to encounter problems of metallurgy and the design of small bore piping(see section 3.7.2 above). The choice of materials for valves and valve componentsexposed to seawater should be agreed with the project corrosion adviser to avoid mixes ofmaterials which can give rise to early corrosion. Rubber lining of seats, discs and gatesas a means of protecting somewhat inferior, cheaper materials may break down resultingin high rates of localised corrosion.Flushing of subheaders with fresh water after in service testing will help to preventpitting of cupro-nickel pipework. Deluge nozzles orifices should be sized not only toprovide the required coverage and spray pattern but to avoid blockage by foreign bodiesor by salt deposits. The choice of metallurgy is also important to prevent corrosion whichcould render the nozzle(s) ineffective.The choice of metallurgy is also important for the monitors, hydrants and hose reels to beused on seawater duty. Hose reels will be found mostly inside in the living quarters andmachinery spaces. The standards for the supply pipework for the reels and for the valvesand fittings should be the same as those for the rest of the firewater system.Foam for rapid knock-down of fires will be aqueous film forming foam (AFFF). There isstill discussion within the industry about the merits of 1% and 3% foam concentrationand so the choice will depend on the preference of the operators fire and safetyengineers. The selection and location of hand held extinguishers will be determined by the size andnature of the fire which might be expected in a given area.The use of inert gas for extinguishing fires is now confined to carbon dioxide. The use ofhalon gas and other similar chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) extinguishants has been banned byinternational convention, i.e. the Montreal Protocol. Carbon dioxide is used mainly in the enclosures of gas turbines. Special precautionshave to be taken during entry to turbine enclosures to prevent the exposure of personnelto CO2 in the event of spurious activation of the system.Where halon flood was once used in switch rooms to extinguish electrical fires, it is nowpossible to have simpler active protection using hand held extinguishers only. Acombination of panel design and strategically placed smoke and heat detection providingearly warning can contain a fire and permit early intervention through electrical isolationand follow-up use of hand held units.160Passive ProtectionIn the event of an explosion, the deluge system for the affected area may be damaged tothe extent that it cannot offer any protection. Passive protection therefore becomes theonly protection against progressive collapse of structure and equipment until such timeas: the source of fuel has been isolated the fire brought under control by depressuring of the production facilities disposal of inventory, where that its possible the use of water or foam from other sourcePassive protection can be provided by partitions, suitably rated for the anticipated type offire, and by coatings. The use and ratings of partitions e.g. H120, A60, B15 etc, arecovered in the Classification Society Rules as follows: Lloyds Register (ref 22) , Part 7, chapter 3, section 2. ABS (ref 24), chapter 4, section 8, subsection 9. DNV (ref 73) OS D301, chapter 1.Where coatings are used to protect critical equipment and structures, the coating systemmust be Able to withstand the impact of firewater deluge and fire hose jets Able to remain intact following an explosion Able to withstand jet fires Non-combustible Flexible to accommodate movement of structural members and equipment due toflexing of the FPSO hull. Impervious to seawater, firewater, hydrocarbons and corrosive chemicals Chemically inert to prevent degradation over time Able to absorb impacts from tools etc without spallingConsideration has also to be given to the method of application as some passive coatingssystems are more labour intensive than others e.g. trowelled on vs spray application.Some may also require a supporting mesh structure to hold them in place.The use of cementitious materials is not recommended due to unsatisfactory flexcharacteristics and a tendency to spall on impact.Additional short term passive protection against thermal radiation for personnelescaping from a fire can be provided by the use of strategically placed mesh screens ofproprietary design. These screens also provide a degree of weather protection in exposedplaces such as the turret structure.1613.7.13 Fire and Gas SystemThe fire and gas system on an FPSO will be much larger than on a tanker by virtue of thecoverage of the production facilities. In the case of a conversion, therefore, where thereis already a fire and gas system in place, the system will not be capable of extension andupgrading to meet the new duty.A review of the tanker system will be needed to determine if it is compatible with theproposed system for the production facilities and if the existing coverage is adequate inthe spaces which it already serves. Depending on the outcome of the review, the designerand owner may decide to a) retain the existing system and extend it in the areas alreadyserved and then interface it with the new or b) scrap it and have a single system for theFPSO.In view of the size and complexity of the F&G system it is recommended that the overallresponsibility for the design of the system is given to the designer of the productionfacilities. The involvement of shipyard design personnel will be confined to anysupporting role, if that is considered necessary.The system will have many detection devices for gas, flame, smoke and where reservoirfluid properties demand it, detection for hydrogen sulphide H2S. Where there are largeproduction modules, line of sight gas detectors looking along a module may be affectedby the flexing of the hull and so any twist has to be compensated for. Fire detectors maybe supplemented by thermal imaging cameras or CCTV for similar reasons.Fusible plugs may be used to initiate the response of the deluge system, and pneumaticloops constructed from a low melting point material may be used where the shape andlayout of equipment make the positioning of conventional detectors complicated orimpractical. Care should be taken when positioning these loops to ensure that they arenot exposed to warm equipment, thermal radiation from the flare, flaming liquid carryover from the flare or to unnecessary mechanical damage.The design of the system and the monitoring and control hardware should be carried outby a system design house which has a proven track record in the design, manufacture,testing, delivery, installation and commissioning of large scale offshore fire and gassystems. The system may be stand alone or may be part of the overall production controland ESD system. Where a combined system is selected, then the system designer/supplier must also have a proven track record in the supply of combined systems as wellas the individual component systems.3.7.14 Production and Marine Controls (including ESD)In the case of a conversion, it is unlikely that the integration of production and marinecontrol systems will be a viable option. Unless the conversion involves an intercepttanker at an early stage in its build, the marine control system will already be in place and162proven. Much of the control system will centre around the propulsion system. It is verylikely that the owner will wish to retain the main engines and their auxiliary systems for avariety of reasons, such as station keeping, possible future uses, movements betweenyards and fields, etc.The tanker bridge will be the marine control room, giving clear views ahead and asternduring offloading operations. Locating the production control room adjacent to thebridge may not be possible due to structural and space constraints and the complexity ofcontrol cabling, termination cabinets etc. A production control room some distance awaywould appear to be the only option necessitating good communications between the two,especially during transfers to shuttle tankers. It may be possible to control the existingmarine system from the production control room via mimics, status panels and a remotecommand panel.In the case of a new build, the possible options for control rooms and systems are: A single control room with a combined marine and control system A single control room with separate control systems Separate control rooms and hence separate systems.The production facilities control systems consist of the process and utilities controls, theESD system and the fire and gas system. These three may be combined into a singlecontrol system or they may be separate but in communication with each other.Whichever configuration is chosen, the vendor of the single combined system or thevendors of the individual systems should have a proven track record for these type ofsystems, especially the supplier of the single system with its three main constituents.Proven experience is essential to ensure, among other things, that data highways andother related systems are not prone to overload, which may result in failure at criticaltimes.Where individual systems are selected from separate vendors, then one should beappointed as the lead to ensure that the interfacing and interaction is properly coordinatedand managed. Active involvement on the part of process engineers and control engineersfrom the production facilities design contractor is recommended to assist the vendor indeveloping a clear understanding of the design intent. The involvement of the ownersoperations representatives from an early stage is also essential in ensuring that screendisplays are clear, easily understandable and unambiguous and that control desk layoutsare user friendly. The presentation of on-screen information must be such that in the event of alarms, tripsand other abnormal events, the control room supervisory teams are not subjected toinformation overload. While the preservation of plant status data is needed to understandwhy certain events have occurred, the data actually presented should be selective and thescanning frequency set so that control room staff can quickly interpret what is happeningand can intervene in the most appropriate manner.163Whatever choice is made for a new build FPSO, i.e. combined or separate marine andproduction control systems, the above comments on vendor experience apply. Where acombined system is selected, it is a project engineering decision on how the productionand marine elements should interface and be managed. The lessons learned from pastprojects suggest that coordinating responsibility should be given to the productionfacilities design contractor and not to ship yard design staff.3.7.15 TelecommunicationsThe design and supply of telecommunications is often undertaken by a specialistcontractor, working to a basis of design set by the FPSO owner and taking cognisance ofthe differences between ship requirements and those of offshore production facilities.The basis of design will reflect the statutory requirements for marine communicationsbetween the FPSO and shore base, supply boat, shuttle tanker, stand by vessel, rescuevessel, passing traffic etc. Aeronautical band provision will also be required forcommunication with helicopter traffic. Radar will be included to monitor passing trafficand alert the FPSO crew to possible collision events. Ship to shore communication willalso be via satellite link, where in addition to voice and fax communications, provisionhas to be made for production data transfer, email and intranet and internet traffic,television channels, video conferencing etc.Care has to be taken with the positioning of radome support structures and aerials on topof the living quarters to avoid possible interference with helicopter traffic and craneoperations.Internal communications on the FPSO will consist of the General Alarm and PublicAddress system, the telephone system, the intercom system with call points, hand-heldradios and pagers. Provision has to be made for communication between crane operators,deck supervisors and banksmen and supply boat crews. Work-stations and computers inoffices around the FPSO will be linked via a local area network tied back via satellite intothe operators own computer network. In addition, there will be an entertainment systemfor radio, television and video.The general alarm signals both audible and visual must comply with the guidelines laiddown by the HSE in the PFEER Regulations (ref 11) Regulation 11. The numbers andsiting of the flashing lights and the loudspeakers has to ensure complete coverage of theFPSO and must take account of obstructions and areas of high background noise,including wind and inclement weather. At the end of the construction phase and duringcommissioning the locations should be checked and repositioned if necessary. Cablelengths should allow for possible repositioning of fittings.UKOOA has provided guidelines for the design of Safety Related TelecommunicationsSystems on Normally Attended Installations (ref 78) covering internal, external andemergency communications.1643.7.16 CranesThe location and number of main cranes on an FPSO will be determined by the size ofthe FPSOs deck i.e. length and breadth, and by the layout of the facilities on the deck.Mechanical Handling StudiesOnce the broad principles of layout have been established, the location of the main itemsof equipment has been agreed and laydown areas identified, it is advisable to performoutline mechanical handling studies. These studies should aim to determine first of allthe sizes and shapes of the largest components of equipment items which might have tobe removed for routine maintenance or in the event of a major breakdown or failure e.g.compressor bundles, gas generators from gas turbines, HV motors, heat exchangerbundles etc. The features of any unusual equipment items such as turrets, cargo loadingreels and hoses, should also taken into account, as well as any need to access the helideckarea.The method of removal and potential removal routes are then identified and thisinformation will help to determine the operating envelop of the cranes. (It is assumedthat the FPSO will have a minimum of two main cranes as insurance against breakdownor prolonged outage). It is also possible that one crane may be needed to assist with themaintenance or overhaul of the other.Crane TypeOperating envelopes and load tables will determine the crane ratings. It is at this pointthat the crane type will be chosen and it is essential that the owner/ operator/designerselect a type that is suitable for offshore duty on a moving FPSO, subject to a wide rangeof vessel motions. Basic ship cranes, which are primarily used for loading to and from avessel at a quayside, are not suitable for the rigours of a North Sea or West of Shetlandsoperating environment, unless considerable expense is devoted to upgrading the basicmodel before it leaves the manufacturers works.Offshore Specification and Safety FeaturesCranes incorporating the more demanding specifications used for cranes on fixedoffshore structures should be specified. At least one classification society refers to aEuropean standard for general purpose offshore cranes, EN 13852, (ref 79). Themanufacturers should be made aware of the special characteristics of an FPSO, includingvessel motions and associated accelerations, and the potential difficulties of supply boatloading/ unloading operations when the FPSO and the supply boat will both be movingbut with different motions. The design of the boom rest should also take into account theaccelerations likely to be experienced in severe weather conditions with the boom parkedand secured.165Safety features incorporated in the crane would include gross overload protection (toprotect against hook snagging), load monitoring and alarms, emergency brakes to permitcontrolled load lowering on loss of power, and fire and gas detection. The cab locationand design should afford the crane driver all round visibility and the controls layout andseat design should afford ease of operation. Communications will include GA/PAfeatures. Means of escape provision should take FPSO vessel movement into account.AvailabilityOnce a basic offshore crane type has been chosen, the method of powering the crane hasto be selected i.e. electric-hydraulic or diesel hydraulic. Whatever method is selected, thecrane should be capable of parking its load safely in the event of a loss of main andauxiliary power on the FPSO. Consideration should be given to crane availability, andany adverse impact on FPSO operation, in the event of a protracted outage of main andauxiliary/ emergency power.Major MaintenanceThe inspection and change out of a slew ring are major activities on a pedestal crane as isan engine change out. The designer, in conjunction with the crane manufacturer and theoperators maintenance team, should make suitable provisions for these activities.Booms should be provided with an adequate walkway or other suitable access to facilitateinspection of the boom and ropes and other maintenance activities.3.7.17 Turret and Support SystemsAlthough the turret and its swivel are proprietary items, where the overall designresponsibility rests with the supplier, the FPSO owner must be able to provide input onmatters of operability and access for operation and maintenance. The safety standardswhich apply to the rest of the FPSO shall apply to the turret also e.g. width of walkways,stairways, ladders, handrails, lighting etc.The complexity of the turret layout is determined by the number of risers which it isdesigned for, including spare riser slots. A large field development with several subseasatellites will require large manifolds for production from the groups of well clusters, forwater injection, for possible gas lift and gas injection, chemicals, etc. Additionalcomplexity can come from gas export, crude oil export to an FSU or a pipeline gatheringsystem and from pigging requirements for subsea flowlines. Pigging operations require asystem of interlocked valves, launchers and receivers to ensure the highest standards ofsafety. Design guidance may be found in the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996(SI1996/825) (ref 60). Good layout around the launcher/ receiver and valve stations is aprerequisite. 166Swivel fluid paths carry produced fluids, injection water, gas, chemicals such asmethanol and utilities for the turret area, such as air, nitrogen and water. Slip rings arealso required for electrical power, control-including ESD and F&G, and telecomms. The turret will also contain the subsea control panels either in the open or in an enclosure.The enclosure, where provided, is located in a hazardous area and so the design of theventilation system will have to take this into account i.e. air intakes and exhausts locatedin a non hazardous area, smoke and gas detection in intakes and exhausts, overpressuredrelative to outside, pressurised air lock.3.7.18 Safety Related Sub-SystemsIn addition to active and passive fire protection systems, fire and gas and emergencyshutdown systems, escape routes and means of evacuation, there is a range of other safetyrelated sub systems or units which have to be taken into account. This section does notgo into any technical discussion about these but merely provides a list of items whichhave to be addressed in the course of the design phase. The list is not exhaustive and afinal list should be drawn up by the project safety and loss control team in conjunctionwith the owners/ operators safety advisors. Where an FPSO vessel was previously atanker, the original provisions should be reviewed to ensure that the design and numbersof any retained items are appropriate for the new application. Emergency lighting (taking account of obstructions and high density areas) Marking of escape routes for visibility in smoke conditions Manual call points (MACs) and their location Breathing apparatus and charging compressor Firemens equipment (overalls, helmets, gloves, axes etc) Personnel protection equipment, including survival suits, life jackets, smokehoods, torches, gloves etc (see PFEER Regulations (ref 11) Regulation 18) Lifeboats (TEMPSCs) and Liferafts Lifebelts Secondary means of escape to sea including proprietary harness devices, chutes,ropes, nets etc Portable fire extinguishers Signage and safety plans Safety showers and eyebaths (and heat tracing of these) First aid equipment including stretchers1673.8 FPSO SMALL UTILITY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMSThis section covers the common small utility systems, which are technicallyuncomplicated but are nevertheless vital to the smooth, reliable operation of the FPSO. Itis possible that some of these systems will be designed by the hull contractor who may beless familiar with the specific needs of the production support systems. By payingattention to relatively minor details, the designer can help to prevent outages andavoidable downtime3.8.1 Diesel FuelThe consumers of diesel on the FPSO are the main power generation units (turbines orreciprocating engines), gas turbine drivers for large compressors and pumps, theemergency generators, the fire pumps and the inert gas generator for cargo tankblanketing. Marine quality diesel, filtered and centrifuged to remove water andparticulates, is unlikely to present problems for the fuel systems of the reciprocatingengines on propulsion and main power generation (where these have been retained), andon emergency generator and fire pump duties. Filtration and System CleanlinessWhere aero-derivative gas turbine drives are used, the quality of the diesel is of majorimportance to prevent the build-up of soot and other deposits on the turbine HP and LPsection blades which can leading to premature blade failure. The engine manufacturersspecification for liquid fuel must be communicated to the designer of the diesel system sothat the target particulate levels can be achieved by both coarse and fine filtration. For some engines the maximum particle size can be as low as 5 microns, a level whichwill require coarse filtration followed by fine filtration. Duplex filters should bespecified as a minimum for each duty so that cartridges can be changed on line andquickly. All fuel supply pipework downstream of the fine filter should be of stainlesssteel to avoid scale pick-up. Chemical cleaning of pipework is recommended beforecommissioning. Compatible gaskets for the stainless steel pipework should also bespecified.Even though the diesel fuel specification for the gas turbines may be stringent in terms ofwater content, particulate and metals such as vanadium, the quality received from asupply boat cannot always be guaranteed. Coalescers or centrifuges can be used toremove water to acceptable levels. The internal coatings of the main diesel tanks and anyday tanks should be chosen with care and applied in accordance with the manufacturersinstructions to prevent premature breakdown of the coating and the onset of corrosion,leading to a larger particulates burden from rust and scale.The draw off from the tank base should be via a stand pipe to avoid contamination fromwater and particulates. The outlet from the supply line and the recirculation line shouldbe submerged to avoid splashing and the risk of static build up.168System MonitoringWhere crew size has been kept to a minimum, it is likely that attendance in the machineryspaces will be low and hence regular routine system monitoring is also likely to be low.Rapid increase in filter pressure drop may result in cartridge collapse and the breakthrough of debris in to the combustion chambers with consequential damage. Theamount of instrumentation and alarms alarming in the control room may therefore need tobe higher than might be expected on a conventional diesel engined tanker and operationsinput should be sought in advance to agree what is required. 3.8.2 Fuel GasThe main consumers of fuel gas will be the main generators, gas turbines or dual fuelengines, and gas turbine drivers for large compressor trains or pumps, where these arerequired.Gas specification and system cleanlinessThe fuel gas specification will be dictated by the turbine manufacturer with very stringentlimits in terms of moisture, sulphur content and particulates. As with diesel fuel, fuel gas system cleanliness is very important and so duplex fuel gasfilters will be required to ensure uninterrupted supply during filter cartridge change out.Stainless steel piping should be specified and chemical cleaning is recommended toachieve as high a cleanliness standard as possible.Avoidance of LeaksThe supply piping from the dehydration unit in the gas processing area should be allwelded to minimise the risk of leaks within the utilities area where the main powergeneration turbines are likely to be located. The number of valves in the supply shouldalso be minimised. The only flanged joint should ideally be at the edge of the turbineskid. Inside the turbine enclosure, flanged joints should be kept to a minimum if at allpossible, although access for maintenance on the turbine skid will necessitate flangedjoints to permit easier piping removal.Fuel Gas in the HullWhere the existing ships generators are retained and where the FPSO fuel gas balanceand flaring policy demands it, fuel gas may have to be supplied to the machinery space.The design of the supply system must involve safety engineers as well as pipingdesigners to ensure that risks of leaks of high pressure fuel gas are minimised. An allwelded pipe in pipe supply will eliminate flanges and provide a second means ofcontainment in the event of leakage from the inner pipe. 169The numbers and the location of gas detectors around the generators and within thegenerator room(s) have to be given careful consideration. The design of the ventilationsystem should provide high rates of air changes to dilute leaks, and its controls and powersupply must ensure as high a degree of reliability and availability as possible.3.8.3 Compressed AirThe compressed air system supplies plant air and instrument quality air for pneumaticinstrumentation systems. Instrument quality air is also used for the inert gas unitsupplying nitrogen to the production facilities for blanketing and purging.Air QualityFor general plant air duty, i.e. hand tools, pneumatic hoists etc, air quality is generally notcritical. Instrument air quality means the air has to be oil free and has a dew point ofminus 20 to minus 40 degC. Apart from causing obstructions in pneumatic controls, thepresence of oil can also damage the membranes of the inert gas generator and thedesiccant of air dryers. Where reciprocating air compressors or injected oil screwcompressors are used for general air duty, oil knock out facilities will be needed toachieve oil free quality. Where dry screw compressors are used, the design of the shaftseals should be checked to ensure that inward leakage of lube oil does not contaminatethe air.Air ReceiversSizing of the instrument air receiver has to take account of the demands of the air systemto allow the FPSO facilities to be shut down safely and restarted quickly in the event of apower outage. Some FPSO owners have used single air receivers to provide both plant air andinstrument air, a single receiver being less costly than two. Whether one or two airreceivers are used, non essential air consumers will be shut down in ascending order ofimportance to maintain satisfactory pressure levels in the system. Sometimes a smallcharge compressor, powered from the emergency switchboard, can be employed tomaintain pressure and can also be used for black start purposes. The instrument air receiver sizing does not need to allow for the demands of the inert gas(N2) generator. During upset conditions, nitrogen demand can be met from the highpressure bottled supply (quads).1703.8.4 Potable WaterOn fixed production platforms with limited bulk liquid storage, potable water makerpackages have been installed, especially where re-supply times have been less predictablein periods of bad weather.On FPSOs, where there is ample storage tank capacity, there is no need to provide onboard treatment capacity, unless the vessel already has a water maker installed for itsformer tanker role.Whether potable water is shipped in or is made on board, water purity and systemcleanliness are essential in preventing health related problems. Water storage tanks musthave internal coatings which apart from being non toxic must also have long termdurability and sufficient flexibility to adapt to the twisting and bending of the hullwithout cracking and spalling. Potable water circulation pumps and main pipework shall be of non-corrosive, non toxicmaterials. In the living quarters domestic copper piping is acceptable in cabins, galley,wash rooms etc. A sterilisation unit will provide final purification to supplement manualdosing of bulk liquids.3.8.5 Heating MediumThe heating medium system, if correctly designed, should help in optimising the energybalance of the FPSO by capturing waste heat primarily from the exhaust gases of thepower generation turbines. As the turbines are on line for most of the time, they canprovide a steady source of waste energy.Waste Heat Recovery Units (WHRU)Waste heat recovery units are usually provided by the package vendor of the gas turbinesas part of his scope of supply, fully integrated with the rest of the turbine packages. TheWHRUs should be robust, totally suitable for exposed outdoor offshore use and haveadequate access to damper controls and main duct joints.If at some later date in the field life, the heating medium load increases, the WHRUs mayneed to cater for turbine exhaust reheat.Heat ExchangersThe system is a relatively low pressure water/glycol mixture circulation system wherecarbon steel is the main material of construction. It may be used with shell and tube andplate exchangers. Where compact designs of exchangers are used, such as the printedcircuit type of design, provision has to be made for in-line duplex filters to avoid scaleand rust clogging up the small passages of this type of exchanger. As it is a platform-171wide source of heat, attention should be paid to pressure differentials across heatexchangers to minimise the risk of contamination of non hazardous users and of theheating medium itself. Heating medium fluid should not be introduced into the livingquarters.3.8.6 Cooling MediumThe cooling medium system is an FPSO wide closed loop cooling system. The fluid is awater-glycol mixture which is in turn cooled by seawater. There are various coolingduties and a variety of heat exchangers can be used in the cooling circuit- shell and tube,plate and proprietary compact units such as printed circuit heat exchangers.Pressure DifferentialsThe system design pressure is relatively low and on duties such as gas compressorintercoolers the gas pressure can be many times higher than that of the cooling mediumsystem. The process designer has to ensure that the possibility of leakage of highpressure fluids into the low pressure cooling side is minimal to prevent the migration ofthe high pressure fluids in to non hazardous areas of the FPSO. The design measures tobe taken include: Careful choice of materials of construction of the exchanger Avoidance of thermal cycling Avoidance of pressure cycling including pulsating flows Design to prevent tube or plate vibration and fatigue failure Provision of pressure alarms and trips Provision of bursting discs and pressure relief valves for sudden tube failure Motorised isolation valves in supply and discharge lines for quick shut-off.Operations in-service checks will include pressure trend monitoring and cooling mediumfluid analysis.Some cooling duties in the utilities and non-hazardous areas of the FPSO will be bydirect auxiliary seawater cooling or a separate, small cooling medium system to eliminatethe possibility of cross contamination of these systems by hydrocarbons or other harmfulfluids.System CleanlinessPrinted circuit and compact heat exchangers are often chosen in preference to heavier andbulkier shell and tube exchangers because of the perceived weight and space savings theyprovide. Their narrow flow paths require then to be used on clean duties so that the riskof flow path blockage is minimised. System cleanliness is therefore essential and the firstline of defence is appropriate levels of fine filtration on both the coolant and the cooledsides of the exchanger.172Carbon steel is usually the material of first choice for the water/ glycol mixture. In orderto meet the standards of cleanliness to prevent flow path plugging, the piping designshould avoid dead legs and minimise low points. The construction and commissioningphases of a project have to include power jetting of pipework to remove scale andextensive flushing followed by chemical cleaning and passivation.3.8.7 SewageThe design of the sewage system , including treatment plant, will most likely complywith classification societies rules for the classification of ships or steel vessels and thedischarge specification will be in accordance with MARPOL regulations (ref 17) orcompany standard whichever is the more stringent, depending on the companysemissions and discharges policy. (Note that although the UK has ratified MARPOLAnnex IV, it has still to introduce appropriate legislation).In the case of a seagoing vessel moving ahead of the discharge point, the risk of crosscontamination of seawater intakes is negligible. On an FPSO on a fixed location, the riskof sewage entering the seachests or seawater caissons should be low due to effects ofheading, wind and current, except when current prevails over wind. Nevertheless,attention should be paid to the relative positions of intakes and outfalls to avoidcontaminationMaterials of construction in the main are PVC, with adequate provision for roddingpoints throughout the system. Care should be taken with the routing of sewage carryingpipework to avoid galley and dining and recreational areas.3.8.8 HelifuelHelicopter refuelling facilities are generally supplied by specialist packagers of this typeof equipment, conversant with industry requirements. Individual owners and operatorshave specific requirements and so it is advisable to obtain the early input of their logisticsgroups to ensure that the package meets their particular needs. LR (ref 22) part 5, chapter13, section 6, provides general guidelines.Firewater deluge and foam arrangements for the main skid and for the skid for theportable helifuel containers should be discussed with safety and loss prevention engineersto ensure adequate coverage. Initiation will most likely be by fusible links or byproprietary pneumatic tubing. These devices are prone to mechanical damage which canlead to premature water and foam release. Care should therefore be taken with thepositioning of links and the routing of tubing to minimise damage from handling,maintenance and operations activities on and around the skids.173REFERENCES The references in this section are believed to be correct at the time of publication. It isthe responsibility of those designing an FPSO installation in the UKCS to ensure that allcomplete and up to date references are applied.Useful web site addresses covering some of the following references are:Department of Trade and Industry: www.og.dti.gov.ukHealth and Safety Executive: www.hse.gov.ukUKOOA: www.ukooa.co.ukLloyd's Register of Shipping www.lr.orgAmerican Bureau of Shipping www.eagle.orgDet Norske Veritas: www.dnv.com1. Review of Lloyd's Register, Det Norske Veritas and American Bureau of ShippingRules and Regulations for the Classification of a Floating Offshore Installation at aFixed Location in the light of Recent Industry Experience, UKOOA Study FPSO JIP00/01, November 2000.2. UK CAA CAP 437 Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas: A Guide to Criteria,Recommended Minimum Standards and Best Practice.3. UKOOA The Management of Offshore Helideck Operations 1.27, 19974. Department of Energy: Offshore Installations: Guidance on Design, Construction andCertification. Fourth Edition-1990.5. DNV Conversion of Tankers to Oil Production and/or Storage Vessels6. HSE report OTO 99: 036 Human Factors Review of Vessel Motion Standards7. HSE report OTO 99: 066 Effects of Motion on Cognitive Performance8. HSE: A guide to the integrity, workplace environment and miscellaneous aspects ofthe Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 19969. The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, SI 1992/2885, as amended10. The Health and Safety at Work Act, 197411. The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and EmergencyResponse) Regulations, PFEER, 1995 (SI1995/ 743)12. Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (SI1999/3242)13. The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction) Regulations, DCR,1996 (SI1996/ 913)14. Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines Act (Assessment of EnvironmentalEffects) Regulations 1999 ( SI1999/360)15. Merchant Shipping Act 1979 16. Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/ 2154) 17. MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution fromShips) 18. API Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing and Constructing FloatingProduction Systems RP 2FPS19. ISO/WD 19904 Offshore Structures - Floating Systems17420. NORSOK Standard N-004 Design of Steel Structures21. HSE Review of API RP 2FPS, OTO 2001-00622. Lloyds Register of Shipping (LR) Rules and Regulations for the Classification of aFloating Installation at a Fixed Location, July 1999.23. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Building and Classing Floating ProductionInstallations, June 2000 24. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Guide for Building and Classing Facilities onOffshore Installations, June 200025. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Offshore 2000 Rules for Classification of FloatingProduction and Storage Units, OSS -102, January 200126. ABS - Guidance Notes on Risk Assessment Application for the Marine and OffshoreOil and Gas Industries, June 200027. DNV - Classification using Performance Criteria determined by Risk AssessmentMethodology, OSS-121, January 200128. LR Ship-Type FPSO Hull Structural Appraisal, OS/GN/99002, June 199929. DNV Guidance and Classification Notes, July 199930. UKOOA Guidelines for the Management of Safety Critical Elements-A Joint IndustryGuide. September 199631. The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations COSHH 1994(SI1994/3246)32. HSE OTO 00:097 Rationalisation of FPSO Design Issues.33. Floating Structures - a guide for design and analysis, CMPT publication 101-98, OPL34. NORSOK Standard N-003 Actions and Action Effects, February 199935. OCIMF report Prediction of Current Loads on VLCCs, 199436. HSE Report Wind and Wave Frequency Distributions for Sites around the BritishIsles, OTO 2001:03037. DNV OS-C102 Structural Design of Offshore Ships, Oct 200038. LR Rules for Ships39. ABS Steel Vessel Rules40. HSE Fatigue Capacity JIP OTN 2001:01541. HSE Report Reliability Based Design and Assessment of FPSO Structures - OTO98:16442. HSE Report Analysis of Green Water Susceptibility of FPSO/FSUs on the UKCSOTO 2001:00543. HSE Research Project 3794, MARIN Review of HSE Greenwater Study, completion200044. HSE Research Project 3959, FPSO Response in long and short crested seas,completion 200245. HSE Report Review of Greenwater and Waveslam Design and Specification forFPSO/FSUs, OTO 2000:00446. HSE Research Project 3397-Collision Avoidance Management47. HSE Report Collision Resistance of Ship-shaped Structures to Side Impact, OTO2000-05348. UKOOA FPSO Committee, Tandem Loading Guidelines - Volume 1 - FPSO/TankerRisk Control during Offtake49. Weather Windows Software (geos.com)17550. HSE Report OTO 2000:123 Review of Model Testing Requirements for FPSOs,prepared by BMT Fluid Mechanics Ltd.51. API RP 2SK Recommended Practice for Design and Analysis of StationkeepingSystems for Floating Structures, 2nd Edition, 199652. INTERTANKO (Association of Independent Taker Owners) entitled RiskMinimisation Guidelines for Shuttle Tanker Operations Worldwide at OffshoreLocations, March 200053. OCIMF (Oil Companies International Marine Forum) Offshore Loading SafetyGuidelines, 199954. International Chamber of Shipping & Oil Companies International Marine Forum -International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals (ISGOTT), published byWitherby.55. Tanker Structures Co-operative Forum - Condition Evaluation & Maintenance ofTanker Structures, published by Witherby.56. Tanker Structures Co-operative Forum - Guidance Manual for the Inspection andCondition Assessment of Tanker Structures, published by Witherby.57. API RP 520 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices inRefineries58. API RP 521 Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressuring Systems59. Prevention of Pollution Act 1971, as amended60. Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 (SI1996/825)61. UKOOA Guidelines for Fire and Explosion Hazard Management, May 1995.62. Offshore Chemical Regulations (2001 draft)63. Offshore Combustion Installations (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Regulations2001 (SI2001/1091)64. Institute of Petroleum IP Code, Part 15:Area Classification Code for PetroleumInstallations65. DNV Offshore Standard OS-A101, Safety Principles and Arrangements, January200166. DNV Offshore Standard OS-D201, Electrical Installations, March 2001.67. International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard 61508, Functional Safetyof Electrical, Electronic, Programmable Electronic Safety Related Systems, January2000.68. UKOOA Guidelines for Instrument based protective Systems, issue No.2, November1999.69. Noise at Work Regulations 1989 (SI1989/1790), as amended70. HSE Report OTO 99: 012, Collection and Analysis of Offshore Noise Data71. HSE Report OTO 01: 044, Review of Corrosion Management for Oil and GasProcessing72. HSE web site: www.hse.gov.uk/research/frameset/offshore.htm 73. DNV Offshore Standard OS D301, Fire Protection, January 200174. HSE Research Report 3770: Machinery Space Risk Assessment75. HSE Research Report 3806: Development of Manual Handling Toolkit for FPSODesign and Specification76. HSE Report OTO 00: 035, Review of the Degradation of Firewater Piping andNozzle Performance due to Blockage17677. UKOOA Recommended Practice for the Use of GRP Piping Offshore78. UKOOA Safety Related Telecommunications Systems on Normally AttendedInstallations79. European Committee for Standardisation: Standard EN13852: Offshore Cranes-Part1:General Purpose Offshore CranesCONTENTS LISTPART 3: PRODUCTION FACILITIESREFERENCESINTRODUCTIONPURPOSE AND OBJECTIVESLIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONSPART 11.2 FPSO FUNCTION AND FIELD LIFE1.3.6 Flares, Exhausts and Vents1.2 FPSO FUNCTION AND FIELD LIFE1.2.1 Introduction1.2.2 FPSO Hull Sizing1.2.3 Sizing of Production FacilitiesMajor systemsExport SystemSingle or Dual Production TrainsRedeployment1.3.1 Introduction1.3.5 Escape and EvacuationEvacuation1.3.6 Flares, Exhausts and VentsFlaresExhaustsVents1.3.7 Wind Tunnel Testing1.6.1 Human Response1.6.2 Effect on EquipmentOperations input to EngineeringSteady State and non-Steady State OperationsProvision for FPSO installation, commissioning, major repairs1.7.2 Accommodation Facilities1.10 HEALTH SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENTFamiliarity with key legislationConcept Safety Evaluation and Preliminary Risk Assessment1.10.4 Design for the EnvironmentPRODUCTION FACILITIESCONTENTS LISTUKOOA FPSO DESIGN GUIDANCE NOTES FOR UKCS SERVICEPART 3PRODUCTION FACILITIES3.2 FRONT END ENGINEERING3.2.1 Performance Standards and SpecificationsPerformance StandardsFunctional SpecificationsIndustry Standards and SpecificationsCriticality Ratings3.2.2 System Sizing3.3 HYDROCARBON AND NON-HYDROCARBON SYSTEMS:3.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIES3.4.2 Safety Management3.4.4 Cargo Management3.4.5 Area Classification3.4.6 HVAC3.4.7 Electrical3.4.8 Controls3.4.9 Noise and Vibration3.4.10 Corrosion Management3.4.11 Isolation for Maintenance3.5 GLOBAL LAYOUT: DEVELOPMENT FACTORSExplosion Risk in Production AreasExplosion Risk in Utilities AreasFire Risk in Production AreasFire Risk in Utilities AreasEscape Route PlanningPrimary RoutesTunnels and Alternatives3.5.4 Temporary Refuge (TR) and FPSO EvacuationTR LocationEvacuation to Embarkation PointsLifeboat TypePersonnel Access on the Production DecksMaintenance Access on the Production DecksPersonnel Access in Machinery SpacesMaintenance Access in Machinery SpacesLaydown Areas3.6 LOCAL LAYOUT DEVELOPMENT FACTORS3.6.3 Maintenance Access and Removal Routes3.6.4 Operations Access and Operability3.6.5 Workshops and StoresStores3.7.2 FirewaterSegregation/ IntegrationPumps, Drivers and HydraulicsMetallurgy and PipingDirect or Indirect CoolingSegregation/ IntegrationPumpsMetallurgy and PipingCargo Vent SystemProduction VentingHP/ LP InterfacesAcoustically Induced Vibration in Flare/ Vent headersClosed DrainsHazardous Open DrainsNon-Hazardous Open DrainsOptions for a new-build FPSOGenerator Type and LocationTransformers and SwitchgearOptions for converted tankers: Integration or SegregationAccessibility for operation and testingMaintainabilityActive ProtectionPassive Protection3.7.16 CranesMechanical Handling StudiesCrane TypeOffshore Specification and Safety Features3.8 FPSO SMALL UTILITY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMSREFERENCES

Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians Issue 6 March 2008
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither Oil & Gas UK, nor any of its members will assume liability for any use made thereof. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a r etrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Copyright ! 2008 The United Kingdom Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Association Limited trading as Oil & Gas UK
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians Issue 6 March 2008
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither Oil & Gas UK, nor any of its members will assume liability for any use made thereof. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a r etrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Copyright ! 2008 The United Kingdom Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Association Limited trading as Oil & Gas UK
ISBN: 1 903003 37 4 PUBLISHED BY OIL & GAS UK London Office: 2nd Floor, 232-242 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1AU. Tel: 020 7802 2400 Fax: 020 7802 2401 Aberdeen Office: 3rd Floor, The Exchange, 2 Market Street, Aberdeen, AB11 5PJ. Tel: 01224 577250 Email: [email protected] Website: www.oilandgasuk.co.uk
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Contents
Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations
Section 1
General Guidance Notes
Section 2
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions
Section 3
Special Employment Groups
Addendum 1
Medical Screening Questionnaire and Examination Record
Addendum 2
Unrestricted Offshore Work Certificate
Addendum 3
Restricted Offshore Work Certificate
Addendum 4
Information for Unsuccessful Applicant
Addendum 5
Cardiovascular/Musculoskeletal Cardiovascular/Musculoskeletal Screening Tool
Addendum 6
Certificate of Fitness to Participate in ERT Duties
Addendum 7
Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Males
Addendum 8
Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Females
Addendum 9
Random Drug Testing Protocol
Addendum 10
Health Surveillance
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Acknowledgements
Authors Dr Graham Furnace
Maersk
Dr Andrew Goodge
RS Occupational Health
Dr Roger McKechnie
ExxonMobil
Acknowledgements Dr Wendy Doig
BP Oil
Dr Mike Doig
Chevron
Inga Heyman
Incite
Dr Tom Brown
Scottish Division, Royal College of Psychiatrists
Energy Institute Health Technical Committee
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
List of Abbreviations
AIDS
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BA BMI BP
Breathing Apparatus Body Mass Index Blood Pressure
CAA CABG COSHH CPHM
Civil Aviation Authority Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Consultant in Public Health Medecine
DVT
Deep Vein Thrombosis
ECG ENT ERT
Electrocardiograph Ear, Nose and Throat Emergency Response Team
FPSO
Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (vessel)
HAVS HDL HIV HSE
Hand/Arm Vibration Syndrome High Density Lipoprotein Human Immunodeficiency Virus Health and Safety Executive
IDDM
Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus
NICE NIDDM
National Institute for Clinical Excellence Non-insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus
PPE
Personal Protective Equipment
RPE
Respiratory Protective Equipment
TIA
Transient Ischaemic Attack
UKCS
United Kingdom Continental Shelf
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Section 1
General Guidance Notes
Paragraph
Page
1
Background
1-1
2
Applicability
1-1
3
The Medical Assessment Process
1-1
3.1 General
1-1
3.2 The Medical Examination
1-2
4
Certificate of Fitness
1-2
5
Frequency of Examination
1-3
6
Offshore Visitors
1-4
7
Information and Review Process for Unsuccessful Candidates
1-4
The Offshore Working Environment
1-5
8
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1
Background It is Oil & Gas UK policy that all persons working offshore shall be examined periodically and classified as medically fit to work in the offshore environment. These guidelines set out what is considered to be good practice regarding the assessment of health of persons working or intending to work offshore, and guidance on the implications of various medical conditions on fitness to do so. They are intended to aid an examining physician's assessment of the medical fitness of an individual to work in the offshore environment. Nevertheless, it remains the responsibility of the operator’s medical adviser (this term is used to cover the medical adviser to offshore platforms, other production units eg Floating Production, Storage and Offloading (vessels) (FPSOs) and mobile drilling rigs) to ensure that persons working offshore meet necessary health standards. While operators will normally accept possession of a certificate of fitness for offshore work as evidence of doing so, the final decision regarding offshore employment or visits rests with the operators. Their decision will take account of the medical advice received from the examining physician but may vary from his/her conclusion. Operators may choose to use alternative methods of assessment for their own installations. However, an individual having passed such assessment would not be acceptable for unrestricted work in the North Sea unless the assessment also meets the requirements of these guidelines.
2
Applicability The guidelines are written with specific reference to the UK offshore industry. Where organisations or companies choose to apply them t o other geographical locations, they must satisfy themselves as to the applicability of the guidance to such locations. In addition, it is outside of the scope of Oil & Gas UK’s procedures to appoint doctors specifically for such locations. The Oil & Gas UK Review Panel Process for unsuccessful candidates will not be applicable for locations outside the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS).
3
The Medical Assessment Process 3.1
General
All assessments under these guidelines must include a personal examination by an examining physician who is approved by Oil & Gas UK and whose name appears on the current Oil & Gas UK list of appointed doctors. The Oil & Gas UK medical adviser maintains such a list of physicians – contact Oil & Gas UK in the first instance on 01224 577250. The list of appointed Oil & Gas UK physicians is available at www.ukooa.co.uk/issues/health/doctors.cfm.
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Oil & Gas UK appointed physicians will: •
•
•
•
•
Have knowledge of the offshore environment and remote medicine Demonstrate knowledge of, or possess a qualification in, occupational medicine Have access to appropriate examination facilities After September 2009, new applicants will undertake an Oil & Gas UK one-day training programme in offshore medical assessment Understand the principles of the risk-based approach embodied in these guidelines
Agree to participate in the Review Panel Process for Unsuccessful Candidates described in Paragraph 7 by submitting copies of relevant clinical records at no cost to the candidate, his employer or Oil & G as UK
•
3.2
The Medical Examination
The medical examination will always include the following: •
Photographic ID of the examinee
•
A comprehensive medical, social and occupational history
Audiometry
•
Urinalysis
•
•
Visual Acuity
•
Body Mass Index (BMI)
•
Appropriate clinical examination
•
Further investigations (eg blood tests, Electrocardiograph (ECG), spirometry) may be required to clarify clinical findings but are not a routine requirement
A suitable form for recording the examination is provided in Addendum 1, although examining doctors may use their own design of form if they wish.
4
Certificate of Fitness Examining doctors should note that possession of an unrestricted Oil & Gas UK certificate of medical fitness for offshore work allows the holder to travel to and work on any installation within the UK offshore sector and implies that the individual is fully fit for all normal duties without the individual requiring any additional support or modification to the working environment. Additional specialist duties such as emergency response team membership will require further assessment under the relevant guidance.
General Guidance Notes 1-2
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
The examining physician should therefore only issue an unrestricted certificate of fitness for offshore work if the individual is found fully fit for offshore work in accordance with these guidelines. This must be in the format shown in Addendum 2 and must be reproduced on either the examining doctor’s or company headed notepaper as appropriate. Individuals not meeting the criteria which would allow issue of an unrestricted certificate of fitness may still be fit to work offshore subject to specific support measures being implemented, but would then be limited to working on such installations where these specific measures have been implemented. Where an examining doctor, following discussion with an operating company’s medical adviser, finds that although an individual is not fit for unrestricted offshore work, he is fit for work at a specified location, a restricted offshore medical fitness certificate should be issued, endorsed to the effect that they are only permitted to travel to and work on specific, named installations. This must be in the format shown in Addendum 3 and must be reproduced on either the examining doctor’s or company headed notepaper as appropriate. Where an examining physician finds an individual unfit for offshore work, the process outlined in Paragraph 7 must be followed and a form ‘Information for Unsuccessful Applicant’ issued (refer to Addendum 4). Employers should be aware that refusal to issue an unrestricted certificate does not necessarily indicate that an individual will be unfit to work offshore in any circumstances and is not intended to provide the employer with any guidance under the Disability Discrimination Act or any other legislation. The employer should in all cases assess the individual employee’s circumstances to determine if suitable modification can be made to allow the individual to work offshore. In such circumstances, the examining physician should be prepared to provide an additional report to the employer, if required, detailing the functional disability present and, where appropriate, suitable modifications which could be considered.
5
Frequency of Examination Every person must be examined prior to employment offshore and thereafter at 2-yearly intervals. The examining physician should consider increasing the frequency of periodic assessments where the individual has a condition which may significantly alter during such a timeframe. In such circumstances, certificates of shorter duration than 2 years should be issued. Following sickness absence due to significant injury or illness, or following evacuation from an offshore installation for medical or dental reasons, an individual’s medical or dental fitness must be assessed and he/she should not return offshore until certified as medically fit to return to work offshore by an Oil & Gas UK approved physician. This assessment may, but need not automatically, involve further medical examination.
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
6
Offshore Visitors The health risks associated with offshore work relate to the geographical location of the installation rather than the purpose of the visit. Although, to a lesser extent, the time to be spent there may affect the risk associated with work offshore, even for offshore visits planned to be of short duration, individuals may unavoidably have the length of their stay extended due to weather or operational reasons. All visitors should therefore be assessed under these guidelines, irrespective of the purpose or duration of their planned trip. However, operating company medical advisers may adopt simpler screening procedures for individuals undertaking short-duration visits to specific installations.
7
Information and Review Process for Unsuccessful Candidates Independent Review Procedure In circumstances where: •
•
No certificate is issued after a medical examination or No certificate is issued following an examination for fitness to return to work offshore or after illness or injury
Oil & Gas UK has established a process for review of the examining doctor’s assessment of the individual and the decision made in his/her case. The questions which will be addressed by the review process are: (1)
Was the medical examination conducted in accordance with the ‘Fitness for Work Offshore Guidelines’ (Oil & Gas UK) and in a professional and reasonable manner?
(2)
Was there reasonable evidence of any significant medical condition(s)?
(3)
If a significant medical condition has been identified – is this a reason for restriction under the ‘Fitness for Work Offshore Guidelines’ (Oil & Gas UK)?
(4)
If the individual is considered unfit to work offshore – would it be reasonable to consider a future evaluation to reassess the applicant’s medical condition with relation to employment?
It is important for examining doctors and examinees alike to note that the review process will not include changing the guidelines or application of the guidelines in an individual case, but is restricted to a reassessment of whether a reasonable interpretation of the guidelines was made.
General Guidance Notes 1-4
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Where an examining doctor declines to issue a certificate of fitness for offshore work he/she must: •
•
•
•
•
8
Fully explain his/her reasons for doing so to the examinee in person. Although the examining physician may wish to confirm these discussions in writing to the individual, this should not be the primary mode of communication If the decision has been made after receipt of a specialist or other report, the examining doctor must provide an opportunity to discuss the decision in person with the examinee If the examinee remains in disagreement that the examining doctor’s decision was a reasonable one, the examining doctor must determine the exact reason why the examinee feels his decision not to be in accordance with the guidelines and provide both verbal and written response to this If, following receipt of the examining doctor’s written response, the individual remains in disagreement, the examining physician should give the examinee a copy of the form ‘Information for Unsuccessful Applicants’ (refer to Addendum 4) and advise that they may initiate the review process by contacting Oil & Gas UK in the first instance. Oil & Gas UK will advise the name of their current medical adviser who will administer the review process on behalf of Oil & Gas UK. It should be noted that the review process is not obligatory but is intended to provide a third-party review of the decision reached, only where the examinee remains in disagreement with the examining doctor’s decision after full discussion and explanation of this, as described above Examining doctors should note that they will be required to provide the Oil & Gas UK medical adviser with copies of their medical records relating to the case and evidence that they have fully complied with the above process
The Offshore Working Environment The examining physician should conduct the assessment in accordance with recognised occupational health standards. In common with good occupational medicine practice the examining physician must ensure that the medical assessment of a prospective offshore employee relates to the particular work factors and environment of the worksite. Although the following description provides a brief guide to offshore working conditions, examining physicians must ensure they have adequate knowledge of the environment to make an effective decision in individual cases. A more in-depth description may be found in ‘Fitness for Work: The Medical Aspects’ published by Oxford Medical Publications.
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General Guidance Notes 1-5
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
The Physical Nature of the Offshore Environment Installations range in size from small exploration and drilling semisubmersibles with a crew of less than 20 to large, fixed leg oil production installations with a crew of up to 250
•
•
•
Installations may be up to 200 miles offshore All facilities have 24-hour operations, with employees working alternate 12-hour day and night shifts
•
Offshore tours of duty are typically of two to three weeks duration
•
Travel to and from the installation is by helicopter
•
•
•
•
•
•
Living accommodation is usually in shared cabins of two, or less commonly, four occupants There are recreational facilities normally including satellite television, a gym and social facilities but no alcohol is allowed offshore Many of the functions offshore still require a large degree of lifting and heavy manual handling and many valves are still manually operated Much equipment is very heavy and needs regular maintenance and repair which often has to be done in a very confined working space Installations are usually of a multi-level design with access between levels by steep, open, external stairs Because of the need to contain potential fires and explosions there are numerous fire and explosion-proof safety doors which can be extremely heavy to open and close
Offshore Survival Training Because the normal transport to any offshore installation is by helicopter and, in an emergency, rescue is likely to involve evacuation by lifeboat or liferaft, every employee offshore must hold a valid Certificate of Offshore Survival Training. The training is physically demanding and initially takes 3 days including activities such as embarking a liferaft from the water, climbing rescue nets and helicopter underwater escape simulation which includes the use of a rebreather device and cold water immersion. Basic firefighting skills are taught and attendees are expected to escape from a smoke house using breathing apparatus. Refresher courses are required every 4 years.
General Guidance Notes 1-6
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Installation Medical Facilities Most offshore installations are required to have a fully equipped sick bay usually consisting of an examination area, a small one or two-bedded ward and a bath to treat hypothermia. Sick bay medical equipment is reasonably comprehensive normally including an electrocardiograph, defibrillator, gas-powered ventilator and pulse oximeter but should not be compared to the level found in hospitals. The Medic has a range of basic drugs available including antibiotics, analgesics (including opiates), cough and cold remedies, antacid preparations, antihistamines and a selection of emergency medication for use in cardiac arrest. The Medic is not expected to have the level of training to be able to prescribe the complete range of stocked medication but, when necessary, their use can be authorised by an onshore physician. The Offshore Medic – Qualifications and Training The offshore Medics are either nurses or armed services medical attendants who have passed a specific Health and Safety Executive (HSE) approved Medic training course. This 4-week course extends the skills of the Medic to a level that reflects the extra roles and skills they will need to deal with sick or injured individuals in a remote location. The Medic does not possess the diagnostic or treatment skills expected of a medical practitioner but has to act with no expectation of immediate medical backup relying only on the help of a first aid team and the telephone advice of an on-call physician. There is normally only one Medic per platform so that they are always on call. The Medic may be given other functions if, as is often the case, the health-related duties do not occupy the full 12-hour shift. Transport and Medical Evacuation Manning levels and accommodation constraints are such that anyone becoming sick for any length of time will have to be returned onshore and replaced by another worker. An emergency medical evacuation can be expensive for the company and, if required in inclement weather conditions, can endanger the crew of the helicopter and any medical personnel involved. There are regular periods of time where travel by helicopter may be impossible for 2 to 3 days due to high winds or fog. The helicopter passenger cabin is small with closely packed seats. Personnel have to wear bulky survival suits and lifejackets.
Issue 6 March 2008
General Guidance Notes 1-7
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Emergency egress is by doors and windows. Larger or obese passengers may find exit through the windows difficult. Flights are conducted at 1000 to 3000 feet. Passengers must be fit to fly at this level for the 1 to 2-hour duration of the flight. Where a person must be evacuated urgently, flights may be diverted to pick up the patient or a dedicated flight can be arranged. As a result, the delay in evacuation times to shore can be in the order of 4 to 5 hours or more, dependent on weather conditions. The management of some patients requiring active care during an evacuation flight may pose difficulties due to the combination of cramped accommodation, noise and vibration. The use of some medical equipment including defibrillators may be curtailed by flight safety considerations. Individuals diagnosed with psychiatric conditions pose a particular concern as the pilot’s cabin is not physically separated from the passenger cabin. This proximity can have safety implications when attempting to medivac severely agitated patients.
General Guidance Notes 1-8
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Section 2
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions
Paragraph
Page
1
Introduction
2-1
2
Cardiovascular System
2-2
3
4
5
6
7
2.1 Risk
2-2
2.2 Assessment
2-2
2.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-3
Diseases of the Nervous System
2-5
3.1 Risk
2-5
3.2 Assessment
2-6
3.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-6
Psychiatric Disorders
2-8
4.1 Risk
2-8
4.2 Assessment
2-9
4.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-9
Alcohol Dependence
2-11
5.1 Risk
2-11
5.2 Assessment
2-11
Drug Abuse
2-12
6.1 Risk
2-12
6.2 Assessment
2-12
Respiratory System
2-13
7.1 Risk
2-13
7.2 Assessment
2-13
7.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-13
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Section 2
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions (cont’d)
Paragraph
Page
8
2-14
9
10
11
12
13
Endocrine Disorders 8.1 Risk
2-14
8.2 Assessment
2-15
8.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-15
Obesity
2-16
9.1 Risk
2-16
9.2 Assessment
2-16
Diseases of the Gastrointestinal System
2-17
10.1 Risk
2-17
10.2 Assessment
2-17
10.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-18
Musculoskeletal Conditions
2-19
11.1 Risk
2-19
11.2 Assessment
2-19
11.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-20
Skin
2-20
12.1 Risk
2-20
12.2 Assessment
2-20
12.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-21
Genitourinary System
2-21
13.1 Risk
2-21
13.2 Assessment
2-21
13.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-22
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-ii
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Section 2
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions (cont’d)
Paragraph
Page
14
2-22
15
Diseases of Blood or Blood Forming Organs 14.1 Risk
2-22
14.2 Assessment
2-23
14.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-23
Organ Transplants 15.1 Risk
16
17
18
19
20
2-24 2-24
Malignant Neoplasms
2-24
16.1 Risk
2-24
16.2 Assessment
2-25
Infectious Diseases
2-25
17.1 Risk
2-25
17.2 Assessment
2-25
17.3 Notes on Specific Conditions
2-26
Ear, Nose and Throat
2-26
18.1 Risk
2-26
18.2 Assessment
2-26
Eyes
2-27
19.1 Risk
2-27
19.2 Assessment
2-27
Dental Health
2-28
20.1 Risk
2-28
20.2 Assessment
2-28
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Section 2
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions (cont’d)
Paragraph
Page
21
2-29
22
Allergies and Anaphylaxis 21.1 Risk
2-29
21.2 Assessment
2-29
21.3 Specific Conditions
2-30
Medications
2-30
22.1 Specific Considerations for Medication
2-31
22.2 General Considerations for Medication
2-32
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
1
Introduction The assessment of an individual’s fitness to travel and work offshore involves making an assessment of the risk which may be posed either to themselves or to others by any underlying medical condition(s) which they may have. In order to be fit to travel and to work offshore an individual must: •
Be able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Be able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Be able to take part in offshore survival training
•
•
•
•
Pose no significant risk to the safety or health of others on the installation by virtue of any underlying medical condition Require no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment Require no medical treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Have no significant liability to sudden illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
If an individual is unable to meet these seven criteria then they should not normally be considered fit for unrestricted offshore work. An individual who is declared temporarily unfit for offshore work should be reassessed after an appropriate length of time. In some cases, on an individual basis, it may be possible to mitigate the risk to a level which is deemed acceptable such that the individual may be allowed to travel and work offshore. In all such cases, the condition and measures put in place to mitigate the risk should be discussed and agreed with the operator’s medical adviser. The individual should then be issued with an offshore fitness certificate limited to travel to such installations as have been agreed with the operating company’s medical adviser. To ensure uniformity of approach, in each of the following sections there is a description of potential concerns related to that organ system followed by guidance on assessing the individual and specific guidance on commonly encountered conditions.
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Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
2
Cardiovascular System 2.1
Risk
Cardiovascular conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
2.2
Assessment
In making an assessment it should be noted that cardiovascular disease is one of the commonest causes of emergency evacuation from an offshore installation. The individual must be assessed with regard to: •
•
•
•
Exercise tolerance with specific reference to general mobility around the platform (including climbing stairs), ability to perform normal job functions, ability to respond to emergency situations and in particular to successfully take part in evacuations Risk of developing sudden life-threatening complications and the likelihood of successful medical evacuation Ability to take part in survival training including exposure to smoke-filled environments, wearing smoke hoods and Breathing Apparatus (BA) equipment, helicopter underwater escape training and use of underwater rebreather equipment Side effects of medication
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
2.3
Notes on Specific Conditions
Ischaemic Heart Disease Individuals with a history of myocardial ischaemia, including myocardial infarction, angioplasty and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG), must meet the following criteria for the risk to be compatible with offshore work: •
•
•
The examining doctor must obtain a report from the treating physician The individual must have been free of cardiac symptoms for at least 3 months The individual must undertake a Bruce Protocol exercise test and complete Stage III without cardiac symptoms or signs of ischaemia
Initially, a certificate restricted to a maximum of one year should be issued, with reassessment by a consultant in cardiology (including successful completion to Stage III of the Bruce Protocol exercise test) at the end of this period. Thereafter, the requirement for re-examination will be determined by conducting a risk factor assessment which may take into account information from specialist reports and/or the process described in Addendum 7 or 8. A new assessment must be performed at each medical examination, the results of which should be used to determine the timing and scope of the next medical, together with any other clinical information the examining doctor regards as relevant. Cardiac Arrhythmias If these produce symptoms, interfere with function, cause temporary incapacitation or require anti-arrhythmic medication then expert cardiac opinion must be obtained. The detail of the cardiology report must be considered when assessing the resultant risk. Pacemakers For individuals with pacemakers it must be demonstrated that they are not likely to suffer any significant symptoms related to the pacemaker. In addition, it must be demonstrated that their pacemaker is not likely to be adversely affected by electromagnetic energy likely to be encountered. Therefore the examining doctor must have: •
A written assessment from the employer/operator detailing the strength of any magnetic field and circumstances with which the individual may come into contact
A written statement from either the cardiologist or the technical representative of the pacemaker manufacturer detailing the risks of exposure to the magnetic field in the circumstances in which it may be encountered
•
•
A cardiologist’s report confirming that the individual is free of syncope or pre-syncope as a result of the pacemaker insertion
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Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-3
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
•
A cardiologis’s report confirming that the individual is experiencing no complications related to the pacemaker insertion
Individuals with overdrive anti-tachycardia pacemakers or implantable defibrillators must be assessed by a consultant cardiologist to confirm that there is no risk of developing syncope
•
Individuals with pacemakers require annual review by a cardiologist to ensure continued correct functioning of the device. Hypertension Hypertension would not normally give rise to a significant risk during work offshore provided it is uncomplicated and well-controlled by treatment. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) Guidelines are a useful reference for this condition and should be consulted for further guidance on management. In respect of work offshore, the following guides the appropriate course of action: •
•
Individuals with accelerated (malignant) hypertension (Blood Pressure (BP) more than 180/110mmHg with signs of papilloedema and/or retinal haemorrhage) or suspected phaeochromocytoma (possible signs include labile or postural hypotension, headache, palpitations, pallor and diaphoresis) should be referred immediately for investigation and treatment. Certification of fitness should be deferred until the individual is stabilised on appropriate treatment when a full certificate may be issued All other individuals with blood pressure above 140/90 should be referred to their GP for further investigation and treatment, where appropriate. Uncomplicated hypertension is unlikely to be a reason for refusal to issue a certificate of fitness although individuals may require short periods of sickness absence while being stabilised on treatment
Congenital Heart Disease Other than atrial septal defects or small ventricular septal defects with no haemodynamic significance, all congenital heart disease must be individually assessed by a cardiologist and the resulting report used in the risk assessment process. Valvular Heart Disease In all cases of valvular heart disease, a cardiology report must be obtained in order to fully understand the condition, its haemodynamic effects and impact upon exercise tolerance. Patients who remain on Warfarin may be at significant risk of prolonged bleeding time associated with trauma and this must be factored into the risk assessment process (refer to Paragraph 22 – Medications (Warfarin)).
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-4
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Peripheral Circulation Individuals with Deep-vein Thrombosis (DVT) should be assessed with regard to the risk of developing complications, particularly pulmonary embolism and side effects of medications, such as anticoagulant regimes (refer to Paragraph 22 – Medications (Warfarin)). Pulmonary Circulation A history of more than one pulmonary embolism indicates a significant underlying condition predisposing to further incidents. Therefore the examining doctor must obtain a specialist report to determine the risk of recurrence. Individuals with other than a low risk of recurrence will not be fit to return to unrestricted work offshore. Cerebro-vascular Disorders Individuals who have suffered stroke due to occlusive vascular disease, spontaneous intracerebral haemorrhage, Transient Ischaemic Attack (TIA) or amaurosis fugax within the past 6 months should be considered at high risk and therefore should not be allowed to work offshore. They may be reconsidered after this time if there is a satisfactory clinical recovery with particular respect to impaired limb function and cognitive defects. Individuals in safety critical jobs may require more than 6 months post event before returning to offshore work and may require more frequent review.
3
Diseases of the Nervous System 3.1
Risk
Nervous system conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
Issue 6 March 2008
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-5
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
3.2
Assessment
The individual must be assessed with regard to: •
Potential for altered levels of consciousness
•
Changes in cognitive function, particularly memory and concentration
•
Loss of muscle power
•
Disturbances of balance or co-ordination
•
•
Disturbances of mobility causing impairment in ability to move around the installation either during normal work or during emergencies Loss of sensation causing functional deficit related to job requirements or emergency evacuation
Reference should be made, where appropriate, to the specific notes below, but individuals exhibiting significant problems in any of the above areas are unlikely to be able to meet the requirements referred to above. The risks may, in certain circumstances, be able to be mitigated sufficiently such that the individual may be considered for travel to a specific, named location following discussion with the employer’s and operator’s medical advisers.
3.3
Notes on Specific Conditions
Epilepsy The diagnosis of epilepsy with persisting epileptic seizures of any type will normally give a risk profile incompatible with unrestricted work offshore. Those with a history of epilepsy but who are able to meet the criteria below may be considered for offshore work. For the purposes of an assessment of fitness for offshore work, individuals should be categorised by their job function: •
•
Category 1 – individuals whose job function is such that sudden impairment of consciousness may adversely affect the safety of, or result in serious injury to or death of, either themselves or others. Examples of such job functions include crane operators, rope access personnel, scaffolders and drill crew Category 2 – all other individuals
In making an assessment of fitness for work the examining doctor must have: •
•
A written statement from the employer determining which of the above categories the individual is in A report from the individual’s GP and/or specialist in order to verify the medical history and establish facts on which the individual risk assessment can be based
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-6
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Based on this: •
•
Category 1 occupations require the individual to have been seizure-free for the last 10 years without taking anti-convulsant medication during that period or have an assessed risk of further seizures of less than 2% Category 2 occupations must be:
- Seizure-free for a minimum of 6 months, whether taking medication or not. Individuals who stop medication must demonstrate a seizure-free period of 6 months before returning to offshore work
- If taking medication, free from significant side effects - If taking medication, demonstrate from the GP/specialist report that they have no indications of subtherapeutic levels on clinical monitoring (where appropriate), nor any indication of poor compliance with treatment For alcohol-related seizures, individuals in Category 2 must be seizure-free (by day and night) and off all medication for at least 6 months before returning to any offshore employment. Those in increased risk (ie Category 1) occupations must be seizure-free for a minimum period of 2 years by day and night and off all medication. Individuals must also be in full compliance with the requirements of Paragraph 5. Following significant head injury or cranial surgery, and when there have been no epileptic seizures, the risk of post-surgical or post-injury epilepsy must be low (normally accepted to mean as being below 2%) in Category 1 occupations (see above). For Category 2 occupations, if the risk cannot be determined to be less than 2%, individuals may be considered fit after a minimum seizure-free period of 6 months. Individuals stopping prophylactic anticonvulsant medication must either have a risk less than 2% or demonstrate a seizure-free period of 6 months after stopping medication. Specialist neurological opinion should be obtained in all cases. Single Seizure The above guidelines for epilepsy should also be followed for individuals who have suffered a single seizure but for whom a diagnosis of epilepsy has not been made. Loss of Consciousness/Altered Level of Awareness Individuals must be fully investigated by an appropriate specialist in all cases. Where a specific underlying cause is found, reference should be made to the appropriate section of the guidance, otherwise the individual may be considered for offshore work after 6 months if there has been no further recurrence.
Issue 6 March 2008
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-7
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Chronic Neurological Disorders Individuals with conditions such as multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, motor neurone disease and other disorders of muscle and movement should be assessed with regard to the factors described above. Those with mild or predominantly sensory symptoms are likely to be at minimal risk and therefore may be fit for offshore work. More severely affected individuals may be fit to travel to specific, named locations if specific measures can be put in place to mitigate the risk to a level deemed acceptable by the operating company’s medical adviser. An increased frequency of medical review may be appropriate, dependent on the rate of progression. Migraine The majority of cases are straightforward in symptomatology and treatment, and are unlikely to give rise to an unacceptable risk for offshore work. Some more severe cases may result in episodic protracted incapacity or unusual neurological features. In such cases, examining doctors must obtain a neurological report confirming the condition and optimum treatment to enable an informed risk assessment to be made. Narcolepsy/Sleep Disorders It is likely that individuals with unpredictable drowsiness during periods of normal wakefulness, as a result of narcolepsy/sleep disorders, will pose a risk incompatible with offshore work. Individuals who have been successfully treated for such conditions may be fit, but a specialist report is required providing objective evidence of the success of such treatment.
4
Psychiatric Disorders 4.1
Risk
Psychiatric conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
•
•
•
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency Poses no significant risk to others on the installation by virtue of any underlying disease Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-8
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
4.2
Assessment
In assessing individuals with psychiatric disorders, examining doctors must consider the potential for exacerbation or precipitation of the condition by factors such as the remote location of offshore installations, the possible social isolation, disruption of normal social patterns, the impact of shift working and the potential for perception of the environment as being stressful in some individuals. Examining doctors should make clinical assessment of the functional effect of symptoms of the condition such as: Mood
•
Memory
•
Concentration
•
Agitation
•
•
Psychotic symptoms
•
Behavioural disturbance
•
Side effects of medication
Reference should be made, where appropriate, to the specific notes below but individuals exhibiting significant problems in any of the areas above are likely to pose a risk which would be incompatible with unrestricted offshore work. They may, in certain circumstances, be considered for travel to a specific, named location following discussion with the employer’s and operator’s medical adviser.
4.3
Notes on Specific Conditions
Mild Anxiety or Depressive Disorders When assessing the risk of mild anxiety or depressive disorders, the examining doctor must be satisfied that the individual has no significant memory or concentration problems, no suicidal thoughts, no behavioural disturbance or agitation and that workplace factors will not exacerbate the condition. If the individual is on medication, the examining doctor should be satisfied that they are stable on medication and not suffering from significant side effects. More Severe Anxiety or Depressive Disorders If the individual is exhibiting memory or concentration problems, has behavioural disturbances, agitation or suicidal thoughts, the risk is likely to be high enough to be incompatible with offshore work until stabilised on medication.
Issue 6 March 2008
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-9
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Psychoses (including Bipolar Disease and Schizophrenic Disorders) The risks associated with acute psychotic episodes are incompatible with offshore work. Following treatment and recovery, the examining doctor must, in all cases, obtain a specialist report to confirm that the individual: •
Has made a good functional recovery
•
Has insight into their problem
•
Is fully adherent to the agreed treatment plan
•
Is fully engaged with medical services
•
•
Is free from any significant adverse effects of medication (eg effects on alertness, concentration, motor performance) Has a low risk of recurrence
All cases must be discussed and agreed with the employer’s and operating company’s medical adviser before being allowed to travel and work offshore. The risk associated with individuals who have exhibited extreme violent tendencies in the past is unlikely to be compatible with offshore work. Personality and Behavioural Disorders The risk associated with those personality and behavioural disorders which are characterised by violence or serious anti-social behaviour is unlikely to be compatible with offshore work. Developmental Disorders (including Asperger’s Syndrome, Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) Individuals need to be assessed with regard to impulsivity and lack of awareness of the effects of their behaviour on others. These risks may be significant such that they are incompatible with the safety requirements of offshore work or the ability to live in a community. Other Psychological Disorders Such as eating disorders, phobias and childhood behaviour disorders (including post head injury syndrome and non-epileptic seizure disorder) should be assessed individually with respect to the requirements listed above to determine the individual risk profile. Examining doctors should obtain a psychiatric report if unable to accurately assess the risk.
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-10
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
5
Alcohol Dependence 5.1
Risk
Alcohol-related conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
•
•
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency Poses no significant risk to others on the installation by virtue of any underlying disease Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
5.2
Assessment
Examining doctors should be aware that employers or operators may have specific alcohol abuse policies which should be referred to in addition to this guidance as appropriate. Individuals who have a physical dependence on alcohol will not be fit to work offshore until it can be demonstrated that such dependence is under control. In making such determination, the examining physician must confirm compliance with the following: (1)
The individual must have completed a recognised initial alcohol treatment programme
(2)
The individual must be participating in and responding to an ongoing alcohol rehabilitation programme
(3)
The examining doctor must obtain a report from the individual’s treating healthcare professional(s)
(4)
The individual must have evidence of an improving trend of liver function test results and MCV
(5)
The examining doctor must make enquiries to determine continued compliance with established treatment goals
(6)
The certificate should be restricted to a maximum of 3 months during the initial 12 months following treatment
(7)
The certificate should be restricted to a maximum of 6 months during the following 12 months
(8)
At each review, the examining doctor must confirm continued compliance with items 2, 4 and 5 above
Individuals who have suffered an alcohol withdrawal induced fit should be assessed in accordance with the guidance given in Paragraph 3.
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6
Drug Abuse 6.1
Risk
Drug abuse may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
•
•
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency Poses no significant risk to others on the installation by virtue of any underlying disease Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
6.2
Assessment
Examining doctors should be aware that employers or operators may have specific drug abuse policies which should be referred to in addition to this guidance as appropriate. Individuals who are demonstrated, by any means, to be actively misusing illegal or prescription drugs will not be fit for offshore work. Prior to return to work offshore, the examining physician must ensure that the following criteria are met: •
•
•
If the individual is dependent on drugs then they must have completed a drug abuse treatment programme Where appropriate, the individual must participate in and respond to an ongoing drug rehabilitation programme The examining doctor must obtain a report from the individual’s treating healthcare professional(s)
The individual must be able to provide evidence of completion of a programme of unannounced/random drug screening of a minimum 3 months duration, during which they have had no positive drug screens and at least three negative tests (refer to Addendum 9)
•
•
•
The certificate should be restricted to a maximum of 3 months for the initial 12 months The individual must remain in an ongoing unannounced/random testing programme for 2 years. A positive drug test result during this period will result in a review of the individual’s ongoing fitness
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
7
Respiratory System 7.1
Risk
Respiratory conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
7.2
Assessment
In assessing the impact of respiratory disease on an individual’s ability to work offshore, the examining physician should consider the following: •
•
•
•
Exercise tolerance with specific reference to general mobility around the platform (including climbing stairs), ability to perform normal job functions, ability to respond to emergency situations and in particular successfully take part in evacuations Risk of developing sudden life-threatening complications and the likelihood of successful medical evacuation Ability to take part in survival training including exposure to smoke-filled environments, wearing smoke hoods and BA equipment, helicopter underwater escape training and use of underwater rebreather equipment Consideration of potential exposure to respiratory irritants and sensitisers
7.3
Notes on Specific Conditions
Asthma The British Thoracic Society guidelines provide detailed guidance on the management of asthma which should be used by examining doctors to assess the severity of asthma and adequacy of control. The following guidance should be used by examining doctors when assessing the risk: •
•
Resolved childhood asthma does not present a significant risk For the risk profile to be compatible with offshore work, the examining doctor must ensure that the individual has:
- Infrequent, non-disabling episodes - Normal exercise tolerance
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
- Absence of hospitalising episodes - Good knowledge and awareness of illness with the ability to modify own treatment as necessary
- Symptoms which do not require high dose inhaled or oral steroids •
Individuals not meeting these criteria will require a specialist report to fully assess the situation and should not be issued with a certificate of fitness without discussion with the operating company’s medical adviser
Pneumothorax The examining doctor must obtain a specialist report to determine the risk of recurrence. Individuals with other than a low risk of recurrence will not be fit to return to unrestricted work offshore. Obstructive or Restrictive Pulmonary Disease Conditions such as chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and any other pulmonary disease causing significant disability or recurring illness, such as bronchiectasis should be assessed using standard spirometry measurements. Individuals with an FEV 1 >60% of predicted values and an FVC >75% of predicted values are likely to have sufficient pulmonary reserve to meet the requirements of offshore travel and work. For individuals who do not meet this standard the examining doctor should, by practical functional assessment, ensure that the individual is able to perform his normal work duties and has the capacity to respond in a platform emergency and evacuation.
8
Endocrine Disorders 8.1
Risk
Endocrine conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
•
•
•
Is fit to carry out their normal assigned duties without risk to themselves or others Is fit to escape from the platform in event of an emergency Requires no ongoing medical treatment which would not be able to be effectively delivered in the offshore environment Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
8.2
Assessment
In assessing the impact of endocrine disease on an individual’s ability to work offshore, the examining physician should consider the following: •
•
•
•
•
•
Risk of developing sudden life-threatening complications and the likelihood of successful medical evacuation Side effects of medication Ability to take part in survival training including exposure to smoke-filled environments, wearing smoke hoods and BA equipment, helicopter underwater escape training and use of underwater rebreather equipment Disturbances of mobility causing impairment in ability to move around the installation either during normal work or during emergencies The requirements for lone working, safety critical work and shift work The effects of any chronic complications such as visual field defects, muscle weakness, mental disturbances such as anxiety, depression or mania
8.3
Notes on Specific Conditions
Non-insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus (NIDDM) (Type II) Individuals with NIDDM should be assessed with regard to: •
•
Risk of hypoglycaemic attack Presence of complications which may affect mobility or ability to respond in emergency situations
An increased frequency of medical examination may be appropriate to ensure regular review of the overall condition and specifically those issues above. If the individual has secondary complications of their diabetes, these must be assessed under the relevant criteria for that condition. Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus (IDDM) (Type I) The risks associated with IDDM are not compatible with unrestricted fitness to work on the UKCS. However, an individual may be considered for restricted certification of fitness to work offshore if the following requirements are met: •
•
•
•
•
The examining doctor must obtain a report from the individual’s treating physician The individual must have had good control of their diabetes as defined by accepted clinical criteria for a minimum of the prior 6 months The individual must be able to self-manage their insulin requirements The examining doctor must satisfy himself that the individual does not suffer from hypoglycaemia unawareness If the individual has secondary complications of their diabetes, these must be assessed under the relevant criteria for that condition
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
•
•
•
The operator’s medical adviser must be consulted regarding the individual case and must agree with the proposal to allow the individual to work on the installation The installation Medic must be competent in the management of diabetic emergencies There must be a supply of glucagon and intravenous dextrose on board the platform
•
Certification must be restricted to named platform(s)
•
Certification must be restricted to a maximum of 1 year
All individuals with IDDM working offshore must be reviewed at least annually to ensure control remains acceptable and the above stipulations continue to be met.
9
Obesity 9.1
Risk
Obesity may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
9.2
Assessment
The individual must be assessed solely with regard to their fitness and capability to perform the duties required. Although obesity may predispose to conditions such as cardiovascular disease or diabetes, the presence of obesity as a risk factor should not be considered unless such co-morbidity is demonstrably present. In most obese individuals the limiting factor relating to fitness for offshore work is likely to relate to safety rather than medical issues. Therefore, individuals with a BMI less than 40 are likely to be fit for unrestricted offshore work unless there is significant co-morbidity or disability present. For all individuals, but particularly for those with a BMI greater than 40, the examining doctor must determine that the individual has an appropriate level of physical fitness: •
To adequately perform his normal job functions
•
For general mobility around the platform (including climbing stairs)
•
To respond to emergency situations and in particular successfully take part in evacuations without compromising either their own safety or that of others
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In addition, all individuals with a BMI greater than 40 must be able to provide written confirmation from either their employer or the operating company to whose platform they intend to travel that he/she can: •
•
•
•
Escape from a helicopter through a standard sized escape hatch Don and fasten standard Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) approved and marine issue lifejackets over a survival suit Sit in a standard helicopter seat and fasten a three-point harness Comply with any other specific requirements of the employing or operating company
Examining doctors must not issue any certificate of fitness until such written confirmation is provided and may consider it necessary to issue a time restricted certificate if there are co-existing medical issues. Should any additional weight increase be noted at subsequent assessments, the individual must provide further written confirmation that he/she can meet the above criteria and, in any event, such confirmation will be required at a maximum of 4-yearly intervals.
10 Diseases of the Gastrointestinal System 10.1 Risk Gastrointestinal system conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
•
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
10.2 Assessment Clinical assessment of any gastrointestinal system disturbance should consider the impact of the condition on an individual’s function as well as any medication taken. In particular, the examining physician should consider the following: •
The risk the individual may develop sudden life-threatening complications such as acute bleeding, perforation or obstruction
The effects of chronic complications such as anaemia, fistulae or malabsorption syndromes
•
•
Side effects of medication
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
10.3 Notes on Specific Conditions Peptic Ulceration The risks associated with active peptic ulcer disease are unacceptable for offshore work. Where there is a past history of ulceration, an individual may be deemed fit for work offshore provided that the examining physician is satisfied that the risk of recurrence or complications is reduced to a minimum by the use of appropriate treatment. For risks to be considered acceptable, the individual must be asymptomatic and, if required, be on maintenance acid suppression therapy and/or have undergone successful helicobacter eradication therapy. Oesophagitis and Gastritis Oesophagitis and gastritis are unlikely to cause significant complications, hence the risk should be considered low and individuals are acceptable on appropriate treatment. Other non-specific upper GI disorders including ‘dyspepsia’ and diaphragmatic hernia are unlikely to give rise to significant risk provided they are non-disabling and the physician is satisfied they are not indicative of a more serious underlying disorder. Inflammatory Bowel Disease Inflammatory bowel disease is unacceptable in the acute phases until the individual is stable and controlled on medication compatible with offshore work. Where the condition is in remission and symptoms are under control the individual may be fit for return to offshore work if, f ollowing consultation with the treating specialist, the risk of sudden disabling relapse is considered to be minimal. Hernia Hernia should be assessed with regard to the risk of strangulation and its effects on an individual’s ability to carry out their normal assigned tasks. Those considered to be of high risk of strangulation are unacceptable until surgically repaired. Those with hernia of low risk who are assessed as able to carry out their normal assigned tasks should be given a time restricted certificate while awaiting surgical assessment and repair if appropriate. Haemorrhoids, Fistulae and Fissures Haemorrhoids, fistulae and fissures are unlikely to cause significant risk unless causing sufficient pain as to limit an individual’s mobility and ability to perform their duties. Perianal abscess will normally cause acute pain and require treatment before being compatible with offshore work.
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Uncomplicated Stoma Uncomplicated stoma will not normally give rise to significant risk but the examining physician should be satisfied that the underlying cause is compatible with offshore work and that the personal management of the condition is acceptable within the confines of the offshore community. Liver Diseases Liver diseases where the condition is serious or progressive and/or where complications such as oesophageal varices or ascites are present will give rise to an unacceptable level of risk. Those with chronic active hepatitis requiring Interferon need to be carefully assessed with regard to the potential side effects of treatment. Assessment of all individuals with a significant history of liver disease should include an update fr om their clinical specialist and a recent (within 3 months) Prothrombin time. Chronic or Recurring Pancreatitis Chronic or recurring pancreatitis should be assessed regarding the length of periods of remission and frequency of acute attacks. The risks in individuals suffering frequent attacks requiring strong analgesia are not compatible with offshore work.
11 Musculoskeletal Conditions 11.1 Risk Musculoskeletal conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work
11.2 Assessment Irrespective of pathology, all musculoskeletal disorders should be assessed according to the following criteria: •
Locomotor function
•
Balance and co-ordination
•
Stability of joints and risk of subluxation or dislocation
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•
Disturbances of mobility causing impairment in ability to move around the installation either during normal work or during emergencies
•
Ability to don and wear a survival suit
•
Side effects of medication
11.3 Notes on Specific Conditions Joint Replacements Joint replacements pose no significant risk so long as the individual can meet the mobility requirements and there is low risk of dislocation. Limb Prostheses Limb prostheses pose no significant risk so long as an individual can meet the mobility requirements of offshore life. Arrangements for fitting the prosthesis in an emergency must be considered.
12 Skin 12.1 Risk Dermatological conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work
12.2 Assessment Individuals with skin disorders should be assessed with regard to: •
The effects the condition may have on an individual’s ability to perform their duties, including potential sleep disturbance and possible fatigue
•
Side effects of medication
•
Compatibility of offshore rotational duties with treatment regimes
•
The probability of exposure to substances which may act as allergens or irritants should be understood and taken into account when making the assessment
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12.3 Notes on Specific Conditions Psoriasis Psoriasis which is well-controlled by topical medication poses no significant risk. Assessment of more serious disease requiring inpatient treatment and chemotherapy should include the compatibility of offshore rotational duties with treatment regimes. Psoriatic arthropathy should be assessed according to its effect on musculoskeletal function. Dermatitis Accurate assessment may require specialist referral and patch testing, the results of which should be taken into account in the risk assessment process. Offshore working will normally be possible with appropriate use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to mitigate the risk.
13 Genitourinary System 13.1 Risk Genitourinary conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
13.2 Assessment A history of a short-term illness will usually present no difficulties for offshore work but chronic or recurrent disease should be carefully considered with particular reference to: •
Risk of developing disabling or life-threatening complications
•
Side effects of medication
•
Chronic or secondary effects of the disease such as anaemia, lethargy, osteoporosis
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13.3 Notes on Specific Conditions Renal Calculi Following an episode of renal colic, the individual requires assessment with regard to the risk of recurrence. A specialist report should be obtained where appropriate. Only individuals with low risk of recurrence should be considered for unrestricted offshore work. Individuals with high risk of recurrence should be discussed with the employer’s and operating company’s medical adviser with regard to the acceptability of the increased risk of medivac. Chronic Renal Disease In addition to considering the chronic effects of the disease on the individual’s ability to work offshore, the examining doctor should also obtain a specialist report to determine the risk of developing acute renal failure. Haematuria Asymptomatic haematuria may be found on routine urinalysis at the medical examination. Although this will usually require further investigation to determine the underlying pathology, the examining doctor should make an adequate risk assessment with regard to the factors above to determine the fitness of the individual to continue working offshore pending further investigation. Dependent upon the outcome of the risk assessment the issue of a full, restricted or failure certificate may be appropriate.
14 Diseases of Blood or Blood Forming Organs 14.1 Risk Haematological conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
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14.2 Assessment Individuals with haematological disease should be assessed with particular reference to the following: •
•
•
Exercise tolerance with specific reference to general mobility around the platform (including climbing stairs), ability to perform normal job functions, ability to respond to emergency situations and in particular successfully take part in evacuations Risk of developing sudden life-threatening complications and the likelihood of successful medical evacuation Ability to take part in survival training including cold water immersion, helicopter underwater escape training and use of underwater rebreather equipment
Due to the complex nature of haematological disease, examining doctors should consider obtaining a specialist opinion before issuing or refusing certification. In chronic conditions, it is frequently inappropriate to issue a certificate of normal duration and the use of restricted duration certificates is appropriate to permit active monitoring of the individual’s condition and continuing fitness for work.
14.3 Notes on Specific Conditions Anaemia Anaemia should be assessed with regard to the underlying cause as well as any specific symptoms related to the anaemia. Thalassaemia Trait and Sickle Cell Trait Thalassaemia trait and sickle cell trait are unlikely to pose significant risk for offshore work. However, the symptoms associated with Thalassaemia Major and Sickle Cell Disease are likely to give significant risk and cases should be considered individually in conjunction with the employer’s and operator’s medical adviser. Polycythaemia Primary polycythaemia (Polycythaemia Rubra Vera) is normally asymptomatic and, provided the individual is receiving appropriate treatment, it is unlikely to pose significant risk. In secondary polycythaemia the causative condition is likely to be the limiting factor and full assessment of this should be made. Haemophilia and Other Bleeding Disorders Must be assessed with regard to the risk of acute bleeding offshore and the availability of appropriate treatment offshore. A specialist report and discussion with the operator’s medical adviser will always be required.
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15 Organ Transplants 15.1 Risk Organ transplants may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
Organ Transplant Organ transplant in itself will not be a bar to offshore work provided the organ is functioning adequately but this will need to be assessed with particular regard to the potential complications and side effects of medication.
16 Malignant Neoplasms 16.1 Risk Malignant neoplasm may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
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16.2 Assessment Assessment of an individual with malignancy should consider both the effect of the neoplasm on the individual’s function and the effect of any treatment. In all cases, the following should be considered: •
•
The nature and location of the neoplasm and any disability caused The likelihood of sudden complication such as haemorrhage, seizure or sudden loss of consciousness
•
The compatibility of treatment programmes with offshore rotation patterns
•
Side effects and other complications of treatment
•
The psychological impact of the illness and availability of appropriate support
It will normally be appropriate to issue a restricted duration certificate during the initial phases of the disease process in order to provide appropriate review of the condition. Individuals in remission should be issued with certificates based on the length of remission and requirements for clinical follow-up.
17 Infectious Diseases 17.1 Risk Infectious disease may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
•
•
Poses no significant risk to the safety or health of others on the installation by virtue of any underlying medical condition Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
17.2 Assessment Individuals suffering from minor infectious disease should not be refused a certificate of fitness. However, all individuals should be restricted from travel offshore during the active stages of an infectious disease if there is significant risk of spread within the offshore community. Catering staff require special consideration to exclude acute or chronic disease involving the gastrointestinal tract, chest, ear, nose, throat and skin due to the risk of food-borne spread of the disease. (Refer to Section 3 Paragraph 3 – Catering Crews.)
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Individuals suffering from chronic communicable disease should be assessed to determine: •
•
•
The risk of transmission to other individuals Any effects of the condition which may adversely affect the individual’s ability to perform their duties or effectively participate in emergency evacuation The requirements for long-term therapy and side effects of such therapy
17.3 Notes on Specific Conditions Open Pulmonary Tuberculosis The risk posed to others by individuals with active pulmonary tuberculosis is not compatible with offshore work. Once an individual is being treated, examining doctors must obtain a specialist report to confirm that they are no longer infectious and that they are not suffering from significant treatment side effects. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired I mmune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) A diagnosis of HIV positive need not debar from employment. Individuals with AIDS-related illness should be assessed with regard to the specific functional effects and the risks associated with such illness and its treatment.
18 Ear, Nose and Throat 18.1 Risk Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others
•
Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency
•
Is able to take part in offshore survival training
•
Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
18.2 Assessment Conditions of the ear, nose and throat can impact on an individual’s ability to perform safely in a working environment. The functional impact on the individual’s ability to hear and communicate as well as any impact on balance must be assessed, in addition to considering any underlying pathological process.
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Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Hearing If an individual requires a hearing aid for normal conversational speech then the examining doctor must obtain confirmation that they are able to hear essential safety announcements in flight or on board a platform without a hearing aid. Note: Hearing aids must be certified as intrinsically safe. Balance Where an individual has a history of a balance disorder sufficient to affect normal movement around the platform or impair ability to take part in emergency evacuation procedures, they should be considered unfit for offshore working until such time as symptoms have resolved or are controlled by medication.
19 Eyes 19.1 Risk Ophthalmological conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
•
•
Is able to carry out their normal assigned duties without compromise to the safety of themselves or others Is able to escape from the platform or helicopter in event of an emergency Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
19.2 Assessment Visual Acuity Visual acuity adequate to permit the individual to mobilise and work safely in the offshore environment is essential and should be confirmed at each medical examination. Any eye disease or visual defect rendering, or likely to render the applicant incapable of carrying out job duties efficiently and safely, gives rise to an unacceptable risk. Corrected visual acuity must be sufficient to perform normal work duties. In addition, individuals should have an uncorrected visual acuity sufficient to permit emergency mobilisation around a location. Individuals with an acuity of at least 6/60 will normally meet this requirement. For individuals with an uncorrected acuity less than this the examining doctor must satisfy himself, by practical testing, that they have a sufficient acuity to effectively mobilise around the platform and escape in case of emergency without the use of corrective spectacles.
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Monocular Vision Monocular vision is acceptable provided the above minimum standard of acuity is met and the individual shows appropriate adaptation to the loss of binocular vision. Diplopia Diplopia may pose a safety hazard and requires assessment in conjunction with the employer’s and operator’s medical adviser. Visual Fields Individuals with significant field deficits should undergo a practical determination of their ability to perform their normal job function and ability to evacuate the platform in an emergency. Colour Vision Colour vision is only required for specialist tasks such as electrical work and need not be assessed unless specifically required for this purpose or a similar colour-dependent task.
20 Dental Health 20.1 Risk Dental conditions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: •
Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
20.2 Assessment Dental problems are a frequent cause of medivac from offshore, causing significant disruption to platform operations. Consequently, a dental screening process is an important part of the offshore fitness for work certification process. The examining physician must make specific examination of the oral cavity to determine that the candidate is free from: •
Bleeding gums or periodontal disease
•
Broken teeth exposing root canals
•
Large missing fillings
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If the examiner thinks that there is sufficient dental pathology to present a risk of acute dental pain requiring emergency treatment, then certification of fitness for offshore work should be withheld pending a dental opinion and treatment if necessary. Individuals medivaced for dental reasons must have a letter from a treating dentist confirming resolution of the dental pathology before they are considered fit to return offshore.
21 Allergies and Anaphylaxis 21.1 Risk Allergies and consequent anaphylactoid reactions may affect the following requirements and hence examining doctors should focus on assessing that the individual: Requires no ongoing medical treatment which cannot be effectively delivered in the offshore environment
•
•
•
Does not require treatment which has significant side effects incompatible with offshore work Poses no significant risk of sudden incapacitating illness requiring medical intervention which cannot be delivered in the offshore environment
21.2 Assessment Individuals with diagnosed allergies cover a wide range of allergens and potential reactions. In making an assessment the examining physician should therefore consider the following: •
The nature of the allergen, the likelihood of exposure offshore and the potential for preventing exposure
•
The nature and severity of the reaction
•
The frequency of attacks and time since last attack
•
The medication required and the ability of the individual to self-administer
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21.3 Specific Conditions Nut Allergy Although there are significant potential risks associated with nut allergy, it need not always be a bar to offshore work. Many individuals have a diagnosis made on the basis of a single episode and suffer no further reactions. If an individual needs to carry an Epipen, Anapen or similar device, examining doctors should note these have a relatively short shelf life and should check to ensure that the individual’s device remains in date at each review. It is essential that in all cases where an individual plans to travel offshore and needs to carry an Epipen, Anapen or similar device there is full prior discussion and agreement with the operating company’s medical adviser and that the installation Medic is made aware of this. Examining doctors should be aware of the particular issues relating to nut allergy in individuals with concomitant asthma and always obtain a specialist report in such cases.
22 Medications Individuals taking regular medication either prescription or non-prescription (including Chinese herbal and health supplements) should be assessed with regard to: •
•
•
•
The nature of the underlying condition, whether this is fully controlled by the medication or whether there are residual symptoms which may affect the individual’s fitness to work offshore (refer to notes under the relevant category) The nature of any side effects, paying particular attention to altered levels of consciousness, impairment of memory, concentration or alertness or extrapyramidal side effects The nature of any therapeutic or side effects which may result in a medical emergency (eg prolonged bleeding time leading to haemorrhage), the ability of the installation to deal with such emergency and likelihood of successful evacuation Issues surrounding compliance in taking medication and the likely effects of sudden withdrawal
Individuals with significant issues in any of the above categories will not normally be fit for unrestricted offshore work but may be considered for travel to specific installations following discussion with the medical adviser of the employer and operator.
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22.1 Specific Considerations for Medication Warfarin If an individual is taking Warfarin and the underlying condition does not preclude them from offshore work then the following considerations should be taken into account when deciding whether an individual is fit for offshore work: •
The nature of work must present a low risk of acute injury
•
The INR must have been stable for a minimum of 1 month
•
The dose of Warfarin must have been stable for a minimum of 1 month
•
•
•
The operating company’s medical adviser may wish to consider the need for use of a near patient test system where there is any doubt over the stability of the individual’s long-term control The platform Medic must be aware of the medication and competent in the management of a Warfarin induced bleeding emergency The platform Medic must have a supply of intravenous vitamin K1 on board
Tranquilisers and Hypnotics Both tranquilisers and hypnotics may cause side effects such as drowsiness, impaired alertness, impaired dexterity and confusion. Hypnotics are particularly prone to hangover effects whereby adverse effects of the drug are still present for some time after the therapeutic effect has worn off. Individuals taking these classes of drug will therefore not normally be fit for unrestricted offshore work. Rarely, individuals taking tranquilisers in whom objective testing demonstrates minimal side effects may be considered fit for restricted offshore work following discussion with the operating company’s medical adviser. Hypnotic use should only be considered in exceptional circumstances and subject to the following criteria: •
Medication to be taken under the direct supervision of the Medic
•
Individual must have no emergency role on the installation
The OIM must be aware that an individual has been administered medication which may affect his ability to respond during a platform emergency
•
•
Another individual must be tasked with assisting the individual in the case of platform emergency to ensure the correct muster procedure
Issue 6 March 2008
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-31
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Immunosuppressants Immunosuppressant drugs may be used for a variety of reasons including suppression of rejection following organ transplant, the treatment of a range of autoimmune diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis and the treatment of some non-autoimmune diseases such as asthma and eczema. In determining the fitness of an individual to work offshore the examining doctor must: •
•
•
•
Assess the underlying disease process according to the criteria in the appropriate section of the guidance Assess the likelihood of the drug to increase susceptibility to infection, which may be dependent on both dose and class of drug prescribed Assess the risk of other side effects such as hypertension, hyperglycaemia, peptic ulceration, hepatic and renal damage Consider treatment and monitoring regime compatibility with offshore work rotas
22.2 General Considerations for Medication •
•
All medication (both prescription and non-prescription) must be reported to the offshore Medic on arrival at a platform or location All offshore workers must take sufficient medication for their requirements for the duration of their trip plus a small contingency supply in the event of a location becoming fog bound
Unidentified substances such as Chinese herbal medications, dietary supplements or similar are liable to confiscation by security under the industry substance abuse control measures. Where these substances are being legitimately used, the individual should carry appropriate identification and prescription details to verify legal and appropriate use thereof
•
Determination of Risk for Specific Medical Conditions 2-32
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Section 3
Special Employment Groups
Paragraph
Page
1
Pregnancy and Offshore Work
3-1
2
Emergency Response Teams
3-2
2.1 Introduction
3-2
2.2 Medical Fitness Standards
3-3
2.3 Aerobic Capacity Standards
3-5
2.4 Frequency of Assessment
3-5
2.5 Roles and Responsibilities
3-5
2.6 Certification of Fitness for ERT Duties
3-5
2.7 Implementation
3-6
2.8 Voluntary Physical Fitness Programme
3-7
2.9 Notes to Examiners
3-7
3
Catering Crews
3-7
4
Crane Operators
3-8
5
Air Crew and Commercial Divers
3-9
Issue 6 March 2008
Special Employment Groups 3-i/ii
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
1
Pregnancy and Offshore Work The purpose of the Oil & Gas UK medical guidelines is to protect individuals and employers from predictable medical emergencies which may arise in an isolated location. Oil & Gas UK clearly recognises that pregnancy is not a medical condition and is a normal physiological state. It is, however, appropriate to consider any additional medical risks faced by the pregnant worker in an offshore environment. The employer of any employee who wishes to work offshore whilst pregnant should conduct a risk assessment and discuss the findings with the employee. On the basis of the consideration of this risk, a decision about the suitability of offshore working whilst pregnant should be recorded in writing. Factors to be considered during this risk assessment include: •
•
•
•
•
Previous obstetric history, particularly particularly any risk risk factors or history of ectopic pregnancy, hyperemesis, pre-eclampsia, premature labour or pregnancy induced diabetes Any relevant relevant medical conditions conditions which which may complicate complicate pregnancy including endocrine disease, cardiovascular disease or epilepsy Proposed location and means of medivac should this be necessary The nature of the work work and potential potential for exposure to physical, physical, biological biological or chemical agents which could be harmful to the foetus The need for regular clinical clinical review of the employee employee and any additional additional logistical requirements this imposes
Contraindications Contraindications to working offshore whilst pregnant include: •
•
Active complication complication of current pregnancy pregnancy including including threatened miscarriage and hyperemesis Any concomitant concomitant complicating medical condition condition such as cardiac disease or or diabetes which would preclude offshore work when assessed under the relevant section above
After a risk assessment assessment it may be reasonable to consider offshore working but in all cases the following must be satisfied: •
•
•
The pregnancy has been assessed by a physician as low risk and confirmed at ultrasound as intrauterine The employee understands understands and accepts the additional additional risks entailed in working offshore whilst pregnant The operator’s medical adviser adviser has been been informed and and agrees to offshore offshore working for the named worker
Issue 6 March 2008
Special Employment Groups 3-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
2
Emergency Response Teams 2.1
Introduction
Duty holders are required to have arrangements in place to provide for an effective response in the event of an offshore emergency. This is achieved by a series of measures summarised in the Safety Case and includes preventive and reactive measures. One element of the response is a trained Emergency Response Team (ERT), some of whom will have a range of duties including firefighting, assisting with a controlled platform evacuation and casualty search and rescue. Participation in emergency response could require engaging in significant physical activity suddenly and without warning, working in a variety of potentially stressful environmental conditions, sometimes with long hours and extended physical demands in situations significantly beyond the individual’s routine job duties. The roles of some of the ERT members will involve wearing protective clothing and breathing apparatus that further add to the physical load. Such activities are likely to put additional physiological burdens on the individual and therefore require higher standards of medical fitness. Some designated team members will have sedentary functions such as Radio Operator and Control Room Operator and would not require this higher standard of physical fitness beyond the standard Oil & Gas UK medical assessment. Because the duties required of ERT members may involve a higher level of physical exertion than that required in their normal job function, employers need to establish that such individuals will be physically capable of carrying out such duties. Oil & Gas UK therefore recommend that ERT members tasked with physically strenuous activities undergo regular: •
Medical Examination
•
Aerobic Capacity Assessment
Medical Examination A medical evaluation should be conducted to ensure that the individual individual does not have a medical or physical condition that would preclude them from safely performing the essential job functions, and is able to safely complete the essential physical requirements of their emergency response role. The examination requires the attainment of standards specific to the ERT function, as described in Paragraph 2.2.
Special Employment Groups 3-2
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Aerobic Capacity Assessment Assessment ERT members will be required to undergo aerobic capacity assessment to ensure they have the stamina to engage in sudden and sustained physical activity. The standards are related to the physical requirements of the various emergency responder groups related to the risk-assessment for each installation or location. The standards detailed in Paragraph 2.3 relate to those required for installations or locations using fixed firefighting apparatus. For other types of firefighting on installations or locations whose risk assessment identifies more extensive response, a higher aerobic capacity standard will be required to match the essential physical requirements of each role.
2.2
Medical Fitness Standards
Examining doctors must satisfy themselves that the individual does not have any medical condition which is likely to impair his ability to perform the essential duties required for their emergency response role, and that the performance of such duties is unlikely to have a significant adverse effect on the medical condition. The examining physician should, in particular, consider the following when making their assessment: Respiratory Function All emergency response team members who may wear BA must have their respiratory function tested and meet the minimum standards as defined in the IP Standards Guidance for Physicians for Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE) Use and specifically: •
Measured FEV1 and FVC must be 80% of predicted values. Measured FEV1/FVC ratio must be at least 70%
Cardiovascular System Any form of cardiac pathology including dysfunction or myocardial insufficiency will normally render an individual unacceptable for ERT duty. Mild hypertension, controlled if necessary by medication, may be acceptable providing the medication does not limit exercise tolerance. Note that the use of some drugs, for example beta blockers, may interfere with the standard evaluation of cardiovascular aerobic function and therefore alternative methods may need to be considered (refer to Paragraph 2.7). Nervous System A history of epilepsy, recurrent impaired consciousness, consciousness, vertigo or impaired co-ordination is unacceptable for ERT members.
Issue 6 March 2008
Special Employment Groups 3-3
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Psychological Disorders Phobic anxiety relating to heights or confined spaces is unacceptable. Evidence of current alcohol and or substance abuse is unacceptable. A history of significant/recurrent anxiety and/or depression would normally be unacceptable. Vision A minimum standard of 6/9 with both eyes open is required if necessary using appropriate corrective lenses compatible with BA use. If visual correction is required, an uncorrected visual acuity of 6/60 with both eyes open is appropriate to allow the safe escape of the individual following an event. Visual fields must be normal. Monocular vision is unacceptable. Hearing Impairment Individuals should be able to hear conversational speech without difficulty. A hearing impairment in excess of 35dB in the better ear (averaged over 0.5, 1, 2kHz) may raise doubts about the ability of an individual to hear in a hazardous environment. Such cases should be individually assessed by the examining physician but are normally unlikely to be fit for unrestricted ERT membership. Endocrine Disease Significant endocrine disease requiring ongoing treatment will normally render an individual unfit to participate in an ERT. Medication Individuals dependent on medication required to control an identified medical condition that would deteriorate significantly should a dose be missed will normally be unfit for ERT membership as will those taking medication that causes side effects that would interfere with any of the ERT functions. Musculoskeletal System The examining physician should examine the musculoskeletal system to exclude any pathology that would interfere with the execution of the individual’s essential job functions in the ERT. At a minimum, this evaluation will include confirmation that the following are within the normal range: active range of motion, limb strength, reflexes, flexibility, joint integrity. In addition, particular attention should be paid to any history of back disorders.
Special Employment Groups 3-4
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
2.3
Aerobic Capacity Standards
It is appropriate to use the measurement of maximal oxygen uptake (VO 2 max) to predict aerobic capability and resistance to fatigue. This VO 2 max may be determined either by performing a ‘shuttle run’, by cycle ergonometer, or by using the Chester Step Test or formally by physiological laboratory testing. Experience in the offshore oil industry has shown the Chester Step Test is an acceptable and reasonably reproducible method. Based on the experience of other occupational groups, it has been determined that a VO2 max of 35mls/Kg/min is the minimum that would indicate that individuals will have a physical capability adequate for normal ERT duties as described in Paragraph 2.1 (applicable to installations and locations with fixed firefighting apparatus). Certain installations may, on the basis of risk assessment, define more extensive physical requirements where a higher physical standard is required. In these cases, a VO2 max of 40mls/Kg/min or greater may be appropriate as assessed by the duty holder.
2.4
Frequency of Assessment
Formal medical examinations should follow the normal Oil & Gas UK periodicity whilst aerobic capacity assessment should be undertaken annually. The aerobic capacity assessment must, however, include using the screening tool described in Addendum 1.
2.5
Roles and Responsibilities
Medical examination should be performed by an Oil & Gas UK approved physician in possession of a valid Oil & Gas UK PIN. The aerobic capacity assessment may be carried out by an Oil & Gas UK approved physician or by an offshore Medic, a nurse or other suitably trained person working under the supervision of a Oil & Gas UK approved physician.
2.6
Certification of Fitness for ERT Duties
Following successful completion of the medical examination, for candidates whose duties contain a physical component, the examining physician should complete Part 1 of the Certificate of Fitness to Participate in ERT Duties (refer to Addendum 6). Following successful completion of the aerobic capacity assessment, the responsible person should complete Part 2 of the Certificate of Fitness to Participate in ERT Duties. Subsequent aerobic capacity assessments between periodic medical examinations should be entered in the remaining sections of Part 2 of the certificate.
Issue 6 March 2008
Special Employment Groups 3-5
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
In addition to confirming fitness to participate in ERT duties, operating companies may wish to use this certificate as confirmation of fitness for firefighting training. In such circumstances, the operating company’s medical adviser should ensure the acceptability of the certificate to the relevant training body.
2.7
Implementation
Guidance based on current industry experience is critical for the successful implementation of any process. Flexibility of application will help to enable individuals to understand, achieve and maintain any required fitness levels for their job function. This will also help maintain the operational availability of the ERT whilst fitness profiles of the individual team members are optimised. Operators should inform contractors of how these guidelines will be implemented on their installations. Aerobic Capacity Assessment It is important to recognise that there is a margin of error associated with all testing methods outside of a physiological laboratory. Fundamental primary considerations to improve accuracy of results obtained include preparation of the testing location, briefing and reassurance of the participant to avoid behaviours that would affect the result, calibration of testing equipment and training of operating personnel. When evaluating results it is important that this potential for error be recognised and that any failures to achieve the required standard be considered with this effect in mind. It is recommended that procedures which allow for reasonably rapid retesting (eg within 1 week) of potentially failed candidates be in place. Where a candidate still fails to achieve the required standard it is recommended that they be advised on participation in a physical fitness training programme prior to formal retest at an appropriate interval (eg 6 to 8 weeks). During this initial period of physical fitness training it would be reasonable to allow the individual to continue as an ERT member unless they are patently unfit. Further failure, however, would normally result in removal of t he individual from the ERT and substitution with a candidate who meets the standard. Individuals on certain types of medication, including beta blockers, cannot be evaluated by simple on-site methods and, if under consideration for ERT membership, should be assessed either by a shuttle run test or by aerobic capacity evaluation at an appropriate physiological laboratory.
Special Employment Groups 3-6
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
2.8
Voluntary Physical Fitness Programme
When there is a physical requirement associated with an emergency response role it is recommended that there be a voluntary formal physical fitness programme available to optimise the physical fitness of these ERT members. This will assist those individuals who have failed to meet the standards of physical fitness to achieve the standard and will also help existing members of the team optimise and maintain their required fitness level.
2.9
Notes to Examiners
Aerobic capacity assessment by Chester Step Test or similar means involves in itself a degree of physical exertion. For individuals deemed medically fit for ERT duty as in Paragraph 2.2 above, the physical exertion involved in a step test is extremely unlikely to result in the occurrence of any adverse event. It is recommended, however, that a musculoskeletal/cardiovascular screening should always be performed before proceeding to an aerobic capacity assessment. A suitable screening tool is reproduced in Addendum 5. Physical capability testing may be carried out at the examining doctor’s premises. Alternatively, in certain circumstances, operating companies may wish to perform such testing at an offshore location. In all instances, the responsible doctor (examining physician or company medical adviser) must conduct a written assessment of the clinical risk and suitability of undertaking such testing for each installation/location under their control. At onshore locations, doctors should consider issues including geographical location of premises, lone working, access to emergency aid and availability of resuscitation equipment. At offshore locations, variables such as the location of the installation, weather, offshore Medic skills and training and equipment should be considered. Responsible physicians should consider the approach contained in the Resuscitation Council (UK) document ‘Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Guidance for Clinical Practice and Training in Primary Care July 2001’ found at: www.resus.org.uk.
3
Catering Crews The following initial health assessment should be undertaken on all catering workers. The assessment can be undertaken by a doctor, nurse or Medic with appropriate experience and should be performed pre-employment and, following a suitable risk assessment, as required thereafter. A catering worker is someone involved in the preparation of food or who spends a substantial period of time within the galley. This includes those involved in the cleaning of utensils, maintenance of equipment or undertaking supervisory duties.
Issue 6 March 2008
Special Employment Groups 3-7
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
The assessment will normally consist of the following: •
•
•
•
A questionnaire specifically related to symptoms of enteric illness and communicable disease An assessment of current hygiene practices. The assessment also provides an opportunity to re-emphasise the principles of basic food hygiene Thorough clinical examination of potential communicable disease sites, eg skin, ears, upper respiratory tract and gastrointestinal tract Laboratory examination of stool specimens should only be undertaken where this is considered clinically appropriate
Further assessment of individual catering workers will be required under the following circumstances: •
Frank or suspected infectious gastrointestinal disease
•
Close contact with an individual known to be suffering from gastroenteritis
•
Upon return from a visit to an area with a known high endemic incidence of infectious gastrointestinal disease
Further investigation requirements should be discussed with a Consultant in Public Health Medicine (CPHM).
4
Crane Operators In addition to the standard Oil & Gas UK requirements, the following standards are required for crane operators: •
•
•
•
•
•
Have a minimum corrected visual acuity of 6/9 with both eyes open. In addition, the corrected visual acuity must be no worse than 6/18 in each eye separately Monocular vision is unacceptable for crane driving because of the lack of stereoscopic vision and the impact on field of vision Candidates should be screened for loss of visual field by confrontation to exclude major defects Diplopia is unacceptable Colour vision need only be tested if crane operations are colour dependent (eg red/green signal lamps controlling movements) Depth perception is necessary for safe crane movements. In most cases this will be effectively established by demonstration of competence during onshore training and consequently medical examination to establish stereoscopic depth perception will not normally be necessary. Medical examiners who choose to use stereoscopic screening procedures prior to attending training should be aware of the potential for false positive results
Special Employment Groups 3-8
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
5
Air Crew and Commercial Divers Workers subject to the statutory medical examination requirements for air crew and commercial divers and in possession of a valid certificate will satisfy these guidelines and do not require a further specific examination for offshore medical fitness. They should, however, be issued with the appropriate Oil & Gas UK certificate.
Issue 6 March 2008
Special Employment Groups 3-9/10
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 1
Medical Screening Questionnaire and Examination Record
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
                                                                                                                                                                     
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Screening Questionnaire and Examination Record Add 1-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
                             

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   

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 
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   
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    
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     
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 
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 
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                 
            
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 
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  
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    
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  
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   
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    
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   
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     
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  
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    
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
 
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 
         
Medical Screening Questionnaire and Examination Record Add 1-2
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
                
     




   
 

 




  
   
 

 



 

 




 
  
   
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Screening Questionnaire and Examination Record Add 1-3
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
       


                                  


                           
    
         
Medical Screening Questionnaire and Examination Record Add 1-4
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 2
Unrestricted Offshore Work Certificate
Note: The following certificate of fitness must be reproduced on company or practice headed notepaper and must be issued to all successful candidates.
                       
                    
                 
Issue 6 March 2008
Unrestricted Offshore Work Certificate Add 2-1/2
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 3
Restricted Offshore Work Certificate
Note: The following certificate of fitness must be reproduced on company or practice headed notepaper.
                                                                   
                 
Issue 6 March 2008
Restricted Offshore Work Certificate Add 3-1/2
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 4
Information for Unsuccessful Applicant
Note: The following certificate must be reproduced on company or practice headed notepaper and must be issued to all unsuccessful candidates.
                                  
                                                    
Issue 6 March 2008
Information for Unsuccessful Applicant Add 4-1/2
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 5
Cardiovascular/Musculoskeletal Screening Tool
    
 
  




                 
 







   



    




          
  




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  

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 
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 


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  


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 


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


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

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 


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    


        
  


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 

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 


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  


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     
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     


               
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 
 
       
                             
Issue 6 March 2008
Cardiovascular/Musculoskeletal Screening Tool Add 5-1/2
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 6
Certificate of Fitness to Participate in ERT Duties
Note: The following certificate of fitness must be reproduced on company or practice headed notepaper and must be issued to all successful candidates.
                                    
 
  




                                                               
         

  
  
                                                
            
    
 
      
    
 
      
Issue 6 March 2008
Certificate of Fitness to Participate in ERT Duties Add 6-1/2
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 7
Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Males
                                                         
                               Risk Factor
Score
                             
    
   
                
 
                
  Total Cholesterol
Age 20-39
Age 40-49
Age 50-59
Age 60-69
Age 70-79






  





  





  











Age 20-39
Age 40-49
Age 50-59
Age 60-69
Age 70-79












 
Issue 6 March 2008
Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Males Add 7-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
                  HDL
Points


  

  



      Systolic BP
If Untreated
If Treated



  


  


  





Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Add 7-2 Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Males
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 8
Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Females
                                                        
                               Risk Factor
Score
                             
    
   
                
 
                 
  Total Cholesterol
Age 20-39
Age 40-49
Age 50-59
Age 60-69
Age 70-79






  





  





  











Age 20-39
Age 40-49
Age 50-59
Age 60-69
Age 70-79












 
Issue 6 March 2008
Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Females Add 8-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
                  HDL
Points


  

  



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Risk Factor Assessment for the Determination of Follow-up Add 8-2 Frequency for Ischaemic Heart Disease – Females
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 9
Random Drug Testing Protocol
The following minimum standards should be used, but employers may use their own policy where this meets or exceeds these standards. Following a diagnosis of drug abuse (refer to Section 2 Paragraph 2.5) individuals must complete a program of unannounced/random drug screening which meets the following criteria before being considered for a return to offshore work: (1)
The individual must submit to a minimum of three urinary drug tests over a minimum period of 3 months. Although specimen collection may be carried out by a suitably trained nurse or technician, the programme must remain under the personal supervision of an Oil & Gas UK registered examining physician.
(2)
Testing must be random and/or unannounced. The individual must provide the examining physician with a telephone number where he/she can be contacted at all times during the testing period.
(3)
The individual will have to attend for the drug test within 4 hours of being contacted.
(4)
If the individual will not be available to attend for a drug test within 4 hours due to family holiday, work commitments or other reasons, he/she must inform the examining physician in advance and provide satisfactory evidence to confirm the reason for non-availability.
(5)
The drug test will, as a minimum, test for the following drug panel: THC
•
Amphetamine
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Metamphetamine
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Cocaine
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Benzodiazepines
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Opiates
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Methadone
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GC/MS confirmation should be performed for all positive results. Additional substances may be tested for at the discretion of the examining doctor or on the requirement of the operating company’s medical adviser. (6)
Individuals may be subject to additional requirements stated in their employing company’s substance abuse policy and should ensure that they fully understand the implications of such a policy before commencing any drug testing programme.
Issue 6 March 2008
Random Drug Testing Protocol Add 9-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
(7)
It is the individual’s own responsibility to arrange the drug testing programme with the examining doctor and the individual will be responsible for paying all fees associated with the programme. The examining doctor may require full or partial payment in advance. Not all examining physicians will have the facilities to provide a random testing programme. In order to assist individuals seeking a doctor able to perform these services, the Oil & Gas UK medical adviser will maintain a list of doctors who have indicated their ability to do so.
(8)
Hair testing, performed to an evidential standard, may provide an acceptable alternative method of assessment. In such circumstances, the individual must provide a minimum of two negative tests over a period of 3 months.
Random Drug Testing Protocol Add 9-2
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Addendum 10
Health Surveillance
Routine health surveillance does not form part of the standard Oil & Gas UK medical examination and employers should be aware that when investigations such as audiometry and spirometry are performed as part of the medical, the primary purpose is in determining fitness for offshore work. However, employers may wish to take the opportunity of fulfilling some of their health surveillance obligations at the same time as the Oil & Gas UK medical. In doing so it should be noted that the periodicity required for health surveillance does not necessarily concur with that of the Oil & Gas UK medical and employees may need to attend for surveillance at interim intervals. Employers wishing to arrange concurrent health surveillance should ensure that the examining physician has the necessary occupational health qualifications and experience to carry out such surveillance. Certain health surveillance procedures require the doctor to have undergone additional training, while statutory examinations such as radiation, lead and asbestos require the doctor to be registered with the HSE. The following is provided to assist examining doctors and employers wishing to develop their own health surveillance programme. It is not intended to replace specific legislation which should be referred to for definitive guidance in all cases. Overview
Health surveillance should be implemented as an integral part of a health risk management process comprising:
Issue 6 March 2008
Health Surveillance Add 10-1
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
•
Identify Risk The first stage of the process is to identify if there is a hazard to health and who may be affected it by it. This includes a consideration of chemical, biological and physical agents and work activities.
Eliminate
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Where a risk has been identified, the next stage is to try to eliminate it. This can be achieved in a number of ways such as engineering design or by changing the way an activity is performed. •
Risk Assessment If a risk still remains, a risk assessment must be carried out to determine the degree of risk. Whilst identifying the hazards, it may be necessary to consider assessments required under specific legislation.
Control
•
Once the degree of risk has been established, the next stage is to identify the controls required to reduce or control the risk. This must as a minimum include a consideration of the task itself, the people involved, what tools and equipment are used and the working environment. Hygiene exposure monitoring may be valuable in confirming that controls remain adequate. •
Health Surveillance Health surveillance must be implemented for all personnel who may be exposed to potentially hazardous situations to determine whether they are being affected by such hazards.
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Management Following Exposure Where health surveillance shows that an employee’s health is being affected by their work, measures must be taken to prevent further harm to the individual and to provide any necessary treatment. Where appropriate, it may be necessary to redeploy personnel or provide ongoing long-term support.
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Monitoring and Evaluation The results of health surveillance must be regularly assessed to determine whether the impact of risk is being minimised and to identify any potential means for reducing the risk in the first instance. Additionally, consideration shall be given to whether there is a requirement for increasing the type and frequency of health surveillance measures.
Health Surveillance Add 10-2
Issue 6 March 2008
Medical Aspects of Fitness for Work Offshore: Guidance for Examining Physicians
Health Surveillance
Health surveillance is an important part of health risk management and seeks to confirm that where employees are potentially exposed to workplace hazards, the control measures are effective and the worker is showing no biological changes that could indicate damaging exposure. Health surveillance is appropriate where potential exposure to a workplace hazard has a known health effect and there is a validated, reproducible and measurable biological impact. Surveillance should be conducted when an exposure is identified or can be reasonably expected, or is required under legislation. These include a wide spectrum of chemical, physical and biological hazards which can be divided into general industry-related hazards such as noise, radiation, benzene and also location-specific exposures such as process-related chemicals. Health surveillance need not be conducted when there is no exposure or reason to expect an exposure unless specifically required by legislation. Health surveillance may take one or more of the following forms: •
•
Biological monitoring is the measurement and assessment of a substance or its metabolite in tissues, secreta, excreta or exhaled air of the exposed workers Biological effect monitoring is the measurement or assessment of early biological effects in exposed workers
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Inspection by a suitably qualified person.
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Review of records and occupational history during and after exposure
Health surveillance is appropriate for workers liable to be exposed to: •
•
•
Substances listed in Schedule 6 of the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations Any other substance or exposure for which an identifiable disease or adverse health effect may be related to the exposure, there is a reasonable likelihood that the disease or effect may occur under the particular condition of work, and there are valid techniques for detecting indications of the disease or the effect When required by specific legislation
Table 10.1 gives a summary of the main legislative requirements for health surveillance.
Issue 6 March 2008
Health Surveillance Add 10-3